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This dissertation explores how languages express durations of time and the sig-
nificant cross-linguistic variation displayed in words describing temporal duration
with otherwise quite similar meanings. Specially, I examine ‘until’-like phrases that
bound events in time. These phrases are puzzling because across languages they
typically only modify atelic predicates and not telic predicates. Yet they are accept-
able with telic predicates if the predicate is negated, and in that case they further-
more generate a factive inference that the event described by the predicate must
xi
come about at a future time. Additionally, some languages, like Greek, use two
distinct lexical words, one for atelic predicates and one for telic predicates. Three
major prior proposals have been posited: (i) a lexical ambiguity account wherein
there is a positive ‘until’ and a negative ‘until’, (ii) a monosemy account wherein
‘until’ is a type of universal quantifier over times that interacts scopally with nega-
tion, and (iii) a monosemy account wherein ‘until’ is a type of measure phrase
over an existentially-quantified event. However, each approach fails to generalize
appropriately. I revisit these three theories by examining the behavior of English
until-phrases vis-a`-vis durative for-adverbials, as well as ‘until’ counterparts in lan-
guages that acquire a superset or a subset of the interpretations of English until,
such as Spanish hasta and Greek mehri. I propose a monosemy account that draws
on insights from all three prior analyses. The key insight is that there is parameteri-
zation in the quantification that ‘until’ words in different languages exhibit. English
until is universal in nature subject to a scope economy constraint. Spanish hasta
is existential in nature subject to a plurality constraint in positive environments.
Both universal and existential ‘until’ allow for negated telic predicates but the lat-
ter admits a wider set of readings and also permits lexical specialization of ‘until’
under negation, as found in Greek. Ultimately, irrespective of their quantification,
English until and Spanish hasta activate temporal scalar alternatives that I argue
derive factive inferences as an epiphenomenon of independent scopal interactions
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1.1 The fundamental puzzle
In this dissertation I explore the ways we talk about time, more particularly how
events are described as bounded in time and the expressions of such temporal
boundaries. Time being one instantiation of a scale (building on Krifka 1998, Beavers
2008a, 2012), the overreaching goal of this thesis is to develop a unified theory for
words that describe delimitation, taking the notion of scalarity and scalar reasoning
as it manifests itself in various pragmatic and semantic domains as a starting point.
Such a theory accounting for atelic measure phrases in the temporal domain could
ultimately be extended to other scalar domains, such as scales of spatial distance,
and likelihood.
The chief object of study are ‘until’-like phrases that mark duration of events
as in John studied until 2 pm, on the basis of data primarily from English and Span-
ish. My proposal takes into account the syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic con-
1
straints on such particles regarding polarity and the inferential system to address
the question whether languages have one or two untils. This is known in the litera-
ture as the puzzle of punctual until, which has received a fair amount of attention,
from e.g. Karttunen’s (1974) and Mittwoch’s (1977) pioneering work to Giannaki-
dou’s (2002) and Condoravdi’s (2008) recent proposals. Consider, for example, the
sentences in (1).
(1) a. John studied until 2 pm.
b. # John arrived until 2 pm.
An atelic predicate as in (1a) accepts an until-phrase to indicate when the eventu-
ality stopped holding, whereas a telic predicate as in (1b) does not. The felicitous
use of until in positive environments marking the duration of an atelic event has ac-
cordingly received the name ‘durative until.’ By contrast, when negation is present,
both atelic and telic predicates can be modified by until-phrases, as shown in (2).
(2) a. John did not study until 2 pm.
b. John did not arrive until 2 pm.
What is furthermore surprising about the use of until with negative telic predicates
in (2b) is that in spite of the presence of negation it conveys the occurrence of
the relevant event, i.e. John’s arrival at 2 pm. This use has been referred to in the
literature as ‘punctual until.’ It is important to observe that such an implication is
not cancellable, as illustrated in (3).
(3) John did not arrive until 2 pm. #In fact, he never arrived
The fact that until with a negated telic predicate licenses a non-defeasible ‘factive’
2
inference, i.e. the actualization of the event at or after the time denoted by until,
poses a challenge for how we can explain both the durative and punctual uses of
until in a unified fashion. Note that the factive property puts until in a different
class from other temporal durative adverbials, such as for-adverbials. For example,
negative for-phrases yield cancellable implicatures of the occurrence of the event:
John didn’t arrive for 2 hours suggests that he arrived after those 2 hours, but that
implication appears to be cancellable (John didn’t arrive for two hours, and in fact
he never arrived).
The empirical data on until above has been explained in two main different
ways. On the one hand, on a scopal account, e.g. in the spirit of Mittwoch (1977),
there is only one lexical item that corresponds to English until: punctual until is du-
rative until above negation. However, accounts such as these cannot readily explain
why the implicature associated with the punctual use of until is non-cancellable.
This has led to the other set of accounts (e.g. Karttunen 1974, Giannakidou 2002,
Condoravdi 2008) that account for this puzzle in a radically different way by di-
verging from general approaches to durative adverbials such as Dowty (1979) and
Krifka (1998): punctual until is a wholly distinct lexical item from durative until. It
is instead a negative polarity item whose meaning already expresses the occurrence
of the relevant event and can only be licensed under the use of negation. This latter
view is based on evidence from languages like Greek, which distinguish such uses
lexically, as observed in (4).1

































‘Gianis didn’t arrive until two.’ (but arrived at some point after two)
Greek uses two different words: mehri in (4a) corresponds to durative until, while
para mono in (4b) corresponds to their punctual until. A simple scopal account can-
not readily capture the contrast in (4). Nevertheless, the lexical ambiguity approach
fails to explain why the majority of languages studied, such as English and Span-
ish, do not make any lexical distinction between the two uses. Therefore, previous
accounts of these phenomena fail to generalize appropriately.
A second puzzle is how words meaning until can differ cross-linguistically
in their semantics. For instance, Spanish hasta has more temporal readings than
English does. The use of Spanish hasta in (5) sounds perfectly fine, whereas the













# ‘Thirty/many/some people arrived until 2.’
The English examples in (5) are odd because they induce a distributive interpre-
tation that the same group of people kept arriving over and over. Surprisingly, the
corresponding examples in Spanish are acceptable and receive a ‘cumulative read-
ing’, namely, a total of 30/many/some people arrived non-simultaneously over the
course of an interval that ended at 2 pm. To my knowledge, this contrast in the
meanings of closely related ‘until’s’ has been neglected in the literature to date.
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A third and final puzzle is that, in certain languages, words meaning until
can have additional meanings outside the temporal domain. For example, Spanish
hasta can mark the endpoint of a path in space by introducing the goal of a motion
construction (e.g. Beavers 2008a, Bassa-Vanrell 2013), as observed in (6a), and can
also act as a scalar additive particle with a meaning similar to English even in more
































‘Juan even came [to the party]F with us.’
This multi-functionality across domains is not specific of Spanish hasta. Rather, it
is common in synchrony and/or diachrony cross-linguistically. For example, Por-
tuguese ate´, Japanese -made, and Korean -kkaci embody all the same temporal,
spatial, and ‘even’ functions as Spanish hasta. Even though synchronically English
until only occurs in the temporal dimension, diachronically, until was also used to
delimit space in the spatial domain (Harper 2001). This makes us also wonder why
‘until’-like markers often embody, prima facie, such unrelated functions in other
domains. Beavers (2008a) offers an initial explanation regarding why ‘until’-like
words like Japanese -made may embody functions in both the temporal and spatial
domains. Beavers (2008a) proposes that -made must denote the final point on some
ordered object that is theta-related to the event e, but leaves open what kind of ob-
2[ ]F indicates the focal-stress bearing element: such an ‘even’ function of hasta is sensitive to
the placement of focal stress.
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ject it is (a temporal object or a spatial object), so that the type of its complement
will fix that. In this way ‘until’ admits both temporal and spatial uses. However,
this approach cannot appropriately account for the cases in which ‘until’ can mean
even since the kinds of alternatives being described there do not obviously form an
entity theta-related to the event in any way. The type of analysis I provide in this
dissertation will ultimately be able to generalize further over different functions.
Overall, previous works have only centered around a subset of the functions
that temporal ‘until’ markers may acquire, since certain patterns had not yet been
noticed or were neglected (e.g. the ability of ‘until’ words to give rise to scopeless
cumulative readings in certain languages). Furthermore, for the vast majority of is-
sues concerning punctual until, until-phrases have been studied independently from
other durative adverbials, so that strong parallelisms with measure adverbs in gen-
eral, like for-adverbials, have been mostly ignored. However, the answers to these
puzzles of ‘until’ in the temporal domain (and other domains) can only come from
closely examining the functions of until-phrases vis-a`-vis other temporal measure
phrases such as for-adverbials as well as until-phrases vis-a`-vis other ‘until’ words
in other languages that show a superset or a subset of the interpretations of English
until, such as Spanish hasta or Greek mehri. Only then we will be able to deci-
pher the above puzzles in a unified fashion so as to fully understand (i) how events
are bounded, (ii) the quite significant cross-linguistic variation in how ‘until’-like
words with otherwise quite similar meanings behave, and (iii) how this relates to
and unifies different notions of scalarity and their interactions with polarity and
inferential systems.
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1.2 The basic proposal
I first show that a monosemy account of English (and other languages that do not
make a lexical distinction) in the spirit of Mittwoch’s (1977) orginal work is possi-
ble by articulating (in a new form) Dowty’s (1979) insight that for-adverbials, and
per extension until-phrases, are universal quantifiers over time intervals for which
the relevant predicate must hold. I hence address for- and until-phrases on a par. I
show that if we furthermore assume that a verb’s event variable is bound at the verb
level (in a Champollion 2015-style of event semantics) and that right-adjoined du-
rative adverbials are low VP adverbs contingent on a semantic economy constraint
limiting the possibility of raising (reminiscent of Fox 1995), a variety of interpretive
facts about for and until automatically follow. The crucial difference in behavior be-
tween until and for regarding factive inferences can be captured by considering their
temporal scalar nature within a system of obligatory scalar implicatures, as in many
recent proposals (e.g. Chierchia 2013). The temporal scalar alternatives associated
with until-phrases are always ‘active’ (as if until were inherently focus-marked),
and must thus be exhaustified, which explains the non-cancellability of their in-
ferences. In contrast, the scalar alternatives associated with for-adverbials are only
optionally factored into meaning, which explains the corresponding cancellable na-
ture of their inferences. All in all, I propose that the punctuality and factivity of
until turns out to be a byproduct of independent scope issues within a system that
interacts with covert exhaustification-based operators.
Second, I suggest that there is parameterization in the quantification that
‘until’ words in different languages exhibit. While in English it represents universal
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quantification over times, in some languages like Spanish it can instead represent
existential quantification over times, and this explains the fact that hasta-phrases
can receive cumulative readings. The analysis I propose for Spanish hasta-phrases
is a modified version of Krifka’s (1998) account of measure phrases where tempo-
ral adverbs are existential time-frame adverbials that ‘measure out’ atelic events. I
advance an account where atelicity is defined in connection with plural morphol-
ogy, following e.g. Spector’s (2007) work. Crucially, the distinct meanings that I
put forth between existential and universal quantification of ‘until’ words is found
across languages and not within one language. The multiple temporal meanings
of hasta-phrases in Spanish can all be derived from one lexical word: existential
until (as opposed to universal until in English). Finally, because of the existential
quantification languages like Spanish lend themselves naturally to the possibility
of separate lexicalization of the negative-polarity-item version (on the basis of e.g.
Krifka 1995, Chierchia 2004, 2006), thus explaining languages like Greek.
1.3 Outline of the thesis
The structure of the dissertation is as follows. I begin in Chapter 2 by providing
a descriptive and empirical overview of the puzzle of punctual until and previous
approaches to this puzzle so as to gauge their strengths and weaknesses. Then I
introduce the close parallelism between until-phrases and for-adverbials in English,
where their strong resemblance cannot be ignored and must play a crucial role in
the theory we are building for until-like phrases. In particular, I outline how both
until-phrases and for-adverbials present highly restricted scopal behavior. Next, I
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review two major accounts on for-adverbials, which could potentially be extended
to until-phrases: Dowty’s (1979) approach and Krifka’s (1998) approach. Dowty’s
universal approach seems more appropriate for deriving a general scopal account of
durative adverbials for the case of English.
In Chapter 3, I flesh out the details of a scopal account of this sort for En-
glish for/until-phrases within a framework of quantification and event semantics
a` la Champollion (2015). I clarify and make more precise the constrained sco-
pal behavior of right-adjoined durative adverbials and establish their scopal-base
position in contrast with other universal adverbials like every-phrases. I propose
that for/until-phrases are low VP adverbs subject to a condition I call Maximize
Strength, an economy constraint where extraposition of the durative adverbial to a
higher position is only possible if it does not lead to a weaker interpretation (defined
in terms of logical entailment relations). Such a scopal account will predict the re-
striction of punctual uses of until to downward-entailing environments, including
in particular negation.
In Chapter 4, I turn to the question of the factivity of punctual until. I focus
on the scalarity of time and offer an exhaustification-based account where until-
phrases obligatorily activate scalar alternatives that must be factored into meaning
and hence exhaustified. Two covert exhaustification operators may intervene, one
based on focus-sensitive only and another based on focus-sensitive even. This will
provide a rather elegant and unified account of the various inferences that the differ-
ent uses of until can trigger. It will furthermore explain the major contrast between
for-adverbials and until-phrases contingent on a simple parametric measure: having
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‘inactive’ vs. ‘active’ alternatives, respectively.
In Chapter 5, I return to Krifka’s (1998) approach to durative adverbials to
account for the nature of hasta-phrases in Spanish. I propose that these are exis-
tential (and not universal) time-frame adverbials subject to a pluractional condi-
tion. I build this pluractional condition in the form of a scalar implicature (rather
than in the form of a presupposition, contra Krifka), reminiscent of recent work
on plural morphology on DPs by e.g. Spector (2007). Plurality of an existential
time-frame adverbial furthermore opens up the possibility that adverbs can acquire
cumulative interpretations. I further offer an exhaustification-based account of the
temporal scalar alternatives of hasta-phrases, where we obtain the same type of
non-defeasible scalar inferences as for English until. I finally argue that the existen-
tial analysis can derive a rather natural negative-polarity-item counterpart, overtly
realized in languages like Greek.
I conclude the discussion in Chapter 6, pointing to future directions for the
application of the present framework developed in this dissertation. For example, I
briefly sketch how to extend the proposed theory to the spatial and scalar additive
cases of hasta in Spanish.
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Chapter 2
Lay of the land: The comparative
structure of English for- and
until-phrases
2.1 Introduction
Even though my main object of study is temporal until-type phrases, their strong
resemblance to for-adverbials cannot be ignored. The main objective of this chapter
is to review the close similarity between English until and for-adverbials so as to
bring into the picture previous accounts of durative adverbials, which will shed
some light on the puzzle of punctual until.
As introduced in Chapter 1, the cross-linguistic behavior of until-phrases in
the temporal domain is still puzzling and controversial since most languages do not
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overtly distinguish its durative from its punctual use lexically. One early analysis
(e.g. Mittwoch 1977) relied on scope ambiguity to explain the difference, claiming
that the difference between durative and punctual uses was that punctual until was
simply durative until outscoping negation. However, such approaches contrast with
a more recent set of accounts (e.g. Giannakidou 2002, Condoravdi 2008) that claim
that the distinct behaviors attributed to temporal until are due to lexical ambiguity
that posits the existence of a different lexical item, namely, Negative Polarity Item
(NPI)-until.
Nevertheless, one of the aspects the ambiguity analysis leaves unexplained
is the strong parallelism between for and until, since nothing like a punctual for
has been proposed in the literature. The empirical scopal facts that until-phrases
and for-adverbials share suggest that, perhaps, their scope limitations could explain
their restriction to a reduced set of environments when modifying telic predicates
without having to stipulate a positive vs. a negative lexical item. The scopal ambigu-
ity theory may thus better account for the scopal constraints that seem to affect not
only until-phrases but also other adverbials that embody similar durative properties.
The outline of this chapter is as follows: in §2, I review the striking be-
havior of until which underlies the puzzle of punctual until. In §3, I review the
general characteristics of the two previous major approaches to punctual until—the
scopal ambiguity approach and the lexical ambiguity approach—by emphasizing
where they differ, and then I review some data from Greek, Dutch, and German
that supposedly support a lexical ambiguity analysis. In §4, I suggest that no avail-
able theory as it stands can account for the phenomenon of punctual until cross-
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linguistically. Instead, I argue for an approach that builds on the scopal ambiguity
approach for the most part and yet incorporates aspects from both accounts, with
the aim of capturing the broader typological picture. In §5, I present a series of
shared features between temporal until-phrases and durative for-adverbials in terms
of their (i) durative/atelic aspect, (ii) behavior under negation, and (iii) scopal con-
straints that support my hypothesis. Finally, in §6, I introduce two classical com-
peting approaches to measure phrases: the measure function analysis a` la Krifka
(e.g. 1998) and the universal quantification approach a` la Dowty (1979), ultimately
adopting the latter as a starting point for understanding English until as parallel to
for-adverbials.
2.2 The puzzle of punctual until
2.2.1 The difference between punctual and durative until
Despite being realized as the single form until, it is often assumed that there are two
temporal untils in English, a durative until as in (1a), and a punctual until as in (1b).
(1) a. John slept/didn’t sleep until 5 pm.
b. John didn’t arrive until 5 pm.
c. # John arrived until 5 pm.
[Adapted from U¨ro¨gdi 2013: 307, ex (5)]
Example (1a) contains a durative predicate (one that can extend throughout a period
of time), whereas (1b) involves a punctual predicate (one that cannot be extended
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and iterated over the course of an interval), hence the names of ‘durative’ vs. ‘punc-
tual’ until. Punctual until requires the use of negation to be felicitous, as contrasted
between (1b) and (1c). Note, however, that the terms ‘durative’ and ‘punctual’ as
used in the literature on ‘until’ are technically inaccurate since, even though ac-
complishments are durative, in general they cannot combine with durative until in
positive environments, as illustrated in (2a).1 However, when negated, they can also
be modified by punctual until, as in (2b).
(2) a. # John loaded ten bales of hay onto the wagon until 5 pm.
b. John didn’t load ten bales of hay onto the wagon until 5 pm.
Accomplishments, however, are still telic in the sense of having a definable stopping
point and cannot be iterated within a given time frame (e.g. several loadings—and
unloadings—of the same object onto the wagon). Thus, the crucial distinction is
that only atelic predicates (statives and activities) and telic predicates on iterated
readings (e.g. semelfactives like cough) can combine with durative until-XPs in
both positive and negative environments, whereas a telic predicate on non-iterated
readings (non-iterative achievements and accomplishments) seem to require the use
of negation in order to license an until-phrase, hence the oddness in (1c) and (2a). I
will continue to use the traditional terminology in the literature here despite this.
A second key difference is that punctual until elicits a non-cancellable infer-
ence that the event described by the non-negated predicate must occur after the time
indicated by the complement of until, as in (3a). In the remainder of the disserta-
1I assume acquaintance with Vendler’s (1957) four aspectual classes of statives, activities, ac-
complishments, and achievements. States and activities are atelic, but only states are considered
“static.” Achievements and accomplishments are telic, but only achievements are regarded as punc-
tual.
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tion, I refer to this implication as a factive inference—also sometimes described in
the literature as switch-reading or actualization implication (cf. Giannakidou 2002,
Condoravdi 2008, U¨ro¨gdi 2013). This type of factive inference does not necessarily
arise from the use of durative until with a negated atelic predicate, as in (3b).
(3) a. John didn’t arrive until 5 pm.
→ John arrived at 5 (or shortly after).
b. John didn’t sleep until 5 pm.
→ John slept after 5 pm OR
→ John stopped sleeping before 5 pm.
The factive inference appears to be non-defeasible in (3a) with a negated punctual
predicate. By contrast, in (3b), when until modifies an atelic predicate in a negative
environment, the factive inference is not obligatory. Instead, two readings are pos-
sible: that John stopped sleeping before 5 pm, or that he did not sleep at all until
5 pm. Additionally, there is a debate regarding the nature of the factive inference
that originates from the use of punctual until: is it a conversational implicature (e.g.
Mittwoch 1977), a presupposition (Karttunen 1974, Declerck 1995), an entailment
(Giannakidou 2002), some sort of scalar inference (Condoravdi 2008),2 or some-
thing else?
Last but not least, if we look into other languages, we sometimes find a
lexical distinction between the durative and punctual uses. This is discussed next.
2Condoravdi (2008) calls it a scalar assertion following Krifka’s (1995) theory of polarity items
and scalar assertions. Underlyingly it ends up being similar to a scalar inference as a result of scalar
alternatives that have been added into the lexical meaning of punctual until.
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2.2.2 Languages that lexically distinguish punctual and dura-
tive ‘until’
Some languages such as Greek overtly use two distinct lexical items for durative and
punctual ‘until’ (e.g. Giannakidou 2002, Condoravdi 2008). For example, Greek
mehri ‘durative until’ seems to only be acceptable with atelic event descriptions in
positive and negative contexts, as exemplified in (4a, b), and unacceptable with telic
event descriptions in positive contexts, as reflected in (4c), thus behaving so far as



































‘The bomb exploded until yesterday.’
[Adapted from Condoravdi (2008), ex. (14)]
Furthermore, when the telic predicate in (4c) is negated, mehri remains ungram-
matical, as shown in (5a). It is precisely in these conditions—i.e. a negated telic
predicate—when mehri’s negative counterpart para mono is used, as exemplified in
(5b) (e.g. Giannakidou 2002, Condoravdi 2008).3
3Condoravdi (2008) further notes that durative mehri with negation becomes an option when
the negated telic predicate is used in the imperfective aspect with the present or past perfect tense
(instead of being in the perfective past tense form, as in (5a)). I illustrate this puzzling data point in
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‘The bomb didn’t explode until yesterday.’
[Adapted from Condoravdi (2008), ex. (14)]
According to Giannakidou (2002) and Condoravdi (2008), para mono would be the
direct translation of punctual until. In addition, the use of para mono triggers a non-
cancellable factive inference. For instance, in (5b) para mono necessarily expresses
that the eventuality actually occurred, and hence negating the explosion of the bomb
results in a contradiction.
Furthermore, the factive inference seems to emerge with the use of para
mono independently of the type of predicate that it combines with. A Greek consul-
tant corroborated the following data in (6), which shows how when the actualization

















‘The bomb had not exploded until yesterday.’
[Adapted from Condoravdi (2008), ex. (14)]
This contrast in acceptability of durative mehri in negative environments between perfective, as in
(5a), and imperfective aspect, as in (i), is beyond the scope of this dissertation and is instead left for
future research.
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‘Gianis wasn’t angry until the end of the conference.’
In (6a), whether or not Gianis becomes angry after the end of the conference is left
open. By contrast, in (6b), the eventuality must take place, since following such a
sentence by something like and he never became angry would result in contradic-
tion.4
In the same way that Greek mehri is strictly durative in that it measures the
duration of an event and does not necessarily give rise to any inference about the
actualization of the event when combined with an atelic predicate in a negative en-
vironment, German bis and Dutch tot also seem to lack the punctual use and do
not give rise to obligatory factive inferences when modifying negated atelic predi-
cates. For instance, Decklerk (1995), Giannakidou (2002), and Condoravdi (2008)
note that these languages do not have a negative punctual until counterpart and use
a Positive Polarity Item (heceforth, PPI) instead to express the actualization of the
event: Dutch pas, as in (7b), and German erst, as in (8a) below, which are focus-
4According to my Greek consultant, even though para mono works with the stative ‘be angry’
in (6b), it would be more natural to use the achievement thimono ‘get angry’, which is a possible
alternative in Greek.
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sensitive items, roughly equivalent to English ‘only.’





























‘Mary only arrived at 9.’
[Adapted from Giannakidou (2002), ex. (47)]
In (7), the Dutch durative adverbial tot cannot modify a negated telic predicate. If
the actualization of the punctual event is intended, i.e. the fact that Marie must have
arrived at some point, then the PPI pas as in (7b) must be used instead.5
Likewise, German PPI focus particle erst can focus times and express that
the event occurred at a certain time, as shown in (8a). By contrast, German bis
‘until’ is strictly durative and hence at most gives rise to an ignorance (cancellable)
implicature about the actualization of the event when combined with a negated telic
predicate. This is corroborated by the fact that actualization implicatures that would
emerge in (8b)-(8d) are cancellable and also the acceptability of a sentence such as
(8e), which would require Mary getting married after dying.6 Possible contexts to
5Very interestingly in Dutch, similarly to Greek, when the present perfect instead of the perfective
is used in a negative environment, the strictly durative adverbial tot may be slightly more acceptable















‘Mary hasn’t arrived until 9.’
Even so, the sentence in (i) would not entail the actualization of the event. Rather, all that is known
is that Marie has not arrived by 9.
6The sentence in (8e) might sound a bit stilted out of the blue to some native speakers for other
reasons, namely what I believe to be a lack of pragmatic motivation for the bis-phrase since it does
not appear to add any new information.
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‘The bomb exploded only yesterday.’ [Condoravdi (2008), ex. (8a)]















‘Up to the present day the bomb hasn’t exploded.’


































































‘Mary didn’t get married until she died.’
All in all, Greek, German, and Dutch are often reported in the literature as
languages that overtly use a different lexical item from durative until to convey the
actualization of a telic predicate at a certain point, either as an NPI combined with a
negated telic predicate as in Greek or a PPI combined with a positive telic predicate
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as in Dutch and German. At first sight, it seems that what the corresponding durative
untils in all these languages have in common is their inability to generate non-
cancellable factive inferences when construed with a telic predicate in a negative
environment.7
A crucial question that arises here is the following: do these data justify that
a lexical distinction between a durative and a punctual until is universal, i.e. applies
to all languages? I next review the two main accounts for these empirical puzzles
regarding durativity, factivity, and lexical ambiguity of until.
2.3 Scopal vs. lexical ambiguity in English
This section reviews two major accounts of the puzzle of punctual until, which,
as they stand, cannot separately capture the cross-linguistic picture. The main dis-
agreement is whether the answer to the puzzle stems from lexical or scopal ambi-
guity. I will ultimately propose that a combination of both is needed.
2.3.1 A lexical ambiguity approach
2.3.1.1 The basic intuition of the analysis
I begin with the lexical ambiguity approach (e.g. Horn 1970, 1972, Karttunen 1974,
Declerck 1995, Giannakidou 2002, and Condoravdi 2008), because it has recently
7Another issue that arises is the question of aspect, left for future research. Independent of
whether a factive inference is obligatorily generated or not, the durative until counterpart in these
languages might not even be able to combine with a negated telic predicate to begin with. This is
generally the case when the perfective aspect, instead of the imperfective, is used.
21
received more attention and support. This approach claims that durative until be-
haves differently from punctual until simply because they are not the same until,
though in languages like English or Spanish the two separate lexical items are real-
ized by the same form.
Condoravdi (2008), a fairly recent version of this approach, claims that du-
rative until combines with an atelic event description (states and activities) in pos-
itive and negative contexts and simply asserts that an eventuality extends (or does
not extend) throughout a certain time interval. Furthermore, in a negative environ-
ment, durative until with atelic predicates leads to two ambiguous readings: a ‘not-
throughout’ (neg > until-XP) and a ‘throughout-not’ (until-XP > neg) reading,
depending on whether negation scopes above or below the until-XP, respectively.
Under Condoravdi’s approach, in line with Giannakidou’s (2002) analysis, any in-
ference that durative until modifying atelic predicates may give rise to is a conversa-
tional implicature, which could easily be cancellable. In this way, a ‘throughout-not’
interpretation of a sentence as in (9) is predicted to be consistent with a context in
which John remains not angry after 2 pm and never becomes angry at all.
(9) John was not angry until 2 pm.
i ‘Not-throughout’ reading (neg>until-XP): John was angry, but it is
not the case that John was angry until 2 pm. This conversationally
implicates that John stopped being angry before 2 pm.
ii ‘Throughout-not’ reading (until-XP>neg): Throughout the interval
in question that ended at 2 pm, John was not angry. This conversation-
ally implicates that John got angry after 2 pm.
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The cancelability of an implicature about the actualization of the event from a
‘throughout-not’ interpretation, though, is debatable.8,9
Instead, Giannkidou (2002) and Condoravdi (2008) predict that a non-cancel-
lable inference about the actualization of the event only follows from punctual un-
til, which modifies telic predicates (achievements and accomplishments) as long
as negation is present.10 The essence of the argument is that punctual until is a
completely distinct lexical item from durative until, whose use is licensed only un-
der negation, since it is a Strong NPI (henceforth, SNPI). Very broadly speaking,
SNPIs are items licensed only under a subset of downward-entailing operators, like
negation (e.g. see Gajewski 2008, 2011, Chierchia 2013). As a consequence, the
meaning given to punctual until is drastically different from durative until in that, in
one way or another, it is lexically specified to be able to take a telic event description
when scoping under negation so that it can then obligatory locate such a described
punctual eventuality (e.g. John’s becoming angry) in a time interval that starts after
the time denoted by the temporal complement of punctual until (e.g. from 2 pm
onwards). This is schematized in (10).
8The judgments from my English consultants differ in this regard, since they agree in that John
is still expected to become angry after 2 pm for the ‘throughout-not’ interpretation in (9).
9Previous variants of such an approach, e.g. Karttunen (1974) and Declerk (1995), support the
view that the inference is always non-cancellable as long as negation is present, regardless of the
telicity of the predicate.
10Condoravdi (2008) further notes that the factive reading comes with the implication that the
actualization of the event could well have occurred earlier: we expected the event to have taken
place earlier. These types of inferences will be dealt with in Chapter 4.
23
(10) a. * John became angry until 2 pm.
(Ungrammatical because it is not a SNPI licensing context.)
b. John didn’t become angry until 2 pm.
(Only 1 reading: neg>until-XP, since it is a SNPI &
Non-cancellable inference that John became angry after 2 pm.)
As observed in (10), the use of punctual until would not depend on a scope-based
relation with negation, since it is only triggered under the negation operator, hence
making any scope ambiguity impossible, unlike durative until. Finally, punctual un-
til would somehow incorporate the actualization of the event already in its meaning—
e.g. via presuppositional content (Karttunen 1974 and Declerck 1995), an entail-
ment (Giannakidou 2002), or as a sort of scalar inference added to the assertion
(Condoravdi 2008)—with the common purpose of ensuring that the factive infer-
ence cannot be cancelled.
2.3.1.2 Shortcomings of the lexical ambiguity approach
Under the lexical ambiguity approach, the meaning given to punctual until drasti-
cally differs from the denotation of the durative version, as they are considered two
distinct lexical items with contrastive functions. The overall claim is that punctual
until in English can only scope below negation because of its SNPI nature, and
when it does it gives rise to a non-cancellable inference about the actualization of
the telic event description. The strongest piece of evidence that supports such an
account is the fact that some languages, such as Greek, lexically distinguish the
punctual from the durative uses of until overtly.
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Nevertheless, such an account fails to explain why the majority of languages
studied in prior literature (e.g. English, all Romance languages, Japanese, Korean)
do not make such a lexical distinction. I illustrate this below for Portuguese in (11),
Catalan in (12), Japanese in (13), and Korean in (14).11 For each language, I give
the paradigm consisting of their ‘until’ counterpart modifying a durative predicate
such as ‘study’ in both positive and negative environments, as well as modifying a
punctual predicate such as ‘arrive’ in both positive and negative environments. Note
that they use the same lexical word for all uses. Further observe that the punctual
predicate can only be modified by the ‘until’-XP in negative environments and un-
der those conditions it also gives rise to the factive inference that John arrived at








































































‘John didn’t arrive until two in the afternoon.’
(This implicates that John arrived after two.)


































































































‘John didn’t arrive until two in the afternoon.’




































‘John didn’t arrive until two in the afternoon.’









































→ John arrived after two.
‘John didn’t arrive until two in the afternoon.’
(This implicates that John arrived after two.)
This lack of an overt lexical distinction across languages suggests that it cannot be
an accidental lexical coincidence that occurs in all of these languages. More specif-
ically, an analysis that relies on lexical ambiguity between the two untils is unable
to account for this recurring syncretism cross-linguistically since there is no appar-
ent correlation between the meanings given to durative until and punctual until, as
one meaning does not appear to be directly derivable from the other one. For exam-
ple, Condoravdi (2008) treats durative until similarly to a time-frame adverbial with
universal quantification over time intervals for which the predicate must hold. On
the other hand, punctual until has an existential—and not universal—force, which,
when combined with negation, states that there is no instantiation of an event within
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the time interval denoted by the temporal complement of until. Only the latter gives
rise to the factive inference, which is incorporated as part of the assertion.12
Taking all of these weaknesses into account, the lexical ambiguity approach
calls for further revision, to say the least. There was, in fact, an earlier story, which
did not have to stipulate an NPI-until: i.e. the scopal ambiguity approach, which
treats both durative until and punctual until as the same unique lexical item, though
such an approach faces its own difficulties on explaining other facts that the lexical
ambiguity approach can more easily account for, as discussed next.
2.3.2 A scopal ambiguity approach: One until
2.3.2.1 The basic intuition of the analysis
The scopal ambiguity approach (e.g. Klima 1964, Heina¨ma¨ki 1974, Mittwoch 1977)
was put forward for those languages that use the same word for both durative and
punctual functions, such as English. Punctual until is simply durative until above
negation. In essence, until looks for an atelic predicate (or a telic predicate on an
iterated reading), explaining why it cannot modify a non-iterative telic predicate in a
positive environment. However, whenever such a predicate is negated, then until can
scope above it, since negation is a predicate modifier that can turn a telic predicate
into one that satisfies the durative requirement of until. Whenever the predicate is
already atelic, until can modify it in both positive and negative environments.
The range of scopal possibilities for atelic (or iterative telic) predicates is
12See Condoravdi (2008) for a detailed description of the formalization specifications of durative
until vs. punctual until.
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illustrated in (15). Note how in negative environments, the until-XP can scope either
below or above negation, as shown in (15b) and (15c), respectively.
(15) a. until-XP (atelic predicate)
b. Not (until-XP (atelic predicate))
• ‘Not-throughout’ reading with an atelic (or iterative telic) predicate.
c. until-XP (Not (atelic predicate))
• ‘Throughout-not’ reading with an atelic (or iterative telic) predicate:
Only conversationally implicates the actualization of the event after x.
Instead, the range of scopal possibilities for non-iterative telic predicates is much
more reduced, as in (16), where the until-XP can only scope above a negated non-
iterative telic predicate. Further note how, in opposition to the lexical ambiguity
approach, the structure in (16b) is assumed to be disallowed (since punctual until
is no longer considered a SNPI licensed under negation), whereas the structure in
(15c) (what would be punctual until outscoping negation) is assumed to be accept-
able.
(16) a. * until-XP (telic predicate)
• Disallowed because the until-XP wants an atelic (or iterative telic)
predicate.
b. * not (until-XP (telic predicate))
• Disallowed because the until-XP wants an atelic (or iterative telic)
predicate.
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c. until-XP (Not (telic predicate))
• ‘Throughout-not’ reading with a non-iterative telic predicate:
Only conversationally implicates the actualization of the event after XP.
[Adapted from Condoravdi (2008), ex. (10-11)]
An additional contrast between the lexical and scopal ambiguity approaches is that
under the scopal approach the factive inference appears for both atelic and telic
predicates under the ‘throughout-not’ interpretation, as indicated in (15c) and (16c).
However, unless any other machinery is added, it originates as a simple conversa-
tional implicature from the fact that the negated predication no longer holds when
the time interval ends. Hence, the scopal ambiguity approach predicts that the ac-
tualization of the event should in principle be cancellable even with punctual pred-
icates, contrary to many native speaker judgements.
2.3.2.2 Shortcomings of the scopal ambiguity approach
An approach in the spirit of Mittwoch (1977) attributes any difference in accept-
ability of until-phrases between telic and atelic predicates solely to the atelic pre-
requisite of until and its scope relation with respect to negation, if present.
Even though the scopal ambiguity approach may sound more appealing
since it treats both durative and punctual until as the same, it still faces some chal-
lenges. First, the scopal theory as it stands does not have a good explanation for why
the conversational implicature obtained from until scoping above negation may not
be canceled. Traditionally, in Gricean pragmatics (e.g. following Grice 1975, 1989),
such inferences are generally understood as being easily defeasible or cancellable.
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This calls at least for a refinement of the mechanism that generates such implica-
tures. Second, this analysis alone cannot account for a system which overtly does
have an additional lexical item, e.g. an NPI-until as in Greek. This suggests that we
want a scopal theory that could in principle admit the existence of a different lexi-
cal item, one whose meaning can ideally easily derive from its durative counterpart,
and it just happens to be the case that it lexicalizes differently under negation. This
would consist of a simple PPI/NPI-until contrast.
2.4 Towards a universal theory
As discussed above, a flaw in one theory ends up being a promising aspect in the
other. As a consequence, neither of the two theories described alone can readily
capture the typology of until-phrases in the temporal domain, though this discussion
does highlight the factors that require improvement. For instance, how can the lex-
ical ambiguity approach account for the straightfoward scopal ambiguity between
a ‘not-throughout’ and a ‘throughout-not’ reading without having to posit distinct
lexical entries for durative and punctual until? How can the scopal ambiguity ap-
proach ensure the factivity of punctual until (i.e. when until oustcopes negation)?
And how can it explain the genuine lexical distinction in languages like Greek?
I will propose a new theory that integrates insights from both accounts that
provides a more general typological picture. I will ultimately claim the distinction
between one type of until or another should be stated in terms of a universal adver-
bial vs. an existential time-frame adverbial. Contra Condoradvi (2008), this lexical
contrast is not found within one language, but rather across languages. The exis-
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tential version will be able to derive PPI to NPI lexemes in languages that make a
lexical distinction. The choice between which type of until (universal or existential)
a language employs appears to be a parametric choice of Universal Grammar.
A purely scopal analysis of a durative until would be most economical for
languages that do not have two items, such as English. Thus I begin by looking into
English until, for which I show that a refinement of the scopal analysis together with
a system that gives rise to obligatory, hence non-cancellable, scalar implicatures
(as in many current proposals) seems to be on the right track. The formal details
of such an analysis will be given in Chapters 3 and 4. First, however, in the next
sections I review the strong similarities of until-phrases with for-adverbials and
their traditional accounts, which bolster a case for a scopal analysis of until as a
universal adverbial in English.
2.5 Parallelism between temporal until and for: Em-
pirical generalizations
In this section, I illustrate the parallelisms between temporal until-phrases and for-
adverbials, both of which introduce a time interval that specifies how long an event
described by the modified predicates goes on. Despite their strong resemblance, the
literature on for has focused mostly on its restriction to certain aspectual classes
of modified predicates and scopal interactions of for adverbials with other scopal
elements in the sentence, while the literature on until has focused mainly on the
distinction between durative and punctual until and the relationship of the latter to
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negation. This divergence has lead to radically different analyses of the two prepo-
sitions. However, given the strong parallelism that I demonstrate between the two
prepositions, I argue instead for a more unified analysis. I begin my argument by
discussing three core similarities between the two prepositions: (i) both select for a
durative predicate, (ii) when scoping above negation both implicate that the eventu-
ality described by the predicate begins after the relevant time interval ends, and (iii)
both are subject to the phenomenon of Differentiated Scope, which I define below.
2.5.1 Durativity
The first similarity between for-adverbials and until-phrases is based on the widely
held assumption that measure adverbials modify “atelic, durative predicates” (Deo
and Pin˜ango 2011: 1). Besides measure adverbials, they have also been called as-
pectual adverbials or durative adverbials when they refer to time rather than space
(Champollion 2010).
Durative adverbials indicate that an eventuality extends over a certain time
interval. This is exemplified in (17), where until and for are both acceptable when
modifying the stative be angry, since it can hold throughout a period of time.
(17) John was angry for 2 hours/until 2 pm.
By contrast, both for and until are incompatible with a non-iterative telic event
description such as become angry in a positive environment, as in (18) (leaving
possible iterative interpretations in (18) aside for now).
(18) # John became angry for 2 hours/until 2 pm. (continuously and not repeat-
edly)
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On the whole, the contrast in (17) and (18) further confirms why, since at least
Verkuyl (1972, 1989), durative adverbials of the type ‘for x time’ have been widely
used as one of the most reliable diagnostics of atelicity (Champollion 2010).13
There are some known exceptions to this generalization. Under certain cir-
cumstances a durative adverbial may also be able to modify a telic predicate in a
positive environment: (i) when the telic predicate does not necessarily entail that
the event described is complete (e.g. accomplishments like read a book)14 or (ii)
when the telic predicate (usually punctual/ semelfactive) receives an iterative inter-
pretation (e.g. cough multiple times within a described time interval) (Marı´n and
McNally 2011). In this respect, the behavior of for-adverbials and until-phrases is
again identical, as illustrated in (19).
(19) a. John read a book for 2 hours/until 2 pm.
b. John coughed for 2 hours/until 2 pm.
In (19a), the interpretation that arises with the accomplishment read a book is that
13When I assert that durative adverbials serve as an indicator of atelicity I am disregarding their re-
sult state-related interpretation (as named in Pin˜o´n 1999, via Champollion 2010, and also discussed
in Dowty 1979 under the name of “internal reading”) because on that reading both until-phrases and
for-advervials could combine with punctual predicates on a positive environment without the event
acquiring a continuous (or iterative) reading. Under those circumstances what the duration of the
interval introduced by for/until modifies is the result state of the event and not the event itself. For
instance, in (i), the interval does not refer to how long John took to open the window but indicates
how long the window stayed open after John opened it.
i. a. John opened the window for 2 hours.
b. John opened the window until 2 pm. [based on Pin˜o´n 1999, via Champollion 2010]
It is also worth noting that not everyone gets these result interpretations with equal ease.
14According to Krifka (1998) what makes read a book special is a generic type of incrementality
that allows for re-reading parts of the book, unlike other types of accomplishment such as eat a slice
of cake. Another circumstance in which accomplishments become modifiable by durative adverbials
could be via aspectual coercion (see Dowty 1979, Krifka 1998, de Swart 1998, Rothstein 2004).
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the event described is unfinished in that the whole book has not yet been read. The
punctual predicate cough in the latter case is interpreted on an iterated reading:
e.g. John coughs not only once but again and again throughout a period of time.
However, this iteration cannot be ongoing throughout a temporal stretch without
gaps between each coughing instantiation. This is in line with van Geenhoven’s
(2004, 2005) claim that the ability of a punctual predicate to acquire a frequentative
interpretation with gaps is key in the acceptability of a durative adverbial so that it
can satisfy the adverbial’s atelicity precondition.
Therefore, a first parallelism between for-adverbials and until-phrases is
their restriction to durative predicates. This durativity may be satisfied in specific
ways: (i) when the for/until-XP modifies an atelic predicate; (ii) when it modifies
a telic predicate, usually an accomplishment, which does not necessarily entail that
the event described has cultimated; or (iii) when it combines with a telic predicate
that can have an iterative interpretation.
2.5.2 Behavior with negation
The next property is the ability of until-phrases to take scope above and below
negation, which may lead to an ambiguity between a ‘throughout-not’ and a ‘not-
throughout’ reading, respectively (the former seems to be the only possible interpre-
tation with a telic predicate). In this regard, for-adverbials also mirror until-phrases
(Smith 1975, cf. Champollion 2011), as shown in the parallelism in (20).
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(20) a. John was not angry for 2 hours.
i X ‘Throughout-Not’ reading: For 2 hours, John wasn’t angry.
ii X ‘Not-Throughout’ reading: It is not the case that John was an-
gry for 2 hours (e.g. he was angry only for one hour).
b. John was not angry until 2 pm.
i X ‘Throughout-Not’ reading: Until 2 pm, John wasn’t angry.
ii X ‘Not-Throughout’ reading: It is not the case that John was an-
gry until 2 pm. (e.g. he was angry only until 1 pm.).
Such an ambiguity disappears with a non-iterative telic predicate. This fol-
lows from scope: when for-adverbials and until-phrases are combined with a telic
predicate, a ‘throughout-not’ interpretation is the only available reading since the
durative selectional requirement of the durative adverbial can only be satisfied when
the asserted telic predication is negated.
(21) a. John did not become angry for 2 hours.
i X ‘Throughout-Not’ reading: For 2 hours, John didn’t become
angry.
ii 7 ‘Not-Throughout’ reading: *It is not the case that John became
angry for 2 hours.
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b. John did not become angry until 2 pm.
i X ‘Throughout-Not’ reading: Until 2 pm, John didn’t become
angry.
ii 7 ‘Not-Throughout’ reading: *It is not the case that John became
angry until 2 pm.
Both (a) and (b) sentences are acceptable and unambiguous. Moreover, whether the
for-adverbial is outscoping negation in (21a) is not under debate. Instead, whether
the until-XP in (21b) is outscoping negation is what is under debate. Leaving this
controversy aside, the most important aspect to note here is that the ambiguity does
or does not arise for both for-advebrials and until-phrases in a parallel fashion.
When they are placed in negative environments they also fully resemble one an-
other.
In addition to the scopal interaction with negation, for-adverbials also seem
to share the property of giving rise to the factive inference with until-phrases under
the ‘throughout-not’ interpretation. This point is illustrated in (22) with both an
atelic and a telic type of predicate.
(22) a. John was not angry for 2 hours. ?In fact, he never became angry.
b. John didn’t become angry for 2 hours. ?In fact, he never became angry.
c. John was not angry until 2 pm. ? In fact, he never became angry.
d. John didn’t become angry until 2 pm. # In fact, he never became angry.
To some extent, both for-adverbials and until-phrases seem to generate the factive
inference when uttered out of the blue. Nevertheless, with appropriate contextual
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support, the degree of cancelability of this inference may vary between them. Con-
sider the following context in (23), in which it is possible to cancel the implicature
arising with for but not with until.
(23) [I arrived at the bus stop at 1:40 pm. I started to wait there for John so
we could take the bus together]
a. John didn’t arrive for 20 minutes. At that point I called him and he told
me not to wait for him, so I took the bus by myself.
b. John didn’t arrive until 2 pm. #At that point I called him and he told
me not to wait for him, so I took the bus by myself.
In (23), it appears that the inference originated by the use of until is stronger than
the inference originated by the use of for.
All in all, despite the fact that for-adverbials mirror the behavior of until-
phrases in that they also require the obligatory presence of negation when construed
with a telic predicate, as well as their predisposition to generate a factive inference,
no such a thing as a different lexical item, i.e. a punctual for, has been proposed in
the literature. Such a parallelism thus weakens the supposed uniqueness of punctual
until and calls into question its status as a separate lexical item for English-like
languages.
2.5.3 Differentiated Scope Phenomena
A third commonality between until-phrases and for-adverbials has to do with their
identical scope behavior with regard to quantificational elements in the clause. I
present three main empirical observations about scope: (i) their strict tendency to
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present narrow scope with respect to other scope-bearing elements in the clause,
which may be suspended (ii) in the presence of another scope-bearing element
(including negation) or (iii) whenever an iterative (or frequentative) temporal dis-
tribution is made available. This restricted scopal behavior has been known and
discussed since Carlson (1977a, b) (cf. Chierchia 1998). A more recent discus-
sion is also found in Zucchi and White (2001), van Geenhoven (2004), Kratzer
(2008), Champollion (2010), and Deo and Pin˜ango (2011), among others, for for-
adverbials. Here I display for-adverbials along with until-phrases on a par to con-
tinue the argument for their close parallelism.
2.5.3.1 Narrow scope behavior for right-adjoined durative adverbials
First of all, a quantified object or indefinite DP must take wide scope with respect
to for-adverbials and until-phrases, except in a very limited set of cases that will
be discussed in the sections below. This behavior for indefinite DPs is observed in
(24a), where the (weak) indefinite15 can only be interpreted with wide scope, which
explains its deviance as it describes a rather unusual state of affairs with a non-
iterative telic predicate: there is a rabbit that was repeatedly killed by John over and
over again within the given time frame. This contrasts with bare plurals (or mass
nouns), which take narrow scope with respect to the durative adverbial and thus
acquire a natural reading, as the acceptability of (24b) illustrates: over the course of
the given interval there are several rabbits that were each killed (once) by John. To
15The weak-strong contrast of indefinites refers to whether it presupposes the existence of indi-
viduals satisfying their restriction (Milsark 1974 via Chierchia 1998). Strong indefinites do whereas
weaker indefinites do not.
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the extent that bare plurals are understood as having existential force, their scope
behavior clearly differs from the behavior of weak indefinites (which is problematic
for theories that treat them equally):
(24) a. # John killed a rabbit for 2 hours/until 2 pm.
b. John killed rabbits for 2 hours/until 2 pm.
Such a constrained scope behavior exemplified in (24) was originally observed in
Carlson (1977a, b) and is known as Differentiated Scope.
It is crucial to note here that the contrast in (24) primarily derives from scope,
and not from, say, a durative requirement of the temporal adverbial. A wide scope
interpretation of a right-adjoined time adverbial is systematically absent, even when
the temporal adverb modifies an achievement predicate that is actually iterable (e.g.
dial a wrong phone number) or an atelic predicate (e.g. pet a dog), which would
overcome any durativity/telicity impediment. In (25), the wide scope reading of the
indefinite DP is still the only possible interpretation.
(25) a. John dialed a wrong phone number for 5 minutes/until 5 pm.
[Adapted from Kratzer (2008), ex. (23a)]
b. John pet a dog for 2 hours/until 2 pm.
In (25a), the same wrong phone number is the one being dialed over and over again
throughout the specified time interval. There is nothing about the meaning of the
other a priori potential scope interpretation—i.e. the indefinite DP taking narrow
scope—that could justify why such a reading is not available, a reading that would
be interpreted as John dialed different wrong phone numbers over the course of five
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minutes (Champollion 2010). Likewise, in (25b), even though John petting differ-
ent dogs over the course of the interval in question would potentially be a natural
interpretation, one infers that it is one single dog who got pet for the given duration.
Further note that the only possible interpretation that arises from an indefi-
nite DP is one that essentially resembles the meaning obtained if the object were a
referential-DP instead. Compare the readings in (24a) and (25) to (26).
(26) a. # John killed the rabbit for 2 hours/until 2 pm.
b. John dialed the wrong phone number for 5 minutes/until 5 pm.
c. John pet the dog for 2 hours/until 2 pm.
This narrow scope behavior is not exclusive to for-adverbials and until-
phrases. Carlson (1977b) already noted that there are other time adverbials that
behave in very much the same fashion, such as English repeatedly, since, and all-
time adverbials, whenever they are right-adjoined, as illustrated in (27).
(27) a. # John killed a rabbit repeatedly.
b. # John killed a rabbit since 5.
c. # John killed a rabbit all last year.
In (27), it must still be the weak indefinite which takes wide scope despite the
fact that one could think that the trigger of the other scope reading would make
sense as a repair strategy to save the strange state of affairs described in (27) (cf.
Champollion 2010), resulting in a meaning similar to the one obtained with the
corresponding bare plural direct object in the counterparts in (28).
(28) a. John killed rabbits repeatedly.
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b. John killed rabbits since 5.
c. John killed rabbits all last year.
The examples thus far have shown the narrow scope behavior of durative
adverbials with respect to singular indefinites in object position. Yet this behavior
also applies with respect to an indefinite DP in subject position as well as to other
types of quantified-DPs (not only singular indefinites) in both object and subject
positions (Zucchi and White 2001, Champollion 2010). This includes plural indef-
inites (other than bare plurals) and quantified DPs, as the following examples with
the plural indefinites some/many and the numeral quantifier thirty demonstrate in
both object and subject positions:
(29) a. # John killed a rabbit/ some/many/thirty rabbits for 2 hours/until 2 pm.
b. # A person/ some/many/thirty people reached the top for 2 hours/until
2 pm.
In (29a), the only available scope reading is one in which John spent the whole inter-
val killing each of the rabbits at the same time over and over again, that is, a narrow
scope interpretation of the durative adverbial. Likewise, in (29b), the only possible
interpretation is one in which the same person or group of some/many/thirty people
kept reaching the top over and over again, and hence the durative adverbial is also
taking narrow scope with respect to the scope-bearing subject.
In sum, a quantified DP in subject or object position seems to have obliga-
tory wide scope with respect to a right-adjoined temporal adverbial, even when this
results in semantic oddness. Bare plurals or bare mass nouns instead seem to be
able to scope below the durative adverbial, which results in a more natural reading
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when the time adverbial modifies a non-iterative telic predicate. One might already
hypothesize that a quantified-DP must obligatorily scope above the durative adver-
bial. However, this is not always the case, as there is a specific and limited set of
exceptions, which is presented next.
2.5.3.2 Pluractionality and suspension of narrow scope behavior
Zucchi and White (2001) note that when another universal quantifier like every day
intervenes, or other pluractional adverbials like day after day (cf. Beck and von
Stechow 2007, Champollion 2016), the constraint of wide scope of the indefinite
quantified DP seems to be relaxed, and the DP object may take narrow scope with
respect to the right-adjoined time adverbial. This suspension of narrow scope be-
havior is also observed for until-phrases, as in (30), where the (a) sentences are
pragmatically odd but the (b) sentences sound natural with the inclusion of the plu-
ractional adverbial every day.
(30) a. # John found a flea on his dog for a month/until yesterday.
b. John found a flea on his dog every day for a month/until yesterday.
[Adapted from Zucchi and White (2001), ex. (17b)]
The (a) examples in (30) are pragmatically odd because the only possible interpreta-
tion is the wide scope reading of the indefinite: there is a flea that John found on his
dog over the course of a one-month time interval. By contrast, when an iterative ad-
verbial intervenes, the indefinite a flea no longer has to outscope the right-adjoined
time adverbial, hence allowing a much more natural sounding interpretation: on
every day over the course of a one-month time interval, John found a (different)
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flea on his dog (note that this is very much in line with the interpretation obtained
with bare plurals and mass nouns, e.g. John found fleas on his dog for a month/until
yesterday, Dowty 1979).
Moreover, suspension of a narrow scope reading of the right adjoined du-
rative adverbial is also observed in the presence of negation. Recall that durative-
adverbials can take scope above and below negation, where a ‘throughout-not’ in-
terpretation might be the only possible reading for a telic predicate. Under those
conditions, the durative adverbial may also outscope an indefinite DP-object/subject
in the clause. This is further exemplified in (31) for clarity.
(31) John didn’t kill a rabbit for 2 hours/until 2 pm.
i 7 ‘Not-Throughout’ reading: #It is not the case that John killed a
rabbit for 2 hours/until 2 pm.
ii X‘Throughout-Not’ reading: For 2 hours/until 2 pm, John didn’t kill
a rabbit (≈ For 2 hours/until 2 pm, John didn’t kill rabbits)
Overall, quantified DP-subjects/objects can also obtain an interpretation similar to
bare plurals in the presence of yet another scope-bearing intervener, like every day
or negation. I call this phenomenon suspension of Differentiated Scope.
2.5.3.3 Context and suspension of narrow scope behavior
Finally, appropriate context may also suspend Differentiated Scope. For instance,
the example in (32a), with a for-adverbial or an until-phrase, might make no sense
when uttered out of the blue since John would be required to take the same pill again
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and again. However, its acceptability greatly improves as in (32b) when placed in
a context that discusses the daily intake of a pill by a patient (Moltmann 1991, cf.
Champollion 2010): John no longer needs to take the same pill again and again,
suggesting that a pill can then scope below the right-adjoined time adverbial.
(32) a. # John took a pill for a month/until yesterday.
b. [The doctor is wondering about John’s daily intake. The nurse
replies:]
John took a pill for a month/until yesterday.
[Adapted from Moltmann (1991) ex. (43) and Champollion (2010):
181, ex. (47)]
Such an observation is further corroborated in Deo and Pin˜ango (2011), who claim
that even though the wide scope reading of measure adverbials is rarely possible,
if appropriate contextual information is made available, it may then be possible,
thus allowing for “the distribution of the indefinite over parts of the measuring en-
tity” (p. 303). Consider (33) in a context in which we know that a specific bicycle
particularly designed to carry children changes owner every two years.
(33) This bicycle carried three children for twenty years/until last year.
[Adapted from Rothstein (2004), cf. Landman and Rothstein (2009)]
The sentence in (33) is felicitous even though it does not need to be the same chil-
dren over the course of the discussed twenty years, which would furthermore be im-
possible based on world-knowledge, as the children would no longer be children for
some subinterval within the interval. Additionally, Deo and Pin˜ango (2011) suggest
that the distribution of the object needs to be regular over parts of the time interval
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in question (e.g. every two years as previously suggested by contextual informa-
tion). For this, they give another example that shows a similar point: sometimes
world-knowledge (with no need for specific contextual information to be present)
makes a regular distribution already salient, as in (34).
(34) We built a huge snowman in our garden for many years/until last year.
[Adapted from Deo and Pin˜ango (2011), ex. (17b)]
The example in (34) is understood as involving several snowmen, presumably due to
world knowledge, which would make the distribution over winter seasons salient.16
On the whole, there is a specific set of exceptions in which right-adjoined
time adverbials, including both for-adverbials and until-phrases, can suspend their
narrow scope behavior with respect to other scope-bearing elements in the sentence.
They may not only do so in the presence of negation or an iterative adverbial such as
every day, but also due to world knowledge or a supporting context that somehow
specifies a distribution over parts of the time interval in question. Perhaps such a
salient partition triggers a covert pluractional adverbial that acts in the same fashion
as overt iterative adverbials like every day.
16As a blind reviewer pointed out to me there can be some poorly understood exceptions like the
following: A camera followed their activities for three days, where a camera may be ambiguous
between a narrow and a wide scope reading with respect to the durative adverbial. In the narrow
scope interpretation of a camera, it is not obvious what the covertly salient distribution would look
like. I hypothesize that this could be due to the contextual and thematic properties of the verb follow,
where we might not care whether it is the same camera or different cameras as long as there is
always one camera filming. Note however the contrast with A policeman followed them for three
days, where a policeman more strongly favors a wide scope reading.
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2.5.4 Summing up
By and large, until-phrases mirror for-adverbials with regard to three peculiar char-
acteristics: (i) durativity in the sense of only applying to a predicate that somehow
licenses an atelic reading, (ii) factivity under negation, and (iii) highly restricted
scopal behavior subject to identical constraints. Yet while the existence of two un-
tils has often been postulated—i.e. a durative and a punctual one—the existence
of two fors has not. Instead, prior accounts have been scopal in nature. In view of
these commonalities, it certainly appears worthwhile to consider a unified account
of for-adverbials and until-phrases in English by revisiting the scopal account: their
constrained scopal behavior together with their restriction to atelic and iterative
telic predicates can account by itself for the NPI properties of punctual until. This
takes us to the main difference between for and until: the issue of factivity. But even
with respect to this property, we have observed that both of them in a negative en-
vironment under the ‘throughout-not’ interpretation can implicate, minimally, the
actualization of the event at some point after the time interval introduced by the
temporal phrase ceases to hold. As a starting point towards a unified account, I next
review two influential theories of for-adverbials that could in principle serve as a
starting point for an analysis of until.
2.6 Prior approaches to measure phrases
In this section, I outline in general terms two significant and competing proposals
that have been put forward to understand the nature of durative adverbials, more
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specifically, for-adverbials, with the purpose of not only implementing one of these
analyses for for-adverbials but also extending it to English until, since for and until
in English seem to share nearly all of their aspectual properties.
2.6.1 An overview of two prior proposals: universal quantifica-
tion vs. temporal framing
The restriction of temporal measure phrases to durative predicates has led to two
main analyses: (i) a measure function analysis over events a` la Krifka (1986, 1989,
1992), and (ii) a universal quantificational analysis over time intervals a` la Dowty
(1979). As Deo and Pin˜ango (2011) point out the difference between them lies in
whether divisivity or atelicity is assumed to be a selectional requirement of for
(Krifka’s approach) or, whether it is a consequence of for’s universal quantification
as part of its meaning (Dowty’s approach), as illustrated in (35).
(35) a. JFor x-timeK = λP. λe : atelic (P )[P (e) ∧ τ(e) = x-time]
(≈ There is an atelic predicate and the duration of the event that it de-
scribes is x-time)
[Adapted from Champollion (2016), ex. (77)]
b. JFor x-timeK = λP. λt [x-time(t) ∧ ∀t′[t′ ⊆ t→ P (t′)]]
(≈ There is an interval whose duration is x-time and for all the subin-
tervals of such an interval the predicate holds)
[Adapted from Deo and Pin˜ango (2011), ex. (11)]
A priori, (35a) assumes that the modified predicate is a predicate over events,
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whereas (35b) assumes that it is a predicate over times. Another key difference,
looking only at their assertive content, is that the durative adverbial in (35b) is
considered a type of universal adverbial, whereas the durative adverbial in (35a) is
treated as an existential adverbial of temporal framing—I call it existential in the
sense that its assertion only contains existential force over the event it modifies,
which becomes evident once the event variable is closed.
More specifically, the measure function analysis stipulates that durative ad-
verbials can only measure out the duration of atelic predicates. This atelicity re-
quirement is usually assumed to arise as lexical presuppositional content, so that its
fulfillment is needed in order for the sentence to acquire a truth value. The analy-
sis in (35a) thus represents a partial function that is defined only if the predicate is
atelic. If defined, it specifies that the predicate holds and the running time of the
event (indicated by the temporal trace function τ(e)) is equivalent to the time ex-
pressed by the argument of for. This theory is found in various forms in e.g. Krifka
(1986, 1989, 1992, 1998), and Champollion (2010, 2016). For instance, Krifka
(1986) (via Champollion 2010), in a first variant of his work on for-adverbials,
imposes the selectional requirement of both cumulativity—“a predicate P is cumu-
lative if and only if whenever it holds of two things, it also holds of their sum”—and
divisiveness—“a predicate P is divisive if and only if whenever it holds of some-
thing, it also holds of each of its proper parts” (Champollion 2010: 19)—for atelic
predicates. Subsequently, Krifka (1989) requires that the predicate be “strictly cu-
mulative or at least non-quantized” (via Champollion 2010: 134); by bearing in
mind that a predicate P is “quantized if and only if no entity which is P can be a
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proper subpart of another entity which is P ” (van Geenhoven 2004: 137, cp. Krifka
1992). Finally, Krifka (1998) requires the predicate to have divisive reference and
contain proper parts.
By contrast, the analysis in (35b) represents for-adverbials—and per ex-
tension until-phrases—as universal quantifiers over all (relevant) subintervals of
a continuous interval so that the predicate is required to hold at every subinterval
described by the argument of for/until. If it does, the predicate must have the so-
called subinterval property. It follows that state and activity predicates have the
subinterval property, whereas achievements and accomplishments may acquire this
property whenever the reading they give rise to permits a semantically and prag-
matically coherent iterative interpretation. This theory corresponds to the influen-
tial account by Dowty (1979) and the main attempts along these lines are found in
Moltmann (1991), Deo and Pin˜ango (2011), and Champollion (2015), inter alia.
Intuitively, such a proposal is appealing because the atelicity requirement is already
derived from universal quantification as part of the assertive content. Nonetheless,
in spite of their dissimilarities, are the two approaches exemplified in (35) really
that different?
2.6.2 Parallelism between the two main proposals: Pluraction-
ality
Despite the superficial differences pointed out above, both accounts impose some
sort of pluractionality condition. An account in the spirit of Dowty (1979) does
so via the subinterval property in the assertive content of the durative adverbial,
50
whereas an account in the spirit of Krifka (e.g. 1998) establishes a similar plurac-
tional condition in the presuppositional content of the adverbial, which essentially
looks at the divisiveness and non-quantized properties of the eventuality described
by the predicate. Even though the former applies such a condition by looking into
predicates of intervals and the latter into predicates of events, we know from a mere-
ological perspective that time and event are related in a way that the two amount to
more or less the same thing (e.g. building on Krifka 1998, Beavers 2008b, 2012).
As will be explained in this section, both types of pluractionality conditions intrin-
sically share the same fundaments.
2.6.2.1 The subinterval property a` la Dowty (1979)
The subinterval property a` la Dowty (1979) requires that the predicate be able to
universally quantify over subintervals of a time interval in question. Dowty (1979)
illustrates this only for for-adverbials with the following contrastive pair:
(36) a. # John discovered the buried treasure in his back yard for six weeks/until
yesterday.
b. John discovered crabgrass in his yard for six weeks/until yesterday.
[Adapted from Dowty (1979), Ch. 2, ex. (74) & (77)]
The sentence in (36a) ends up meaning something along the following lines: John
has been discovering the same treasure over and over again in his back yard through-
out a period of time, which seems “to entail that he has repeatedly not known and
then come to know the very same fact, which is obviously a contradiction (barring
memory loss)” (Dowty 1979: 80), hence its incoherence. By contrast, Dowty then
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gives a Carlsonian (e.g. 1977a, b) explanation as to why the mass noun in (36b)
does not give rise to oddness: bare plurals and mass nouns denote kind individuals
that receive their existential interpretation from the stage-level verbs, e.g. discover,
and are thus bound within the scope of the durative adverbial. Considering this, the
sentence in (36b) can result in the pragmatically plausible meaning that “for six
weeks [or until yesterday] John discovered there to be some x such that x is crab-
grass and is in his yard” (Dowty 1979: 80), where the value of x differs from one
subinterval to the next as it is existentially bound within the scope of the temporal
universal quantifier.17
As Deo and Pin˜ango (2011) put it, the acceptability of durative adverbials
with a certain predicate—regardless of its classification as telic/atelic—just follows
from the ability of “interpreting predicates [...] as being instantiated at regular inter-
vals across the measuring interval”, which may then lead to iterative readings in the
case of punctual verbs such as cough or ongoing interpretations of predicates tradi-
tionally classified as atelic, such as run. Assuming the interval-event mapping, such
a universal quantification over intervals that gives rise to the iterative or ongoing
interpretations could also be expressed at the events level by explicitly implicating
universal quantification over events, along the following lines in (37b), where τ is a
function that maps events to intervals and represents the temporal trace or runtime
17However, Dowty (1979) already observes that the predicate of e.g. discovering crabgrass in
(36b) might not hold for literally every single moment of a specific interval, e.g. it seems impossible
for John to come upon some new crabgrass for every subinterval throughout a six-week long period.
Therefore, the moments over which the durational adverb quantifies must be something like “rel-
evant psychological moments which are both vaguely specified and also contextually determined”
(p. 81). This is more generally known in the literature as the minimal parts problem (e.g. Moltmann
1991, Vlach 1993).
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of the event. In what follows, type int stands for intervals, t for truth values, and v
for events.
(37) a. JFor x-timeK = λP〈int,t〉. λt[x-time(t) ∧ ∀t′[t′ ⊆ t→ P (t′)]] (= (35b))
b. JFor x-timeK = λP〈v,t〉. λe.λt[x-time(t) ∧ ∀t′[t′ ⊆ t → ∃e′[e′ ⊆ e ∧
P (e′) ∧ τ(e′) = t′]]]
[Adapted from Deo and Pin˜ango (2011), ex. (11)]
In (37b), note that the straightforward relation between subevents and subintervals
is established by the trace function, where the duration of every subevent of the
event in question must relate to a subinterval of the interval picked by the durative
adverbial. The difference in the denotations in (37) would thus consist of a trivial
difference in type.18 Taking (37b) into account, let us examine next what the atelic
precondition established by an account in the spirit of Krifka looks like, since it is
also event-oriented.
2.6.2.2 Divisiveness a` la Krifka (1998)
The prerequisite of atelicity of the measure function analysis in (35a) indicated by
the shorthand atelic is unfolded in (38) based on Krifka’s (1998) most updated anal-
ysis of for-adverbials. The denotation of the measure phrase consists of an assertion
and a presupposition, both of them given in their original form in (38) with the pre-
supposition (which ensures atelicity) underlined in (38) for clarity, as this is the key
to the present discussion.
18Assuming a traditional Davidsonian event semantics framework where the event variable is
bound at sentence level, the pair in (37) would consist of one variant (event-oriented) as in (37b)
that applies low and selects for a predicate of events, and then another variant (interval-oriented) as
in (37a) that applies high and can pick a property of intervals.
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(38) JFor an hourK = λRλx, e[R(x, e) ∧H ′(e) = 1 ∧
∂∃e′ ∈ UE[e′ <H′ e ∧ ∀e′′ ∈ UE[e′′ ≤H′ e′ → R(x, e′′)]]]
[Krifka (1998), ex. (55)]
In the specifications above note that the measure function is H ′, the number of
hours is 1, <H′ indicates the notion of part-of relation, which is construed based
on time only, and the presupposition is indicated by ∂. The adverbial has three
arguments: a predicateR, an individual x, and an event e. The predicateRmust hold
for the arguments x and e, and the duration of the event must measure one hour. The
presupposition in (38), which universally quantifies over subevents, requires that the
event e (ultimately contributed by existential closure) have proper parts and that all
parts fall under the predicate R. This ensures that the predicate R must not be telic
with respect to its event argument. Thus, the presupposition essentially imposes
the requirement that the predicate be divisive because the predicate denoted by the
verb phrase must relate the subject to all the temporal subevents. Additionally, the
event to which the predicate applies must contain temporally shorter subevents.
As Champollion (2010) notes, the additional requirement of containing temporally
shorter subevents is needed in order to exclude quantized telic predicates like kill a
rabbit which vacuously satisfy the divisiveness condition, as the event to which the
predicate applies has no proper parts and hence all of its parts would also be in the
denotation of kill a rabbit.
All in all, Krifka’s requirement of atelicity consists in selecting for a predi-
cate that has divisive reference and is non-quantized. In this way, a predicate with
a bare plural like find fleas is non-quantized, as a proper part of an event of finding
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fleas may still be an event of finding fleas. For this to make sense the kind as a whole
must be regarded as the theme of the event. On the other hand, its singular coun-
terpart or a plural quantified DP is quantized because no proper part of an event of
finding a flea or finding three fleas is still an event of finding a flea or finding three
fleas, respectively.19
2.6.2.3 Comparing their pluractionality requirement via universal quantifi-
cation
Ultimately, in one way or another, both accounts resort to universal quantification
over subevents of the maximal event in question, be it in the presuppositional con-
tent, as in Krifka (1998), or in the assertive content, as demonstrated in the event-
oriented variant a` la Dowty (1979). The durative requirement of measure phrases
seems to amount to the ability of the predicate to apply to all the subevents that
relate to the subintervals of the interval introduced by the for/until-XP.
Yet universal quantification over events in the presuppositional content of
the durative adverbial is not expected to directly interact scopally with any scope-
bearing elements in the clause, unlike universal quantification in the assertive con-
tent of durative adverbials in an account in the spirit of Dowty (1979). Such a dis-
19Further note that under this view verbal predicates with plural kinds (e.g. find fleas) are in
principle just treated as a plural set that stands in cumulative-like relation with the plural event.
However, there are syntactic arguments to believe that kinds explicitly introduce individual instances
in the semantic composition and behave as existential quantifiers (Chierchia 1998). The existential
nature of bare plurals that receive a kind interpretation is prima facie ignored under the measure
function approach as it only takes into account a cumulative-like relation in the atelic precondition.
If bare plurals as well as quantified objects introduce existential quantifiers, it remains unexplained
why verbal predicates with bare plurals pattern unlike verbal predicates with count individuals or
plural indefinites modified by durative adverbials.
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tinction becomes crucial when telic predicates with indefinite plurals are brought
into the picture, like find some fleas, which come out atelic, i.e. non-quantized, on
Krifka’s approach—“an event of finding some fleas may have proper parts that are
also events of finding some fleas” (Zucchi and White 2001: 231)—and yet they
are problematic as complements of achievement/accomplishment verbs modified
by durative adverbials, as in ??John found some fleas on his dog for an hour (Zuc-
chi and White 2001, ex. (9), cp. van Geenhoven 2004) in opposition to John found
fleas on his dog for an hour. An account a` la Dowty (1979) can resort to a Carl-
sonian scopal analysis between the universal quantifier of the durative adverbial
and the existential quantifier of the indefinite to explain such a contrast, where the
existential quantifier of a kind object takes narrow scope with respect to the univer-
sal quantifier of the adverbial, while the existential quantifier of a plural indefinite
takes wide scope instead. On the other hand, it is not so clear how such a contrast
can be explained under Krifka’s (1998) approach. Zucchi and White (2001) propose
a modified analysis of Krifka’s (1998) account, where the objects can be interpreted
in situ and their quantized nature lies in the presence or absence of the determiner.20
In sum, the restriction of durative adverbials to atelic predicates is encoded
via universal quantification over subintervals or subevents in both approaches. Ref-
erence to such a pluractional condition of the event (whether it be in the assertion or
the presupposition) is necessary for both accounts so that they can predict whether
20In particular, the determiner would introduce maximal participants, which are the total sum of
individuals instead of sums of events. In this way some fleas would refer to the maximality of all
fleas that participated in the event at reference time, which will not be in the denotation of a subevent,
hence failing to satisfy the non-quantized precondition of the durative adverbial. Such a maximality
condition would be absent with no determiner in a predicate like find fleas. See Zucchi and White
(2001) for further discussion and a formalization of the account.
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the event described by the predicate can be modified by a measure adverbial. How-
ever, choosing one theory over the other one may require resorting to different as-
sumptions regarding the nature of quantized vs. non-quantized predicates when it
comes to distinguishing telic predicates with quantified DPs from verbal predicates
with plural kinds.
2.6.3 Contrast between the two main proposals: Pluractionality
under negation
2.6.3.1 A fusion-based treatment of negation instead of logical negation
A crucial distinction between the subinterval analysis and the measure function
analysis arises when it comes to analyzing their interaction with negation, namely
when capturing the ‘throughout-not’ reading. Remember that in the former ap-
proach durative adverbials take a predicate over intervals whereas in the latter they
take a predicate over events. However, negation normally takes place above existen-
tial closure of events (e.g. Diesing 1992, Kratzer 1995, Carlson 2003). This makes
it difficult for an account a` la Krifka (1989, 1998) to explain how the durative ad-
verbial can take scope above logical negation, where we would no longer have a
predicate of events, hence theoretically predicting that a ‘throughout-not’ reading
is in principle unavailable. By contrast, an account a` la Dowty (1979), where the
durative adverbial takes a predicate of intervals, can more easily explain a scopal
interaction between the durative adverbial and negation above existential closure
once we have a predicate of intervals so that the machinery is capable of equally
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licensing both ‘throughout-not’ and ‘not-throughout’ interpretations.
This challenge for the measure function analysis was already noted in Krifka
(1989), which resorted to a fusion-based treatment of negation so that there can be
suitable “negative events” whose runtimes can be modified by durative adverbials,
which can reproduce the ‘throughout-not’ interpretation under existential closure.
In this way, Krifka (1989) characterizes negated expressions “with the help of max-
imal events, that is, the fusion of all events at a certain time” (p. 101), thus yielding
the maximal eventuality relative to a specific time interval, as formulated in (39).
The maximal eventuality at some time interval t is expressed by FUSION in the
denotation. The subinterval relation is indicated as⊆T , and the subevent relation as
⊆E .
(39) Jdid notK = λP. λe. ∃t [e = FUSION(λe′[τ(e′) ⊆T t]) ∧ ¬∃e′′[P (e′′) ∧
e′′ ⊆E e]]
(≈ the fusion of all events within a time interval t that does not contain any
event described by the predicate P )
[Adapted from Champollion (2011), ex. (18), c.p. Krifka (1989), ex. (D44-
45)]
Following the analysis of negation in (39), a sentence like John didn’t laugh is
interpreted as describing the fusion of all the events that take place within some
time interval and asserting that it does “not contain an event of John’s laughing”
(Krifka 1989: 101). Then the duration of the fusion of all events as long as it does
not contain John’s laughing could be specified by the measure phrase.
As Champollion (2011) observes, a fusion-based treatment of negation has
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been both embraced and debated in the literature. For example, Zucchi and White
(2001) and Condoravdi (2008) reformulate it to account for the scopal effects of
for-adverbials and until-phrases, respectively. De Swart (1996) and de Swart and
Molendijk (1999), among others, adopt this type of negation in support of the pop-
ular claim that negation is a stativizer. However, this treatment of negation has been
disputed, e.g. see Csirmaz (2006, 2009), Giannakidou (2002), Condoravdi (2008),
MacDonald and U¨ro¨gdi (2011) and U¨ro¨gdi (2013) for argumentation against the
claim that negation stativizes. Considering the controversy that a fusion-based anal-
ysis of negation may arise, I believe it is better to adopt a treatment of durative
adverbials within a syntactic, semantic, and/or pragmatic framework that does not
have to commit to such a claim.
2.6.3.2 Punctuality under negation in relation to the debate on punctual until
In choosing between these two accounts of durative adverbials, another issue worth
considering in relation to the puzzle of punctual until is whether negative telic pred-
icates are not durative predicates after all, i.e. whether such adverbials lose their
pluractionality requirement under negation.
More specifically, rather than treating negation as an aspectual operator that
functions as a stativizer (e.g. de Swart 1996), negation could be regarded as an NPI-
licenser. In that case the durative adverbial modifying a telic predicate would no
longer be durative in nature but a punctual NPI, i.e. a different lexical item, licensed
under negation. If we were to follow such a theory for languages like Greek, a theory
that treats durative adverbials as existential adverbials of temporal framing, more
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in line with Krifka’s (1998), is particularly appealing with respect to punctual until
because it could better explain why certain languages might overtly have an NPI-
variant that realizes lexically different from their durative until counterpart under
negation, since usually NPIs are interpreted as existential in nature (Krifka 1995,
Chierchia 2004, 2006, 2013).21 A theory that treats until as a universal quantifier
would have greater difficulty in explaining the origin of NPI variants, given the
cross-linguistic rarity of NPIs with a ‘universal’ semantics or, for that matter, a
universal morphology.
Nevertheless, for languages like English, in the case that an NPI-analysis
of an existential until with punctual predicates were to apply only to until-phrases
under negation (and the behavior of for were, on the other hand, to be explained
in terms of scope with respect to negation), this leaves unexplained the otherwise
strong parallelism between for and until. Thus, we will leave the NPI theory aside
for now, and pursue a unifying account of durative adverbials in English.
2.6.4 Summing up
In conclusion, both classical approaches to durative adverbials posit some sort of
pluractional condition on the predicate that is represented by the measure phrase
universally quantifying over subevents/subintervals. Krifka’s (1998) plural require-
ment belongs to the presuppositional content of durative adverbials and it quantifies
over events, whereas Dowty (1979) embeds it in the assertive content of durative
21It could consist of a simple contrast like between some and any, both existential in nature, which
would explain why a durative adverbial may give rise to an NPI counterpart. This idea will be further
developed in Chapter 5.
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adverbials and it quantifies over times.
Prima facie, there does not seem to be many substantial arguments for adopt-
ing one approach over the other one. For instance, either approach will have to in-
evitably end up positing a durative ‘until’ vs. a specialized NPI (or PPI) for telic
predicates for languages like Greek that make a lexical distinction when the ac-
tualization of the event is intended. Yet the measure function analysis as it stands
unavoidably runs into the controversial issue of having “negative events” so that
they can be measured out by durative adverbials so as to capture the ‘throughout-
not’ and ‘not-throughout’ readings. In order to avoid negative events, plus to have
a cleaner unified scopal account between durative adverbials and logical negation,
I believe it is worth further exploring the universal quantification approach a` la
Dowty (1979), while updating it to be compatible with an event semantics.
This constitutes the point of departure for our proposed analysis for English
in Chapters 3 and 4, which will explain the durative, scopal, and factive behavior of
both for-adverbials and until-phrases in a unified fashion. Nevertheless, these facts
may not be universal. In Chapter 5, we will have to find what the relevant param-
eters are for Spanish and whether an account based on the universal quantification
approach still holds for Spanish hasta. Ultimately, I will point out a difference un-
noticed in the literature so far that virtually requires a development of the universal
approach for English until and a modified version of the existential analysis for
Spanish hasta, which challenges the necessity of a fusion treatment of negation.
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2.7 Conclusions
The puzzle of punctual until might potentially be a broader phenomenon that af-
fects other temporal measure phrases with similar durative properties and restricted
scopal interactions with negation and other quantifiers in the clause. This seems
to be the case for at least for-adverbials too, thus suggesting that it might all be
an epiphenomenon of independent scope constraints. I propose that a refinement
of Mittwoch’s (1977) original insight of English punctual until as arising from the
scope behavior of the durative adverbial with respect to negation is still possible.
This is preferable to a lexical ambiguity account (e.g. Condoravdi 2008) where
punctual until in English would be seen as an NPI. The key evidence suggesting
this is (a) the lack of separate PPI and NPI words for until in English and (b) the ex-
tensive and nearly perfect parallelism of until and for adverbials, where for the latter
the usual assumption in the literature is that there is just one for. As a prerequisite for
formalizing my analysis in the next chapter, I offer a new defense of Dowty’s (1979)
universal quantification approach to temporal measure adverbials, which is proven
to be to a certain extent more advantageous than the measure function account a` la
Krifka (1998) and more appropriate for a scopal account of the facts of for/until in
English. However, a number of issues present themselves as challenges for such an
approach, such as the prominent tendency of the universal quantifier to take narrow
scope while still tolerating some exceptions, e.g. when scoping above verbal pred-
icates with bare plural DPs like find fleas or above frequentative adverbials such as
every day. For this, I show in Chapter 3 that embedding the subinterval approach
within independently motivated assumptions, such as Champollion’s (2015) event
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A unified scopal account of temporal
for-adverbials and until-phrases in
English
3.1 Introduction
The scopal approach I put forth is a refinement of Mittwoch’s (1977) original in-
sight that the crucial difference between durative and punctual uses of until is scopal
and not lexical. Ultimately, the factive behavior of negative until will fall out from
the scopal account together with an exhaustification-based approach to scalar in-
ferences. The upshot is that the NPI behavior of punctual until and its factivity are
derived as an epiphenomenon of independent scopal constraints, exactly in the same
manner, by using the same machinery, as we derive the behavior of for-adverbials.
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A translation of Mittwoch’s (1977) earlier proposal in event semantics is possible
nowadays thanks to the availability of a framework along the lines specified in this
chapter, which makes two independently motivated assumptions: Champollion’s
(2015) analysis of event quantification and a Carlson/Chierchia approach to bare
plurals. It emerges that special conditions on DP-quantifiers and event quantifiers
interact with a simple scopal analysis of for/until-XPs as universal quantifiers a`
la Dowty (1979), rightly predicting the attested behavior. This scopal account will
ultimately be combined with an exhaustification-based approach in the next chap-
ter, fully predicting the ‘special’ behavior that has been attributed to until-phrases
regarding factive inferences in particular.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In §2, I introduce the basis of quan-
tificational event semantics a` la Champollion, a framework that I adopt together
with a syntactic treatment of scope via quantifier raising. In §3, I give a scopal
account of for-adverbials in a parallel manner to until-phrases. The basic cases in
positive environments are presented, as well as the various downward-entailing and
frequentative cases. This will lead to a hypothesis that right adjoined durative ad-
verbials are low adverbs subject to an economy constraint on scope based on infor-
mativeness/logical strength. In §4, the conclusions of the proposed scopal analysis
are discussed.
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3.2 The framework: Quantificational Event Seman-
tics
In this section, I present the basis of the theoretical semantic framework that I adopt
so as to develop an analysis for temporal durative adverbials, where events and
duration of events come into the picture. I follow the proposal in Champollion’s
(2015) framework, a version of ‘quantificational event semantics’, where the main
difference from typical instantiations of Neo-Davidsonian event semantics is that
verbs and their projections contain low existential quantifiers over events. In other
words, the event variable is no longer bound at the sentence level, but is already
bound in the lexical entry of the verb, so that it takes the lowest possible scope. The
main reason for adopting this framework is to avoid the mereological treatment of
negation. Such a framework also allows for a rather straightforward reconstruction
of Dowty’s (1979) scope theory within an event-based semantics. In the follow-
ing subsections I outline the basic mechanism of the proposed framework, where
independently motivated assumptions will conspire to produce the right results.
3.2.1 Event propositions and their modifiers
A major development since Dowty made his proposal about for-adverbials in 1979
has been the growth and common adoption of (neo-)Davidsonian event semantics.
This derives from Davidson’s (1967) original suggestion that the logical form of
verbs contains an event variable and verbs denote relations between events and
other induviduals, as shown in (1b), in opposition to a more traditional account in
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which a verb solely denotes a relation between its (non-event) arguments, as in (1a).
The crucial contrast in (1) lies in whether e.g. a transitive verb denotes a two- vs. a
three-place relation.1
(1) a. JkissK = λy.λx[kissing(x, y)]
b. JkissK = λy.λx.λe[kissing(e, x, y)]
A more modern view of Davidsonian event semantics, i.e. often referred to as ‘neo-
Davidsonian’ (e.g. Parsons 1990, Landman 2000), treats the verb as a one-place
predicate of eventualities and their arguments are introduced later via special rules
or applicative heads that are event modifiers and stand in thematic relations to the
event. On such an approach, verbs are not typed for how many arguments they take,
and the contrast between arguments and modifiers is somewhat blurred.2 In this
model of neo-Davidsonian semantics a transitive verb such as kiss is represented in
the following manner, in which an event fills the verb’s sole argument place:3
(2) JkissK = λe[kissing(e)]
In (2), verbs and all their projections up to the sentence level are treated as pred-
icates of events of type 〈v, t〉 (with v the type of events). At the sentence level,
after all the syntactic arguments of the verb have been introduced, a silent operator
1From here onwards, I use boldfacing to indicate logical relations that look the same as English
words.
2There are also mixed accounts, such as Kratzer (2003), which puts forward that only sub-
jects are fed by applicative heads, whereas objects serve directly as arguments to the verb: e.g.JkissK = λy.λe[kissing(e, y)]. Another variant of neo-Davidsonian semantics could place the the-
matic relations as part of the denotation of the verb, where the verb takes its arguments directly but
uses neo-Davidsonian roles: JkissK = λx.λy.λe[kissing(e) ∧ agent(y, e) ∧ patient(x, e)] (e.g.
Hunter 2009).
3See, for instance, Borer (2005), for arguments supporting the view that all of a verb’s arguments
are introduced in the syntax.
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known as existential closure introduces an existential quantifier that binds the event
variable so that the proposition ends up having value t.
Champollion (2015) introduces an alternative to this sort of Neo-Davidsonian
account so as to accommodate the observation that in general “the existential quan-
tifier that binds the event variable always takes lowest possible scope”, thus sug-
gesting the hypothesis that it could already be “contained in the lexical entry of the
verb” (p. 34).4 For example, the event quantifier always seems to take low scope
with respect to fixed-scope operators like negation, as shown in (3), since the repre-
sentation in (3b) is not an accurate interpretation of the sentence John didn’t laugh.
(3) [John didn’t laugh]
a. ¬∃e[laughing(e) ∧ ag(e) = john]
“There is no event in which John laughs.” ¬  ∃e
b. ∃e¬[laughing(e) ∧ ag(e) = john]
“There is an event in which John does not laugh.” ∃e ¬
[Based on Champollion (2015), ex. (8-9)]
Champollion (2015) changes the value of the propositional nuclei to a generalized
quantifier over events, i.e. predicates of sets of events V of type 〈vt, t〉, by binding
the event variable at the lexical entry of the verb, instead of treating them the usual
way. This gives a way of elegantly avoiding ‘negative events’, that is, to avoid an
interpretation as in (3b).
I first review the core of the proposed framework on the basis of Champol-
4I encourage the reader to see Champollion (2015) for a more detailed motivation and spelling
out of this proposal regarding quantificational event semantics.
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lion (2015). Under such an approach, verbs, as well as all their projections, are con-
ceptualized as predicates of sets of events 〈vt, t〉, where f is a variable that ranges
over predicates of events of type 〈vt〉. For instance, “it rains” is true of any set that
contains a raining event, and the same reasoning is carried up to the sentence level.
(4) JrainK = λf.∃e[raining(e) ∧ f(e)]
[Based on Champollion (2011), ex. (11)]
The idea behind (4) is the following. The event variable is bound off lexically. So
how does a modifier of any sort get access to it? The trick is that although the
variable is bound off the verb takes an argument f that is a predicate over events,
and specifically over the bound event e. So anything that wishes to compose with the
verb or its projection to add in new information about the event can take something
of type 〈vt, t〉 (V) as an argument and then apply that to a function of type 〈vt〉 that
imposes the right condition on e, and the effect will be to put it under the scope
of the operator. Such a modifier will have to output a new thing of type 〈vt, t〉 to
ensure that additional modification can apply, until eventually f gets closed off near
the top of the clause. For instance, consider a simple event modifier quietly, as in
(5), which takes a verbal meaning like (4) as input and outputs a new generalized
quantifier over events with a new enriched f .
(5) a. JquietlyK = λV.λf.V (λe[f(e) ∧ quietly(e)])
b. Jrain quietlyK = JquietlyK(JrainK) = λf.∃e[raining(e) ∧ f(e) ∧
quietly(e)]
As a consequence, this machinery will automatically derive the lowest pos-
sible scope of the event quantifier with respect to other scope-bearing elements,
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like negation, leaving no room for scopal ambiguity between negation and the event
quantifier.5 Hence, the present system is advantageous in that we can interpret nega-
tion in logical terms. Champollion (2015) gives the following denotation for not, as
in (6), conforming to the semantic type 〈〈vt, t〉, 〈vt, t〉〉 of all verbal arguments and
modifiers in the present system to ensure that all verbal projections are formulated
as predicates of sets of events.6
(6) JnotK = λV.λf.¬V (f) [Champollion (2015), ex. (28)]
In this way, a negated sentence like it did not rain quietly as in (7d) (ignoring tense
for the moment) can be given “a straightforward translation and does not involve
reference to fusions” (Champollion 2015: 47). Nor does the scope-taking operator
(negation in this case) need to raise above closure, as shown in the LF in (7a) .
(7) a. LF: [V P not [[rain] quietly] ]
b. Jnot rain quietlyK = JnotK(J(5b)K) = λf.¬∃e[raining(e) ∧ f(e) ∧
quietly(e)]
Even though existential closure of the event variable happens at the verb
level, as illustrated in (7), a sentence-level operator—different from existential closu-
re—is still required after all syntactic arguments and modifiers have been intro-
5As Champollion (2015) points out, to some extent this is reminiscent of Carlson’s (1977a, b)
treatment of kinds, where existential quantification over bare plurals also ensures narrowest scope,
an approach that I will adopt in this dissertation. Additionally, the machinery that updates the propo-
sition nuclei by enriching f and putting a new f in the place of the original one also resembles
certain versions of dynamic semantics on discourse update (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991, Chier-
chia 1995).
6I also suggest the use of Pos, the identity function adjusted to the present framework, as the
counterpart of not as in (i).
i. JPosK = λV.λf.V (f)
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duced as a way of extracting the truth-conditional import of the sentence. Such a
closure operator would be of type 〈〈vt, t〉, t〉. It would take a propositional unit of
type 〈vt, t〉, and the output would be something of type t. By adopting an anaphoric
treatment of tense, Champollion (2015) suggests that the contribution of tense could
be part of the closure operator. For example, [past-closure] could be given the fol-
lowing entry, as in (8), where reference time is written as tr in its denotation, tem-
poral inclusion as ⊆T , and temporal precedence as ≺.
(8) J[past-closure]K = λV [tr ≺ now ∧ V (λe[τ(e) ⊆T tr])]
[Based on Champollion (2015), ex. (30)]
In (8), the past-closure operator asserts that besides a sentence being true of the
world, its reference time corresponds to the past, i.e. precedes the present time. In
order to illustrate what something at the sentence level looks like within the present
framework thus far, note the meaning of a simple past sentence like it did not rain
quietly—assuming that the verb rain has no semantically visible arguments—as in
(9), building on (7b).7
(9) Jit did not rain quietlyK = J[past-closure]K(J(7b)K) = [tr ≺ now ∧
¬∃e[raining(e) ∧ quietly(e) ∧ τ(e) ⊆T tr]]
For the purposes of this dissertation, I follow Champollion’s treatment of tense by
already including its meaning within the closure operator, though other implemen-
tations of tense could in principle also be adaptable to the present framework.
Having presented the fundamentals of Champollion’s (2015) framework and
7Champollion (2015) treats did as semantically vacuous, whose presence only morphologically
signals past tense. I also ignore the semantics of the expletive it.
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the interaction of proposition nuclei with event modifiers such as negation and ad-
verbials like quietly, I focus next on the contribution of durative adverbials as event
modifiers, which are central to the present discussion.
3.2.2 Translating for-adverbials and until-phrases
A major advantage of adopting and adjusting the subinterval analysis of durative ad-
verbials within the framework of quantificational event semantics a` la Champollion
(2015) is that one can maintain that right-adjoined adverbials are low adverbs at the
VP-level and derive a scopal account with respect to negation. No matter what (e.g.
whether they are interpreted above or below negation) they will always outscope
the event quantifier, since such a variable is already existentially quantified inside
the verb.
Based on Champollion’s (2015) denotation of for-adverbials, I put forth the
translation of for 2 hours in (10), where durative adverbials are of type 〈〈vt, t〉,
〈vt, t〉〉 after having combined with their temporal argument (a predicate of times).
In this way, a durative adverbial takes the denotation of a verbal projection of type
〈vt, t〉 and returns another generalized quantifier over events, ensuring that all ver-
bal projections are type 〈vt, t〉. Additionally, in its translation, I add a contextually
supplied partition or cover C as a placeholder for the minimal parts problem, as
suggested by Moltmann (1991). This problem deals with the fact that the predi-
cate may not hold at every smallest subinterval. For example, a sentence like John
jogged for two hours is still true even when John stopped to drink water for a brief
72
moment (Deo and Pin˜ango 2011).8 The cover C below in (10) would determine
how the predicate is distributed along relevant subintervals.9
(10) Jfor 2 hoursK = λV.λf.∃t[hours(t) = 2 ∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t) →
V (λe[f(e) ∧ τ(e) = t′])]]
[Adapted from Champollion (2015), ex. (31)]
In (10), the predicate must hold for each of its subintervals within a two-hour long
interval, as suggested in Dowty (1979). Champollion (2015) also observes that
t ⊆T tr in the denotation is necessary because it prevents the time interval from
being trivially verified outside of the reference time (p. 47). Moreoever, C(t′)(t) in
the denotation represents that the subinterval t′ is part of the contextually supplied
cover C of the interval in question t, that is, t′ falls within a contextually relevant
partition of t. Going back to the example John jogged for two hours, C would make
certain that the subintervals be regularly spread throughout the two-hour long in-
terval and large enough to contain an instantiation of John’s running, while at the
same time allowing for pauses such as short breaks to stop and take a breath, taking
into account contextual information. For instance, C(t′)(t) = true if and only if
8Moltmann (1991), departing from an event-based semantics of Dowty’s (1979) treatment of
for-adverbials, appeals to the contextually determined concept of relevant parthood, labeled P, as in
(i).
i. JFor x-timeK = λP. λt [x-time(t) ∧ ∀t′[t′Pt→ ∃e[P (e) ∧ τ(e) = t′]]]
[Moltmann (1991), ex. (17), simplified]
Such a parthood relation limits the number of subintervals to ‘relevant subintervals.’ What deter-
mines which are the relevant parts is left unclear (cf. Zucchi and White 2001). I believe that the
influential factors can be subsumed under two intermingled categories, which need to be taken into
consideration together: a) the regular size of the event described by the predicate relative to the size
of the interval and b) contextual/world knowledge information (cf. frequency adverbs like occasion-
ally in Stump 1981 via Champollion 2010).
9See e.g. Schwarzschild (1990, 1996) and Landman (1996, 2000) for further discussion on how
pluralities may distribute over subgroups or individualities.
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t′ is a sufficiently large part of t, where ‘sufficiently’ means large enough to con-
tain a running event. For a simple demonstration of how such event modifiers can
combine with a predicate like rain, observe the derivation in (11).
(11) Jrain for 2 hoursK = Jfor 2 hoursK(JrainK) = λf.∃t[hours(t) = 2 ∧
t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→ ∃e[raining(e) ∧ f(e) ∧ τ(e) = t′]]]
Finally, based on (10) and (11), and the close parallelism between for and
until, we can give a denotation for until in (12). In what follows, t0 is a contextually
supplied left boundary and [t0, n] represents a closed time interval, where n stands
for the temporal right boundary provided by the complement of until:
(12) Juntil 2 pmK = λV.λf.∃t[hours(t) = [t0, 2] ∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t) →
V (λe[f(e) ∧ τ(e) = t′])]]
In (13), I give a simple illustration of a modified VP by an until-phrase.
(13) Jrain until 2 pmK = Juntil 2 pmK(JrainK) = λf.∃t[hours(t) = [t0, 2] ∧
t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→ ∃e[raining(e) ∧ f(e) ∧ τ(e) = t′]]]
Even more relevant to the puzzle of punctual until, observe how the present frame-
work allows for a durative adverbial such as until 2 pm to be a low adverb that
scopes above or below negation, without resorting to non-standard treatments of
negation, since negation always outscopes the event quantifier. I illustrate this in
(14) (disregarding tense and closure for simplicity) for a sentence such as it did
not rain until 2 pm, which is ambiguous between a ‘not-throughout’ reading, as in
(14a), and a ‘throughout-not’ reading, as in (14b), since rain is an atelic predicate.
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(14) a. ‘Not-throughout’ reading: It is not the case that it rained until 2 pm.
PolP
〈vt, t〉
λf.¬∃t[hours(t) = [t0, 2] ∧ t ⊆T tr ∧
∀t′[C(t′)(t)→ ∃e[raining(e) ∧ f(e) ∧ τ(e) = t′]]]
Neg
not




λf.∃t[hours(t) = [t0, 2] ∧ t ⊆T tr ∧







〈〈vt, t〉, 〈vt, t〉〉
λV.λf.∃t[hours(t) = [t0, 2] ∧ t ⊆T tr ∧
∀t′[C(t′)(t)→ V (λe[f(e) ∧ τ(e) = t′])]]
Fig. 3.1: LF for the ‘not-throughout’ reading of the predicate not rain until 2 pm
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b. ‘Throughout-not’ reading: “Until 2 pm, it did not rain.”
λf.∃t[hours(t) = [t0, 2] ∧ t ⊆T tr ∧














〈〈vt, t〉, 〈vt, t〉〉
λV.λf.∃t[hours(t) = [t0, 2] ∧ t ⊆T tr ∧
∀t′[C(t′)(t)→ V (λe[f(e) ∧ τ(e) = t′])]]
Fig. 3.2: LF for the ‘throughout-not’ reading of the predicate not rain until 2 pm
In (14a), it is not the case that there is a time interval that ends at 2 pm such that it
rained for all of its relevant parts. In contrast, in (14b), there is an interval that ends
at 2 pm during which (i.e. during all of its relevant parts) there is no event of raining.
This ambiguity derived from using one single entry of until (instead of e.g. one
event-oriented and another one interval-oriented) together with a standard treatment
of logical negation could have not been achieved within previous frameworks of
event semantics. The fact that the two LFs in (14) are possible will help us develop
a uniform scopal account of the various functions of until.
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3.2.3 Argument saturation
As introduced above, in a neo-Davidsonian account verbal arguments—other than
the event argument tied to the verb—are introduced later in the syntax, which deter-
mines the order in which these are fed. But it could well be that thematic roles are
introduced as part of verbal denotations by a verb selecting all its arguments itself.
One can choose one’s favorite theory here. For comparison and uniformity across
analyses, since the framework in Champollion (2015) uses applicative heads, and
mostly for convenience, we are going to choose the former, and assure that thematic
roles combine with verbal projections via separate syntactic heads.
However, a technical difference from Champollion’s (2015) analysis is that
in our framework applicative heads operate on the verb first (instead of applying to
the DP first), which will make the rule for scope assignment, namely quantifier rais-
ing (henceforth, QR) cleaner. These thematic role heads I propose cannot combine
the verbal projection with a quantificational noun phrase, only with entities of type
e. This forces QR of any quantificational DPs.10 Ultimately, as detailed in §3, our
goal is that our syntactic theory of scope through quantifier raising will predict the
right scope relations, e.g. between a theme argument and a right-adjoined durative
adverbial.
Let us assume that thematic role heads take the denotation of a verbal projec-
tion, i.e. a generalized quantifier over events (i.e. predicate V), allow it to combine
with a referential noun phrase type e, and finally return another generalized quan-
tifier over events, conforming to the scheme of the present system. The applicative
10This is so that we do not have to unnaturally boost the types of the verbal phrase or its projections
in situ, unlike Champollion (2015).
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head type ends up being 〈〈vt, t〉, 〈〈e〉, 〈vt, t〉〉〉, as shown in (15).
(15) a. J[TH]K(preliminary) = λV. λx. λf. V ( λe[f(e) ∧ th(e) = x])
b. J[AG]K(preliminary) = λV. λx. λf. V ( λe[f(e) ∧ ag(e) = x])
An example is given in (16), where the syntactic head [TH] first combines with the
verbal projection of arrive and then the output of this applies to the entity John,
hence establishing a theme relation between this individual and the event denoted
by the predicate.
(16) a. J[TH]K(JarriveK) = λx. λf.∃e[arriving(e) ∧ f(e) ∧ th(e) = x]
b. J(16a)K(JJohnK) = λf.∃e[arriving(e) ∧ f(e) ∧ th(e) = j]
In this way, the mechanism of applicative heads makes it easier to have a uniform
analysis of thematic roles (both agent and theme) and to place constraints on the
role of the thematic head without having to change the lexical entry of the verb.
At this point, it is worth considering what happens when the verbal argument
that combines with a thematic head receives a kind-level reading. I assume that bare
plural and mass noun phrases can make reference to kinds and be categorized as
entities. Recall that bare DPs should not be treated on a par with a quantificational
DP like an N or some Ns. Otherwise, there is no systematic way to account for
the fact that a bare plural theme could take narrow scope with respect to a right-
adjoined durative adverbial, whereas an N or some Ns can only take wide scope
(e.g. John killed rabbits for two hours vs. #John killed some rabbits for two hours).
The acceptability of the former reminds us of a kind reading (e.g. John killed this
type of animal for two hours) (Carlson 1977a, b). Thus, bare plurals and mass nouns
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must be treated differently from indefinite DPs, contra analyses such as Wilkinson
(1991) and Diesing (1992) where “the source of existential quantification for bare
NPs and indefinites of the form an N and some Ns is the same” (via Zucchi and
White 2001: 269).
One way of differentiating bare/mass nouns from indefinites is by positing
that kinds do not have a quantificational force of their own, since they basically
denote entities that can be instantiated. On one approach, kinds behave in a simi-
lar way to individuals, in the sense that they are introduced directly into argument
positions of the verbal phrase/applicative heads.11 For example, an episodic sen-
tence with a bare plural kind would be interpreted along the lines in (17) under this
account.
(17) JHorses arrivedK = ∃e[arrive(e) ∧ th(e) = horses]
On another approach, a variant of Carlson’s (1977a, b) original proposal advanced
in Chierchia (1998) (see also Dayal 1992, 2004), kinds combine with verbs via
Derived Kind Predication (henceforth, DKP), a type-shifting operation which, trig-
gered by a type mismatch, inserts an existential quantifier that binds bare plural
kinds in episodic contexts. DKP ensures that the existential quantificational force
11By kind I mean the denotation of a ‘plural kind’, and not to a ‘singular kind.’ A potential concern
worth highlighting is that there is a difference between kind readings of bare plurals and of singular
definites. While the former are always good in episodic contexts, the latter are only good when what
is expressed is somehow momentous for the life of the whole kind (e.g. Chierchia 1998). See the
contrast in (i).
i. a. ?? The horse arrived. (on the kind-level reading)
b. The horse arrived in America with Columbus.
For ways of handling this contrast, see Kleiber (1990), Krifka et al. (1995), Chierchia (1998) and
Dayal (2004).
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that instantiates individuals of a kind in episodic contexts comes from a different
and external source than the existential quantifier binding an indefinite. After ap-
plying DKP, a sentence such as horses arrived would acquire a meaning along the
lines in (18).
(18) JHorses arrivedK = ∃e∃x[horses(x) ∧ arrive(e) ∧ th(e) = x]
For our purposes these two approaches are equivalent, since they both account for
how bare plurals differ from other weak indefinites, since they both predict narrow
scope behavior of bare plurals with respect to right adjoined durative adverbials.12
I will pursue a version of the latter following Chierchia’s (2015) proposal in
which if arguments are fed via applicative heads (which applies here), the effects
of DKP may already arise from the definition of the applicative head itself. I first
introduce the ‘up’-operator ‘∪’, as defined in (19), which associates a kind, seen as
a special type, with a special predicate over individuals that instantiates that type,
which can be regarded “as the ‘predicativization’ of kinds” (Chierchia 1998: 349).
(19) ∪x: it turns x into a predicate over entities that instantiate that kind if x is a
kind: P (∪x) = ∃y[∪x(y) ∧ P(y)].
Second, the predicativization of kinds in (19) can be built as part of the meaning of
the thematic head where if the head combines with something of type e other than
a kind then DKP does not obtain: ∪x = λy[y = x] if x is not a kind. This leads to
the final denotations of thematic heads in the present framework, as given in (20).
12Nevertheless, in other phenomena, such as anaphora, binding, and control involving kinds, there
are syntactic and semantic reasons that support the insertion of an existential quantifier; see Chier-
chia (1998, 2015) for examples of these. For even further independent motivation, see e.g. van
Geenhoven (1996) and Zucchi and White (2001).
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(20) a. J[TH]K(final) = λV. λx. λf. V ( λe[f(e) ∧ ∃y[∪x(y) ∧ th(e) = y]]),
where if x is not a kind, ∪x = λy[y = x]
b. J[AG]K(final) = λV. λx. λf. V ( λe[f(e) ∧ ∃y[∪x(y) ∧ ag(e) = y]]),
where if x is not a kind, ∪x = λy[y = x]
The basic idea behind (20) is that the existential quantifier that binds bare plurals
and mass nouns that receive a kind interpretation in episodic contexts can already
be provided by the applicative head. On the other hand, when the theme or agent
argument of type e in the input of the applicative head is not kind interpretable, then
no DKP effects unfold. For example, note the application of ∪ to an individual like
John:
(21) a. J[TH]K(JarriveK) = λx. λf. ∃e[arriving(e) ∧ f(e) ∧ ∃y[∪x(y) ∧
th(e) = y]]
b. J(21a)K(JJohnK) = λf. ∃e[arriving(e)∧f(e)∧∃y[∪j(y)∧th(e) = y]]
= λf. ∃e[arriving(e) ∧ f(e) ∧ ∃y[λz[z = j](y) ∧ th(e) = y]]
= λf. ∃e[arriving(e) ∧ f(e) ∧ ∃y[y = j ∧ th(e) = y]]
= λf. ∃e[arriving(e) ∧ f(e) ∧ th(e) = j]
[Based on Chierchia (2015), ex. (2c)]
In (21), John, a referential entity of type e, does not qualify as a kind, since it refers
to something instantiated just by one individual13, and hence we obtain the same
expected results as with our preliminary (common) version of applicative heads,
which ignored the effects of DKP. Otherwise, if the applicative head receives a kind
13It has been noted though that exceptionally there are kinds that can be instantiated only by one
individual or not instantiated at all in the real world, such as dodo; see Chierchia (1998), e.g. p. 350,
for further discussion.
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as input then the effects of DKP are obtained. This is illustrated in (22) with the
application of ∪ to a kind like horses.
(22) J(21a)K(JhorsesK) = λf. ∃e[arriving(e) ∧ f(e) ∧ ∃y[∪horses(y) ∧
th(e) = y]]
The applicative head, which already maps a kind into a corresponding property,
directly combines with the kind horses in (22) and nothing else happens.
3.2.4 Quantified DPs and scope assignment
Unlike Champollion (2015), I do not treat all noun phrases (henceforth, DPs) as
generalized quantifiers over individuals which can be interpreted in situ via type-
lifting rules of the verb or verbal projection so that the verb can combine directly
with a quantifier. Instead, I follow a syntactic theory of quantifier scope which uti-
lizes quantifier raising for type reasons. For this, recall that after the thematic head
operates on the verb, the verb phrase expects a non-quantificational argument.
3.2.4.1 DP arguments
In the present account, only proper names, referential DPs, pronouns, and kinds are
type e, as exemplified in (23), and can be interpreted in situ.
(23) JJohnK = j
On the other hand, I adopt the standard assumption that common nouns and pred-
icate noun phrases are predicates of type 〈et〉. I use P to refer to predicate of indi-
viduals, as in (24).
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(24) JrabbitK = λx.rabbit(x)
I also assume that quantified DPs are interpreted as generalized quantifiers over
individuals of type 〈et, t〉, and Q stands for predicates of such a type, as in (25).
(25) Ja rabbitK = λP.∃x[rabbit(x) ∧ P (x)]
3.2.4.2 (Extended) Quantifier Raising Rule
In the present framework we are changing the type of the propositional nuclei to
〈vt, t〉. One way of solving a type mismatch of a quantified DP with a verbal pro-
jection that expects something of type e is via quantifier raising. Let us assume, for
the time being, that the only two admissible landing sites for a quantified DP are (i)
TP (after closure) of type t, where a traditional QR rule following May (1977) may
apply, and (ii) vP of type 〈vt, t〉, where an extended QR rule, as explained below,
comes into play.
For the former, May (1977) posited a rule of QR that basically allowed a
quantifier to adjoin to IP. Under May’s QR approach, it follows that a raised quan-
tifier can only sit in an adjunction site whose semantic type is t. This is only possi-
ble after closure applies in the present framework. We will be adopting Heim and
Kratzer (1998) notation system and interpretable rules for QR (as discussed further
below).
Nevertheless, considering that all verbal projections before closure are event
propositions of type 〈vt, t〉, we may need to QR into the new propositional type,
say at vP. Hence, I posit the following extended QR rule in (26).
(26) Extended QR-rule: JDPi vPK = λf〈vt〉.JDPiK(λxi.[JvPK(f)])
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The effect of the extended QR-rule is as follows, stated in procedural terms. First we
apply the meaning of vP to a variable f of type 〈vt〉. We are then left with something
of type t. We can now perform regular QR, where vP now of type t and the adjoined
index are subject to Predicate Abstraction Rule, which assigns it a meaning of type
〈e, t〉. Then, the raised quantifier formerly adjoined to vP applies directly by func-
tion application. This yields something of type t. Finally, we reabstract f, giving
us back something of type 〈vt, t〉, complying with any verbal projection within the
current framework.14
3.2.5 Basic illustrations of the framework
On the basis of the principles of the suggested framework, below I show the deriva-
tions of three basic constructions: (i) an intransitive predicate; (ii) a transitive predi-
cate with a quantified direct object; and (iii) an ambiguous transitive predicate with
a quantified direct object in a negative environment. The first sentence in (27) in-
volves only function application, as illustrated in Fig. 3.3.
14This operation is essentially the ‘Generalized Quantifying in’ rule of Rooth’s (1992), who sug-
gests using this strategy known as Pointwise Function Application as the fundamental compositional





[tr ≺ now ∧ ∃e[studying(e) ∧ ag(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆T tr]]
[past-closure]
〈〈vt, t〉, t〉
λV [tr ≺ now ∧
V (λe[τ(e) ⊆T tr])]
PolP
〈vt, t〉
λf.∃e[studying(e) ∧ f (e) ∧ ag(e) = j]
Pos




λf.∃e[studying(e) ∧ f (e) ∧ ∃y[∪j(y) ∧ ag(e) = y]]







λx. λf.∃e[studying(e) ∧ f (e)
∧ ∃y[∪x(y) ∧ ag(e) = y]]
v[AG]
〈〈vt, t〉, 〈〈e〉, 〈vt, t〉〉〉
λV. λx. λf. V ( λe[f (e) ∧ ∃y[∪x(y) ∧ ag(e) = y]])
VP
〈vt, t〉




λf.∃e[studying(e) ∧ f (e)]
Fig. 3.3: LF for example (27): John studied
A slightly more complex construction is presented in (28), which contains
a quantified object, thus requiring the application of QR (subject to our extended
QR rule when QRing into vP) with movement and trace interpretation, as shown in
Fig. 3.4, giving us the interpretation that there is a rabbit such that John killed that
rabbit.
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(28) John killed a rabbit.
TP
t
[tr ≺ now ∧ ∃x[rabbit(x) ∧
∃e[killing(e) ∧ ag(e) = j ∧ th(e) = x ∧ τ(e) ⊆T tr]]]
[past-closure]
〈〈vt, t〉, t〉
λV [tr ≺ now ∧




∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧ ag(e) = j ∧ th(e) = x]]
Pos








λP.∃x[rabbit(x) ∧ P (x)]
vP
〈vt, t〉
λf.∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧ ∃y[∪j(y) ∧ ag(e) = y] ∧ th(e) = x1]







λx. λf.∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e)
∧ ∃y[∪x(y) ∧ ag(e) = y] ∧ th(e) = x1]
v[AG]
〈〈vt, t〉, 〈〈e〉, 〈vt, t〉〉〉
λV. λx. λf. V ( λe[f (e) ∧ ∃y[∪x(y) ∧ ag(e) = y]])
VP
〈vt, t〉
λf.∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧ ∃y[∪x1(y) ∧ th(e) = y]]
= λf.∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧ th(e) = x1]
V′
〈e, 〈vt, t〉〉
λx. λf.∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e)
∧ ∃y[∪x(y) ∧ th(e) = y]]
AP[TH ]
〈〈vt, t〉, 〈〈e〉, 〈vt, t〉〉〉




λf.∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e)]
x1
Fig. 3.4: LF for example (28): John killed a rabbit
Finally, the sentence in (29) only differs from (28) with respect to polarity.
As illustrated in Fig. 3.5, even though negation is applied before [past-closure], it
can be treated classically in terms of logical negation. The reading we obtain after
application of our extended QR rule as in Fig. 3.5 is that there is no rabbit such that
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John killed that rabbit, i.e. an any-type interpretation comparable to John didn’t kill
any rabbit.
(29) John didn’t kill a rabbit.
TP
t
[tr ≺ now ∧ ¬∃x[rabbit(x) ∧
∃e[killing(e) ∧ ag(e) = j ∧ th(e) = x ∧ τ(e) ⊆T tr]]]
[past-closure]
〈〈vt, t〉, t〉
λV [tr ≺ now ∧




∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧ ag(e) = j ∧ th(e) = x]]
Neg
not








λP.∃x[rabbit(x) ∧ P (x)]
vP
〈vt, t〉
λf.∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧ ∃y[∪j(y) ∧ ag(e) = y] ∧ th(e) = x1]







λx. λf.∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e)
∧ ∃y[∪x(y) ∧ ag(e) = y] ∧ th(e) = x1]
v[AG]
〈〈vt, t〉, 〈〈e〉, 〈vt, t〉〉〉
λV. λx. λf. V ( λe[f (e) ∧ ∃y[∪x(y) ∧ ag(e) = y]])
VP
〈vt, t〉
λf.∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧ ∃y[∪x1(y) ∧ th(e) = y]]
= λf.∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧ th(e) = x1]
V′
〈e, 〈vt, t〉〉
λx. λf.∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e)
∧ ∃y[∪x(y) ∧ th(e) = y]]
AP[TH ]
〈〈vt, t〉, 〈〈e〉, 〈vt, t〉〉〉




λf.∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e)]
x1
]
Fig. 3.5: LF-1 for example (29): John did not kill a rabbit
An alternative interpretation of (29) is obtained by regular QR-ing the quantified
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object to TP, from where the DP-object outscopes negation: there is a rabbit such
that John did not kill that rabbit, as demonstrated in Fig. 3.6:15
TP
t
∃x[rabbit(x) ∧ tr ≺ now ∧




λP.∃x[rabbit(x) ∧ P (x)]
et
λx.tr ≺ now ∧
¬∃e[killing(e) ∧ ag(e) = j ∧ th(e) = x ∧ τ(e) ⊆T tr]
1 T’
t
tr ≺ now ∧
¬∃e[killing(e) ∧ ag(e) = j ∧ th(e) = x1 ∧ τ(e) ⊆T tr]
[past-closure]
〈〈vt, t〉, t〉
λV [tr ≺ now ∧
V (λe[τ(e) ⊆T tr])]
PolP
〈vt, t〉
λf.¬∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧ ag(e) = j ∧ th(e) = x1]
Neg
not




λf.∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧ ∃y[∪j(y) ∧ ag(e) = y] ∧ th(e) = x1]







λx. λf.∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e)
∧ ∃y[∪x(y) ∧ ag(e) = y] ∧ th(e) = x1]
v[AG]
〈〈vt, t〉, 〈〈e〉, 〈vt, t〉〉〉
λV. λx. λf. V ( λe[f (e) ∧ ∃y[∪x(y) ∧ ag(e) = y]])
VP
〈vt, t〉
λf.∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧ ∃y[∪x1(y) ∧ th(e) = y]]
= λf.∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧ th(e) = x1]
V′
〈e, 〈vt, t〉〉
λx. λf.∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e)
∧ ∃y[∪x(y) ∧ th(e) = y]]
AP[TH ]
〈〈vt, t〉, 〈〈e〉, 〈vt, t〉〉〉




λf.∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e)]
x1
Fig. 3.6: LF-2 for example (29): John did not kill a rabbit
Here I have illustrated how the present framework works by giving the derivations
15In very simple terms, the purpose of a branch with an index in the tree is to create a prop-
erty via λ-abstraction out of the sentence, and g(1) is the relevant variable assignment via variable
assignment function g. See Heim and Kratzer (1998: 210-238) for further details.
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of three basic sentences: John studied, John killed a rabbit, and the ambiguity in
John didn’t kill a rabbit.16
3.2.6 Summing up
In this section I have introduced the main characteristics of the quantificational
event semantics framework a` la Champollion (2015) together with some alterations,
mostly due to the treatment of scope I have adopted. As a summary of the main
formal specifications, see Table 3.1.
Category Abbreviation Semantic type Example of denotation
Verb V 〈vt, t〉 JkissK = λf.∃e[kissing(e) ∧ f(e)]
Proper name x e JJohnK = j
Common noun P 〈et〉 JrabbitK = λx.rabbit(x)
Quantified DP Q 〈et, t〉 Ja rabbitK = λP.∃x[rabbit(x) ∧ P (x)]
AP[TH] [TH] 〈〈vt, t〉, 〈〈e〉, 〈vt, t〉〉〉 λV. λx. λf. V ( λe[f(e) ∧ ∃y[∪x(y) ∧ th(e) = y]]),
where if x is not a kind, ∪x = λy[y = x]
v[AG] [AG] 〈〈vt, t〉, 〈〈e〉, 〈vt, t〉〉〉 λV. λx. λf. V ( λe[f(e) ∧ ∃y[∪x(y) ∧ ag(e) = y]]),
where if x is not a kind, ∪x = λy[y = x]
Negation Neg 〈〈vt, t〉, 〈vt, t〉〉 JnotK = λV.λf.¬V (f)
Pos 〈〈vt, t〉, 〈vt, t〉〉 JPosK = λV.λf.V (f)
Past-closure 〈〈vt, t〉, t〉 λV [tr ≺ now ∧ V (λe[τ(e) ⊆T tr])]
For 2 hours 〈〈vt, t〉, 〈vt, t〉〉 λV.λf.∃t[hours(t) = 2 ∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→ V (λe[f(e) ∧ τ(e) = t′])]]
Until 2 pm. 〈〈vt, t〉, 〈vt, t〉〉 λV.λf.∃t[hours(t) = [t0, 2] ∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→ V (λe[f(e) ∧ τ(e) = t′])]]
Table 3.1: A summary of the basic formal semantic specifications of our framework
3.3 A scopal account of for-adverbials and until-phrases
I put forward a syntactic and semantic account of quantifier scope of English du-
rative adverbials for and until treated as universal quantifiers, so as to capture the
following basic facts:
16From here onwards, for simplicity purposes, I will not show on trees the intermediate step in
the derivation of the application of the ∪operator from an applicative head to an entity e other than
a kind, as I have, for instance, illustrated at the vP and VP nodes in Fig. 3.6 above. I will give the
result of composing the applicative head with a DP x of type e by taking into account that if x is not
a kind, then ∪x = λy[y = x].
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i Affirmative non-iterative telic predicates (non-iterative achievements and ac-
complishments) cannot combine with a durative adverbial.17
ii Telic predicates become acceptable with durative adverbials under negation and
acquire a ‘throughout-not’ interpretation, whereas atelic predicates are ambigu-
ous between a ‘not-throughout’ and a ‘throughout-not’ interpretation.
iii DP quantifiers generally scope over right-adjoined durative adverbials unless
another overt/covert distributive operator such as every day intervenes.
My scopal approach is a refinement of Mittwoch’s (1977) original insight in that the
crucial difference between durative and punctual uses of a durative adverbial such
as until is scopal and not lexical. I start by claiming that right-adjoined durative
adverbials are low adverbs that attach as low as possible compatible with their type,
as expected from their prevalent tendency to take narrow scope with respect to
other scope bearing elements in the clause. The initial specifications of the analysis
together with its preliminary predictions are described below. These are shown first
for episodic sentences in upward entailing environments.
17Recall that sometimes an accomplishment predicate accepts a durative adverbial on what is
often referred to as a partitive reading (e.g. Champollion 2013), or a coerced imperfective interpre-
tation (e.g. in Krifka’s 1998 terms), because the predicate has not yet reached its completion, as in
John read a book for 2 hours/until 2pm. Such interpretations are outside the scope of the present
dissertation. But intuitively one could invoke some sort of partitioning operator (which maps poten-
tially complete eventualities into incomplete ones through the mereological notion of incrementality,
e.g. Krifka 1998, Beavers 2012) or a notion of partial theme (vs. complete theme) so as to account
for such cases. For instance, see for discussion on this issue Krifka (1998) and Tatevosov and Inanov
(2009).
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3.3.1 The base position of for/until-XPs in positive episodic con-
texts
I first suggest that right-adjoined durative adverbials are low adverbs, i.e. the canon-
ical attachment site for English for and until measure phrases is the VP, as expressed
in (30).
(30) Hypothesis #1 (to be modified): Right-adjoined durative adverbials are low
adverbs whose canonical attachment site is the lowest possible XP, i.e. the
VP, compatible with their type.
Considering that these adverbials are generated in a low position, a quantified sub-
ject will always scope over them. Furthermore, a quantified object cannot be inter-
preted in situ either, thus entailing that the object-DP must QR to some higher pos-
sible attachment site, say vP. In this way, through the assumption that right-adjoined
durative-adverbials are low adverbs, their usual narrow scope behavior directly fol-
lows, as captured in the following examples. The temporal measure phrase chosen
below just for illustrative purposes is for-adverbials, but exactly the same applies to
until-phrases, considering that their denotations only differ in terms of the type of
interval they pick to encode the duration of the event in question.
3.3.1.1 Atelic predicates
Below in (31) and Fig. 3.7, I give the LF and derivation of a simple example com-
posed by an atelic predicate and a durative adverbial, which displays the durative
adverbial generated low at the VP level. The fact that the for-XP can modify the
atelic predicate simply follows from the subinterval property.
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(31) John studied for 2 hours.
TP
t
[tr ≺ now ∧ ∃t[hours(t) = 2
∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→
∃e[studying(e) ∧ ag(e) = j ∧ τ(e) = t′ ∧ t′ ⊆T tr]]]]
[past-closure]
〈〈vt, t〉, t〉
λV [tr ≺ now ∧




∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→
∃e[studying(e) ∧ f (e) ∧ ag(e) = j ∧ τ(e) = t′]]]
Pos





∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→








∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→
∃e[studying(e) ∧ f (e)
∧ ∃y[∪x(y) ∧ ag(e) = y] ∧ τ(e) = t′]]]
v[AG]
〈〈vt, t〉, 〈〈e〉, 〈vt, t〉〉〉




∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→
∃e[studying(e) ∧ f (e) ∧ τ(e) = t′]]]
VP1
〈vt, t〉




λf.∃e[studying(e) ∧ f (e)]
PP
for 2 hours
〈〈vt, t〉, 〈vt, t〉〉
λV.λf.∃t[hours(t) = 2
∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→
V (λe[f (e) ∧ τ(e) = t′])]]
Fig. 3.7: LF for example (31): John studied for 2 hours
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3.3.1.2 Punctual predicates with a referential object
The following example in (32) demonstrates a basic case of a telic predicate with
a referential object of type e. The verb used is the punctual verb kill, which does
not allow for iteration of the predicate, since the same object cannot be killed more
than once. In Dowty’s terminology, kill lacks the subinterval property (given that
the predicate cannot hold at any subinterval of the interval of which it holds). Thus,
the combination of kill with a durative adverbial turns out to be infelicitous.




[tr ≺ now ∧ ∃t[hours(t) = 2
∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→
∃e[killing(e) ∧ ag(e) = j ∧ th(e) = r ∧ τ(e) = t′ ∧ t′ ⊆T tr]]]]
[past-closure]
〈〈vt, t〉, t〉
λV [tr ≺ now ∧




∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→
∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧ ag(e) = j ∧ th(e) = r ∧ τ(e) = t′]]]
Pos





∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→








∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→
∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧
∃y[∪x(y) ∧ ag(e) = y] ∧ th(e) = r ∧ τ(e) = t′]]]
v[AG]
〈〈vt, t〉, 〈〈e〉, 〈vt, t〉〉〉




∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→
∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧ th(e) = r ∧ τ(e) = t′]]]
VP1
〈vt, t〉
λf.∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧ th(e) = r]
V′
〈e, 〈vt, t〉〉
λx. λf.∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e)
∧ ∃y[∪x(y) ∧ th(e) = y]]
AP[TH ]
〈〈vt, t〉, 〈〈e〉, 〈vt, t〉〉〉











〈〈vt, t〉, 〈vt, t〉〉
λV.λf.∃t[hours(t) = 2
∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→
V (λe[f (e) ∧ τ(e) = t′])]]
Fig. 3.8: LF for example (32): #John killed the rabbit for 2 hours
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3.3.1.3 Punctual predicates with a kind object
The implausible scenario in Fig. 3.8 contrasts with a context in which the object
may vary at each subinterval, e.g. when the direct object is a bare plural that receives
a kind interpretation, as exemplified in (33) and Fig. 3.9 below. The intuition behind
this is that when the object (e.g. rabbits) is perceived as a kind, the theme applicative
head existentially binds the object in situ, which is then able to scope below the
universal quantifier of the durative adverbial.




[tr ≺ now ∧ ∃t[hours(t) = 2
∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→
∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧ ag(e) = j ∧
∃y[∪rabbits(y) ∧ th(e) = y] ∧ τ(e) = t′ ∧ t′ ⊆T tr]]]]
[past-closure]
〈〈vt, t〉, t〉
λV [tr ≺ now ∧




∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→
∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧ ag(e) = j ∧
∃y[∪rabbits(y) ∧ th(e) = y] ∧ τ(e) = t′]]]
Pos





∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→
∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧ ag(e) = j ∧








∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→
∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧
∃z[∪x(z) ∧ ag(e) = z ∧
∃y[∪rabbits(y) ∧ th(e) = y] ∧ τ(e) = t′]]]]
v[AG]
〈〈vt, t〉, 〈〈e〉, 〈vt, t〉〉〉




∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→
∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧
∃y[∪rabbits(y) ∧ th(e) = y] ∧ τ(e) = t′]]]
VP1
〈vt, t〉
λf.∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧
∃y[∪rabbits(y) ∧ th(e) = y]]
V′
〈e, 〈vt, t〉〉
λx. λf.∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e)
∧ ∃y[∪x(y) ∧ th(e) = y]]
AP[TH ]
〈〈vt, t〉, 〈〈e〉, 〈vt, t〉〉〉











〈〈vt, t〉, 〈vt, t〉〉
λV.λf.∃t[hours(t) = 2
∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→
V (λe[f (e) ∧ τ(e) = t′])]]
Fig. 3.9: LF for example (33): John killed rabbits for 2 hours
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As a consequence, bare plurals or mass nouns on a kind-reading derive a felicitous
interpretation with a durative adverbial even with punctual, non-iterative eventuali-
ties, in a positive environment, as illustrated in Fig. 3.9.
3.3.1.4 Punctual predicates with an indefinite/quantified object
On the other hand, a quantified-DP subject or object cannot combine directly with
the applicative head due to type theoretic mismatch. As a result, it raises to a higher
position, vP, where an interpretation is possible via our extended QR rule. This
derives a wide scope reading of the indefinite/quantified DP since, after QR, the
existential force of the DP ends up scoping above the universal quantifier of the
durative adverbial. This is exemplified in (34) and Fig. 3.10 with a singular indefi-
nite DP-object and the non-iterative telic predicate kill, which is infelicitous for the
same pragmatic reasons as (32) is with a referential DP object, since the theme is
kept constant and the predicate kill lacks the subinterval property.




[tr ≺ now ∧ ∃x[rabbit(x) ∧ ∃t[hours(t) = 2
∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→
∃e[killing(e) ∧ ag(e) = j ∧ th(e) = x ∧ τ(e) = t′ ∧ t′ ⊆T tr]]]]]
[past-closure]
〈〈vt, t〉, t〉
λV [tr ≺ now ∧
V (λe[τ(e) ⊆T tr])]
PolP
〈vt, t〉
λf.∃x[rabbit(x) ∧ ∃t[hours(t) = 2
∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→
∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧ ag(e) = j ∧ th(e) = x ∧ τ(e) = t′]]]]
Pos
〈〈vt, t〉, 〈vt, t〉〉
λV.λf.V (f )
〈vt, t〉
λf.∃x[rabbit(x) ∧ ∃t[hours(t) = 2
∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→








∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→








∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→
∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧
∃y[∪x(y) ∧ ag(e) = y] ∧ th(e) = x1 ∧ τ(e) = t′]]]
v[AG]
〈〈vt, t〉, 〈〈e〉, 〈vt, t〉〉〉




∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→
∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧ th(e) = x1 ∧ τ(e) = t′]]]
VP1
〈vt, t〉
λf.∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧ th(e) = x1]
V′
〈e, 〈vt, t〉〉
λx. λf.∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e)
∧ ∃y[∪x(y) ∧ th(e) = y]]
AP[TH ]
〈〈vt, t〉, 〈〈e〉, 〈vt, t〉〉〉









〈〈vt, t〉, 〈vt, t〉〉
λV.λf.∃t[hours(t) = 2
∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→
V (λe[f (e) ∧ τ(e) = t′])]]
Fig. 3.10: LF for example (34): #John killed a rabbit for 2 hours
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Therefore, the assumption that right-adjoined durative adverbials are event modi-
fiers that attach low at the VP level is in line with their narrow scope tendency, as
shown in the derivation in Fig. 3.10, which accounts for the anomaly of a sentence
such as #John killed a rabbit for 2 hours. Now it is time to ask the question: Why is
the universal quantification force of measure-phrases restricted to low scope? Even
if for/until-phrases are generated ‘low’, why can they not raise and scope over the
object, which would yield a natural reading?
3.3.1.5 Punctual predicates with an indefinite/quantified object: Unavailable
alternative scenario
At this point, it is important to consider an alternative scenario in which the du-
rative adverbial would attach to a higher position compatible with its type, say at
PolP, right above a quantified raised-object. At first, there is nothing that should in
principle be disallowing such a plausible scenario, say for the sentence as in (34),
given again as (35).
(35) # John killed a rabbit for 2 hours.
If the durative adverbial were able to attach higher and scope above the indefinite
in (35), the derivation would give rise to a perfectly plausible scenario, i.e. one in
which John kept killing rabbits, one at a time, over the course of two hours, thus
resembling the meaning of (33) with a bare plural object. However, such a reading,
with the ∀ scoping above the ∃, which would correspond to the derivation in Fig.




[tr ≺ now ∧ ∃t[hours(t) = 2
∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→
∃x[rabbit(x) ∧ ∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧
ag(e) = j ∧ th(e) = x ∧ τ(e) = t′ ∧ t′ ⊆T tr]]]]]
[past-closure]
〈〈vt, t〉, t〉
λV [tr ≺ now ∧
V (λe[τ(e) ⊆T tr])]
〈vt, t〉
λf.∃t[hours(t) = 2
∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→
∃x[rabbit(x) ∧ ∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧




∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧
ag(e) = j ∧ th(e) = x]]
Pos








λP.∃x[rabbit(x) ∧ P (x)]
vP
〈vt, t〉







λx.λf.∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧
∃y[∪x(y) ∧ ag(e) = y] ∧ th(e) = x1]
v[AG]
〈〈vt, t〉, 〈〈e〉, 〈vt, t〉〉〉
λV. λx. λf. V ( λe[f (e) ∧ ∃y[∪x(y) ∧ ag(e) = y]])
VP
〈vt, t〉
λf.∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e) ∧ th(e) = x1]
V′
〈e, 〈vt, t〉〉
λx. λf.∃e[killing(e) ∧ f (e)
∧ ∃y[∪x(y) ∧ th(e) = y]]
AP[TH ]
〈〈vt, t〉, 〈〈e〉, 〈vt, t〉〉〉









〈〈vt, t〉, 〈vt, t〉〉
λV.λf.∃t[hours(t) = 2
∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→
V (λe[f (e) ∧ τ(e) = t′])]]
Fig. 3.11: Unavailable LF for example (35): #John killed a rabbit for 2 hours
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The fact that the meaning derived in Fig. 3.11 is not available suggests that some-
thing must block this construal. Some constraint that blocks this configuration seems
necessary on every approach. Therefore, note that such right-adjoined adverbials
scope low, and this was my hypothesis for their base-position. But we can now
ask the question of why they scope low, and furthermore address the question of
whether there are any exceptions to this and when such exceptions occur and why.
Below I will make a more concrete proposal.
3.3.1.6 Summing up
Up to this point, the major claim of this chapter about for- and until-XPs has been
that they are event modifiers that attach as low as possible compatible with their
type, i.e. at the VP-level. This captures their narrow scope behavior with respect to
any indefinite/quantified DP subject/object in the clause in positive episodic sen-
tences. As it turns out, however, this is not always the case: suspension of narrow
scope of the durative adverbial is indeed possible under certain circumstances (e.g.
with negation), suggesting that extraposition of the durative adverbial to a higher
attachment site should still be allowed, yet restricted. This calls for a revision of
our preliminary hypothesis.
3.3.2 Suspension of differentiated scope via Maximize Strength
In this section, I address the scopal behavior of right-adjoined durative adverbials
so as to better understand the constrained behavior of their universal component,
and how it may differ from other freer universals like every day.
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So far I have proposed that right-adjoined durative adverbials have a low
attachment site. However, I now argue that they can also be extraposed to a higher
position in certain circumstances. For example, suspension of narrow scope behav-
ior seems to be possible in the presence of negation. The configuration in (36b) is
necessary for the ‘throughout-not’ reading.
(36) a. John didn’t pet a dog for 2 hours/until 2 pm.















for 2 hours/until 2 pm
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In the configuration in (36b), a right-adjoined durative adverbial is extraposed, and
right adjoined to PolP (i.e Pos/NegP) from its position to the right. However, as dis-
cussed above, we generally need to block adjunction to PolP so as not to overgen-
erate. The durative adverb seems to be constrained to having narrow scope with re-
spect to an object but it must be allowed to have wide scope with respect to negation.
How do we resolve this paradox? Any theory dealing with right-adjoined durative-
adverbials must tackle this puzzle, because contrary to what one would expect, they
do not have free scopal behavior. Remember that this might be so even when the
reading that would obtain from scoping out the adverbial would sound more nat-
ural; e.g. in John dialed a wrong phone number for two hours, the only possible
interpretation is dialing the same wrong phone number over and over again, instead
of dialing different wrong phone numbers. So what prevents extraposition of the
adverb?
I propose that extraposition of for/until-phrases is subject to a version of
a Maximize Strength Constraint, a constraint on the processing of possible clause-
internal scope interpretations: these types of adverbials cannot scope out if they lead
to a logically weaker reading. This is to be viewed as an economy condition rem-
iniscent of (i) Fox’s (1995) treatment of scope restriction in VP-ellipsis and of (ii)
theories that posit that argument structure is sensitive to informativeness/strength
(e.g. Horn 1972, 1989; Beavers 2010). I hence suggest replacing our former hy-
pothesis given in (30)—repeated here as (37)—for (38).
(37) Hypothesis #1: Right-adjoined durative adverbials are low adverbs whose
canonical attachment site is the lowest possible XP, i.e. the VP, compatible
with their type.
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(38) Hypothesis #2: Maximize Strength (to be modified): Right-adjoined du-
rative adverbials are low adverbs whose canonical attachment site is the
lowest possible XP, i.e. the VP, compatible with their type, and they may
not raise if it leads to weakening.
I refer to “degree of informativeness” in terms of “logical strength.” Extraposition
of the low adverbial to a higher position, say PolP or FreqP, is only permissible
when it does not weaken the assertion, i.e. when it does not make the assertion less
informative, along the lines specified below: “If φ asymmetrically entails ψ, then
φ is more informative than ψ, simply because φ must be true in a proper subset of
the situations(/worlds) in which ψ is true. In other words, φ rules out more ‘live
options’ than any logically weaker proposition ψ” (Chierchia 2013: 24).
Recent theories of scalar implicatures in grammar (Gajewski 2003, Chier-
chia 2006, 2013, 2017, Fox and Hackl 2006, Magri 2009) suggest that scalar impli-
catures and logical contradictions are computed prior to and blindly to pragmatic
processes. Along similar lines, I propose that the logical entailment relation invoked
by Maximize Strength “is checked at a level of representation where only logical
operators are retained, while non-logical lexical entries are ignored, together with
the common knowledge that they carry along” (Gajewski 2003 via Magri 2009:
260). In a nutshell, the argument has the following shape: Maximize Strength is
computed blindly (ignoring content words). This will prevent extraposition in the
basic cases (i.e. in positive episodic environments). Then, once content words come
into play, the result will be deviant or not depending on the specific verbs and nouns
and common knowledge. This is similar to cases of blind computation discussed in
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the literature for scalar implicatures.18
More specifically, measure phrases, which can be legitimately analyzed as
numbers, such as for 2 hours/until 2 pm, do count as logical words, whereas lexical
entries of a verb, object, or subject count as content words, represented in (39) as
Ving, object, and subject, respectively. The scopal outcome of applying Maximize
Strength is computed ‘blindly’ to common knowledge, where the structure in (39a)
is preferred to (39b) because the latter is weaker, since an ∃ > ∀-reading entails a
∀ > ∃-reading. Thus, (39b) is ruled out by Maximize Strength. Once (39b) is out
of the picture, the result in (39a) is checked against common knowledge and if it
clashes with it then deviance ensues.
(39) a. Base position λf.∃x[object(x) ∧ ∃t[hours(t) = 2 ∧ t ⊆T tr ∧
∀t′[C(t′)(t) → ∃e[Ving(e) ∧ f(e) ∧ ag(e) = subject ∧ th(e) =
x ∧ τ(e) = t′]]]]
b. Extraposed λf.∃t[hours(t) = 2 ∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→
∃x[object(x) ∧ ∃e[Ving(e) ∧ f(e) ∧ ag(e) = subject ∧ th(e) =
x ∧ τ(e) = t′]]]]
In other words, the derivation in (39a), which complies with Maximize Strength, is
per se non-contradictory in logical terms (ignoring how the lexical words, Ving, ob-
ject, subject, are replaced in the structure), but it can become a lexical contradiction
18Magri (2009) contributes to the claim that scalar implicatures must be derived within grammar,
which can be used to provide a semantic account of grammatical facts. For instance, this would
explain the oddness of a sentence such as #a biological father of the victim arrived late because of
its strengthened meaning computed blindly to common knowledge, namely that the victim has more
than one biological father, which then clashes with common knowledge and hence its deviance. If
the scalar implicature were not computed blindly to common knowledge #a biological father of the
victim arrived late would mean the same as the biological father of the victim arrived late, assuming
a world in which people have only one biological father. See Magri (2009) for further discussion.
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(not a logical one) once we insert particular content words and take into account
world knowledge.
In more concrete terms, the structure in positive episodic environments rep-
resented in (39a) becomes deviant when the content words are filled in with a non-
iterative telic predicate such as kill a rabbit, since according to world knowledge the
same rabbit cannot be killed multiple times. On the other hand, deviance does not
derive when the lexical items constitute an atelic predicate or a telic predicate that
allows for iteration, such as dial a wrong phone number, because world knowledge
allows for the same wrong phone number to be dialed multiple times, as contrasted
in (40).
(40) a. λf.∃x[a rabbit(x) ∧ ∃t[hours(t) = 2 ∧ t ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t)→
∃e[killing(e) ∧ f(e) ∧ ag(e) = John ∧ th(e) = x ∧ τ(e) = t′]]]]
(there is a rabbit that was killed over and over again for two hours)
b. λf.∃x[a wrong phone number(x) ∧ ∃t[hours(t) = 2 ∧ t ⊆T
tr ∧ ∀t′[C(t′)(t) → ∃e[dial(e) ∧ f(e) ∧ ag(e) = John ∧ th(e) =
x ∧ τ(e) = t′]]]]
(there is a wrong phone number that was dialed over and over again
for two hours)
All in all, an economy condition based on logical strength, computed blindly to
contextual knowledge along the lines specified in Maximize Strength, seems to be
on the right track and capable of explaining why extraposition of the low adver-
bial is blocked in positive episodic sentences. However, logical strength reverses
in downward-entailing environments, as explained next, and this will have conse-
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quences in presence of scopal operators like negation that derive predictions that
further support this analysis.
3.3.2.1 Negation
As seen above, when we have a positive episodic sentence, i.e. when PolP is filled
with pos, only one of the two scopal possibilities can be derived because a narrow
scope interpretation of the durative adverbial is logically more informative than a
wide scope reading.
(41) Yesterday John pet a dog for 2 hours.
a. [∃ > ∀] [John pet a dog [for 2 hours]] (Base position)
b. [∀ > ∃] [[John pet a dog] for 2 hours] (Extraposed)
A ∀ > ∃-reading is weaker than an ∃ > ∀-reading since the latter asymmetrically
entails the former. Thus, in (41), extraposition of the low adverbial to a higher po-
sition so that the time universal can outscope the existential object is disallowed,
since it would weaken its meaning (no matter what the content words are).
As far as negative contexts are concerned, it is a general logical fact that
downward-entailing items (like negation) reverse logical strength/ informativeness.
More specifically, in the case of negation or a downward-entailing environment, if
φ entails ψ (i.e. if φ is logically stronger, and hence more informative than ψ) and
C is a downward-entailing environment, then φ in the environment of C does not
entail ψ in the environment of C. This is exemplified in (42).
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(42) John didn’t pet a dog for 2 hours.
a. [¬∃ > ∀] [It is not the case that [John pet a dog [for 2 hours]]] (Base
position)
b. [∀ > ¬∃] [[It is not the case that [John pet a dog]] for 2 hours] (Extra-
posed)
The meaning derived from the base structure in (42a), in which the universal scopes
below negation, now does not entail the meaning derived from the extraposed struc-
ture in (42b), where the universal outscopes negation, since the former is compatible
with situations in which the latter is not. Imagine a context in which John pet the
dog for only one hour. This comes out true in the ‘not’-throughout reading, but false
in the ‘throughout-not’ reading. In other words, a ‘throughout-not’ reading, which
asserts that throughout a specific time interval an eventuality did not take place, is
not entailed by a ‘not-throughout’ reading, which asserts that the eventuality did
not take place only throughout a subset of the subintervals of the interval in ques-
tion. The Maximize Strength constraint allows for both scopal possibilities in (42)
because extraposition of the durative adverbial in (42b) does not weaken the logical
meaning that arises from its base position in (42a) considering that it gives us an
interpretation that is not entailed by the base position. Thus we predict that when
a for/until-phrase modifies a negated predicate, the outcome should be ambiguous
between a ‘not-throughout’ and a ‘throughout-not’ interpretation.
A case worth mentioning here is a sentence with a quantified DP nobody,
which seems to also be able to take narrow scope with respect to a right-adjoined
durative adverbial since it gives rise to a perfectly felicitous reading with a non-
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iterative telic predicate. Nobody could be analyzed as an n-word by positing covert
negation, e.g. following Zeijlstra (2009), which reverses logical strength, and extra-
position of the durative adverbial is hence permitted because it does not lead to a
weaker reading, similarly to the case discussed above in (42). Thus both scopal pos-
sibilities are in principle possible according to Maximize Strength. However, when
content words are taken into account only the extraposed configuration gives rise
to a natural interpretation if it involves a non-iterative telic predicate such as kill a
rabbit, as shown in (43).
(43) Nobody killed a rabbit for 2 hours.
a. [¬∃ > ∀] #[it is not the case that [somebody killed a rabbit
[for 2 hours]]]
(Base position)
b. [∀ > ¬∃] [[it is not the case that [somebody killed a rabbit]]
for 2 hours]
(Extraposed)
Nonetheless, the fact that the extraposed reading is possible at all follows from
Maximize Strength for exactly the same reason it does with negation, providing
further justification for this approach.
Thus far, based on Maximize Strength, right-adjoined durative adverbials
in downward-entailing episodic environments can attach to a higher position, e.g.
right-adjoining to PolP, provided that this does not weaken the meaning obtained
from their low base-position.19 If the predicate can satisfy the subinterval property,
19I would like to thank Hans Kamp for all his insights on Maximize Strength. The key general-
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this leads to ambiguity between a ‘not-throughout’ and a ‘throughout-not’ reading,
otherwise the latter interpretation, i.e. the reading obtained via extraposition, is the
only possibility.20
3.3.2.2 Other downward-entailing environments
A significant question that arises at this point is the following: is it only (overt/covert)
sentential negation that licenses extraposition of the durative adverbial, or are there
other DE contexts, which also reverse logical strength, that trigger a higher attach-
ment of the low adverbial? Maximize Strength predicts this to be the case, and as we
will see here this prediction is borne out.21 This provides still further independent
ization of such a constraint is that a right-adjoined durative adverbial does not raise if it leads to an
interpretation already entailed from the base position. It is not necessary for the wide scope reading
to entail the interpretation obtained from the base position, i.e. raising need not lead to strengthening.
20Further note that a predicate with an indefinite/quantified object may be ambiguous between
three (and not only two) potential readings depending on the telic properties of the verb, plus where
the DP attaches to after QR, as specified in (i) for the sentences John didn’t kiss (durative)/ kill
(punctual) a diplomat for two hours:
i. a. [PolP not [ a diplomat1 [vP was kissed/ killed x1 for/until-XP ]]]
there is no diplomat that was kissed/ ?killed for 2 hours.
Sensible or not depending on the telic properties of the event
b. [ for/until-XP [PolP not [ a diplomat1 [vP was kissed/ killed x1]]]]
for 2 hours there was no diplomat that was kissed/killed
Sensible
c. [ a diplomat1 [TP past [ for/until-XP [PolP not [vP John kissed/ killed x1]]]]]
there exists a diplomat and for 2 hours John didn’t kiss/ ?kill such a diplomat
Sensible or not depending on the telic properties of the event
d. [ for/until-XP [PolP ′ a diplomat1 [PolP not [vP was kissed x1]]]]
for 2 hours there was a diplomat that wasn’t kissed
Unattested
This is the reason why we might have to stipulate that the only admissible landing sites for QR of a
quantified object/subject are vP and TP (but not PolP).
21Non-logical predicates that create downward-entailing environments, such as fail, deny, and
avoid, are predicted to systematically lack readings available with downward monotone logical op-
erators and instead behave in the same manner as if they were upward entailing. This prediction
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evidence for this approach.
Besides negation, there are other environments that can reverse the entail-
ment properties, such as the case of adnominal only and DE plural quantified DPs.
Prima facie, the anomaly of the examples in (44) suggests that extraposition of a
for-adverbial above these types of phrases does not happen, contra what we would
anticipate based on Maximize Strength. In the examples below the interpretation is
that John or the same group of people kept arriving over and over again throughout
a 2-hour long interval, similar to the readings that we would obtain with upward en-
tailing quantified DPs like “thirty people/many people/some people”, which involve
a strange state of affairs:
(44) a. # Only John arrived for 2 hours.
b. # Few people arrived for 2 hours.
c. # Less than fifty people arrived for 2 hours.
d. # At most fifty people arrived for 2 hours.
Nevertheless, the sentences in (44) improve dramatically if the interval denoted by
the argument of the for-adverbial is definite (e.g. for the first 2 hours/ for those
2 hours vs. for 2 hours) and can thus be more easily placed onto the referential
temporal spectrum, suggesting that it is indeed possible for a right-adjoined dura-
tive adverbial to scope above such DE-quantified DPs, as predicted by Maximize
Strength and shown in (45).
seems to be borne out as well as shown in #John doubted that Bill killed a rabbit for 2 hours/until 2
pm. Fully exploring the details of this remains for future work.
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(45) a. Only John arrived for the first 2 hours.
b. Few people arrived for the first 2 hours.
c. Less than fifty people arrived for the first 2 hours.
d. At most fifty people arrived for the first 2 hours.
Additionally, observe in (46) the acceptability across the board with adnomi-
nal only and downward entailing DPs when the durative adverbial is an until-phrase
instead, which might be due to the fact that the complement of until is always defi-
nite. The examples in (46) thus also conform to Maximize Strength.
(46) a. Only John arrived until 2 pm.
b. Few people arrived until 2 pm.
c. Less than fifty people arrived until 2 pm.
d. At most fifty people arrived until 2 pm.
Further note that the DE examples in (45) and (46) with both for-adverbials and
until-phrases strongly trigger a factive inference in the same way as a ‘throughout-
not’ reading does. Such an inference implicates that more people must have arrived
afterwards, e.g. it is natural and, in fact, quite necessary to give such sentences a
contextual interpretation along the lines of At most fifty people arrived until 2 pm,
which is when everybody else arrived.22
It is not clear to me, at present, why the interval selected by the durative
adverbial must be definite in (45) and (46), other than as a description of the facts.
One speculation lies in the fact that the factive implication about the actualization
22I would like to thank Stephen Wechsler for pointing out to me the acceptability of these exam-
ples with DE-DPs and until-phrases as long as they trigger the factive reading.
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of the event strongly emerges in such DE examples and hence must be placed at
some point on the temporal spectrum, and thus the interval complement of for/until
needs to be able to be interpreted contiguously so that the factive inference can
easily emerge right after it ends. Observe that a crucial difference between for-
adverbials and until-phrases is that the former can take an indefinite time interval
and such an interval does not need to be contiguous. This was already noted in
Dowty (1979): “the duration specified by the for-adverbial may be the duration of
the union of several non-contiguous intervals: John served on that committee for
four years (italics mine) can be true if he served four non-consecutive one-year
terms” (p. 334). Definiteness and contiguity could be related. A definite contiguous
interval referential to the temporal spectrum makes logical deductions in terms of
entailment from the base and the extraposed positions easier, hence facilitating the
application of Maximize Strength. This working hypothesis remains to be further
explicated in future work.23
Another observation worth noting is that the normal scope of adverbials is
clause-bound (e.g. Cinque 2004). Therefore, adverbs cannot be topicalized across
clause boundaries even when that movement would not weaken the meaning ob-
tained from its base position, for instance, due to clause external operators that
reverse polarity. A case in point is a durative adverbial whose base-position is in-
23According to the native speakers I have consulted, if context makes the interval contiguous, the
wide scope interpretation of the for-adverbial in a sentence such as #Few people arrived for two
hours slightly improves, but that is still not enough. The interval really seems to have to be definite.
i. [I was sitting at home at 6 pm waiting for all the guests to show up at my birthday party.
Two hours went by. It was 8 pm and most of the guests were not there yet.]
??Few people arrived for 2 hours.
This could be an issue of markedness. This observation is left for future research.
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side the antecedent of an if -clause. It follows that the adverb cannot cross the clause
boundaries of the antecedent and scope above it. The only possible interpretation in
(47) is the same person arriving again and again.
(47) # If a person arrives for the first 2 hours/until 2 pm, they will find Mary
inside.
Also note that the lack of raising to a higher clause is further explained by the me-
chanics of extraposition of the adverbial. Raised durative adverbials do not leave
traces denoting variables in their base position; rather, their traces are better an-
alyzed as identity functions and the effect of extraposition is to modify a higher
structure. As a consequence, if it were to raise out of the clause where it is base
generated and attach to another VP, it would end up modifying another event alto-
gether as though it had been base generated in the higher clause to begin with. For
instance, in the example in (47), the durative adverbial for the first 2 hours/until 2
pm attaching above the if -clause would end up modifying the duration of the ‘find-
ing of Mary’ event instead. The fact that extraposition and high base generation
would end up deriving the same semantics may explain why raising durative adver-
bials outside the clause boundary is disallowed. At any rate, for clarity purposes,
I specify this general restriction on clause bounding of low right-adjoined durative
adverbials in the Maximize Strength constraint.
(48) Hypothesis #3: Maximize Strength (to be modified): Right-adjoined dura-
tive adverbials are low clause-bound adverbs whose canonical attachment
site is the lowest possible XP, i.e. the VP, compatible with their type, and
they may not raise if it leads to weakening.
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In the remainder of this section, I illustrate how Maximize Strength al-
lows for the acceptability of the examples in (46) with a downward entailing DP-
argument, bearing in mind that a DE context reverses the entailment patterns and
a narrow scope interpretation of the durative adverbial is true in circumstances in
which its corresponding wide scope reading is not. Thus the extraposed meaning
is not entailed by the interpretation obtained from its base position. For example,
consider a downward entailing plural quantified DP such as less than fifty people as
subject of an atelic predicate such as study, so that the durative adverbial can give
us a felicitous interpretation from both its base and extraposed positions. Simpli-
fied representations for the two scopal possibilities are provided in (49) and (50).24
On the one hand, in (49a), I show a simplified meaning of until scoping below the
DE-subject. Such a derived meaning allows for an interpretation in which a group
larger than 50 people started studying during the beginning of the interval, say from
t0 until 1 pm, as long as less than 50 people of that group continued studying all the
way until the end of the interval, from t0 until 2 pm. It could further implicate that
no more people studied beyond the right-boundary of the interval. Such a reading
is schematized in the diagram in (49b).
24This is a shorthand for the denotation of until-phrases. From here onwards, I will suppress
the following aspects of the denotation of until/for-phrases: tense, closure, the introduction of the
interval in question and its cover, and the description of the predicate. Nothing changes; this is purely
for notational and expository purposes.
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(49) Less than 50 people studied until 2 pm. (Base position)
a. ∃x [less than 50 people (x) ∧ ∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)]]25
b. Potential interpretation: (In what follows, >50 stands for ‘more than or







On the other hand, the interpretation in (49b) would have come out false if the
durative adverbial had taken wide scope instead, i.e. by the adverb scoping above
the downward entailing DP-subject. Such a wide scope reading is represented in
(50), which only allows for a group of less than 50 people to be studying at all
times from the very beginning of the interval in question, say t0, until the very end,
2 pm. Further note in (50b) that this interpretation carries the strong implication
that after 2 pm more people started to study.
(50) Until 2 pm, less than 50 people studied. (Extraposed)








All in all, the fact that the wide scope interpretation of the adverbial in (50) is true
in situations in which the narrow scope interpretation in (49) is false shows that (50)
25Again, this is a simplified representation. The proper representation would be compatible with
no people studying. But the main point here is not affected by that.
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is not logically entailed by (49). Maximize Strength hence predicts that such a wide
scope interpretation is possible, which is indeed borne out.
The same line of reasoning applies for all the other DE quantified DPs such
as at most 50 people or few people, because likewise whenever the durative ad-
verbial scopes above them, the meaning is not weakened. Similarly, whenever a
right-adjoined durative adverbial is extraposed to outscope adnominal only, the re-
sulting logical configuration is not entailed by the base position, thus allowing for
both scope possibilities (depending on the telic properties of the predicate). Based
on Horn (1969), the assertion of adnominal only—ignoring its existential presuppo-
sition component and alternative-based semantics26—can be defined as a quantifier
as in (51) where α is the syntactic restrictor of only (i.e. the sister of only, e.g. the
DP John), P is a predicate over individuals, and the variable x ranges over all other
possible relevant entities (e.g. Bill instead of John), which are linguistically and
contextually determined. The denotation in (51) asserts that if the predicate holds
for a relevant individual, then such an individual must be α.
(51) JOnly αK = λP.∀x[P (x)→ x = α]
In our framework, it follows that such a quantified DP (e.g. only John) must QR so
that it can later combine with a VP projection (e.g. of a predicate like study) via our
extended QR rule. For example, we obtain the following meaning in (52).27
26Switching to a definition of only in alternative semantics (e.g. Rooth 1985, 1992; Wagner 2006)
would not change this basic picture.
27The presupposition content of only, which I am ignoring here as it is irrelevant to the present
discussion, would ensure that there exists an x that studied.
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(52) JOnly John studiedK = λf.∀x[∃e[studying(e) ∧ f(e) ∧ ag(e) = x] →
x = j]
The representation in (52) ends up meaning that if there is any x in the relevant
context under consideration that studied then x must be John. Let us now see what
potential interpretations we may obtain when a durative adverbial such as until 2 pm
modifies such a sentence: (53a) corresponds to the narrow scope interpretation of
the adverbial with respect to the quantified DP only John, whereas (53b) represents
a wide scope interpretation of the adverbial. As we will see, the former is true in
situations in which the latter is false, thus showing that (53a) does not entail (53b).
(53) a. λf.∀x[∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ ∃e[studying(e)∧ f(e)∧ag(e) = x∧τ(e) =
t′]]→ x = j]
(≈ if there is an x such that for all relevant subintervals within [t0, 2] x
was studying, then x is John)
b. λf.∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ ∀x[∃e[studying(e)∧ f(e)∧ag(e) = x∧τ(e) =
t′]→ x = j]]
(≈ for all the relevant subintervals within [t0, 2], if there is an x that
studied at some point during such an interval then x is John)
The narrow scope interpretation of the adverbial in (53a) allows for a reading in
which, for example, Bill also studied from say t0 to 1 pm but only John studied
throughout the whole interval in question, i.e. from t0 to 2 pm. Such an interpreta-
tion comes out false when the durative adverbial outscopes adnominal only. In the
latter case, John must be the only person that studied at some point within [t0, 2].
Further note that the configuration in (53b) would be the only scope possibility that
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would give rise to a felicitous reading, after taking into account the content words, if
the predicate being modified were a non-iterative punctual predicate such as arrive.
In sum, Maximize Strength makes a significant prediction: wide scope read-
ings of a durative adverbial should be possible (and give rise to factive inferences,
as we shall see). For/until-XPs are not only allowed to scope above sentential nega-
tion but also above downward entailing DP-subjects/objects. What links all of these
together is that a higher attachment of the adverbial gives rise to a configuration
not entailed by its base position (regardless of what the content words are). This
prediction is borne out with respect to (45) and (46), though not with respect to
sentences like (44). We have no account for the latter, though the pattern suggests
it may be related to definiteness of the relevant temporal interval. Overall, the data
with downward entailing DP-arguments provides additional support for Maximize
Strength beyond just the facts with negation, lending it independent justification.
Finally, a question I have not addressed here is what happens if the durative
adverbial itself introduces a downward entailing operator as in #John killed a rab-
bit for at most 2 hours. These seem to lack a wide scope reading of the adverbial.28
Unfortunately, I cannot address this fully here, but a key point is that the downward
entailing environment itself is inside the durative adverbial. If the durative adverbial
were to attach higher, it still weakens the meaning, which is disallowed by Maxi-
mize Strength. It would say that “for all times in the up to 2 hour cover there is
a rabbit that John killed.” This is entailed by the meaning from its base position:
“there is a rabbit which was (repeatedly) killed for all times in the up to 2 hour
28I would like to thank David Beaver for pointing these examples out to me.
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cover.” In the DE environments we have seen where raising of the right-adjoined
durative adverbial is allowed, the crucial point is that the adverb moves out the DE
context by raising over the DE operator, which results in an interpretation which is
not entailed by the base position. However, here the DE environment would move
up along with the adverbial, giving us a weaker interpretation. Therefore, these kind
of examples wherein it is the durative adverbial itself that is downward entailing do
not constitute counterexamples to the present Maximize Strength hypothesis. The
economy constraint as it is correctly predicts that under these conditions raising is
not possible. However, fully exploring the details of this is something I must leave
for future work.
3.3.2.3 The presence of other distributive adverbials
The other environment that licenses a wide scope interpretation of a right-adjoined
durative adverbial involves either a covert or overt frequentative-type operator of
some sort like every day (cp. John took a pill every day for two years vs. #John took
a pill for two years uttered out of the blue). In the same way that durative adver-
bials are analyzed as logical/functional words, frequentative-type phrases such as
every day also plausibly constitute logical words. These are also traditionally trans-
lated as temporal universal quantifiers that express iteration of an event, e.g. every
single day. At issue here is how the universal component of the durative adverbial
combines with the universal component of a distributive phrase such as every day.
First, observe that in (54a) the interpretation obtained from the durative ad-
verbial attaching low, below every day, results in a logical contradiction regard-
120
less of what the content words are since the interval denoted by the for/until-XP is
greater than the temporal partition. In other words, a two-year long interval cannot
be contained in a one-day partition. On the other hand, in (54b), one-day intervals
can be included in a two-year long period of time.
(54) a. [every day [[Y did X] for 2 years]] (#every day > for 2 years)
• Example (contradictory): It used to be the case every day that John
pet a dog for two years.
b. [for 2 years [every day [Y did X]]] (for 2 years > every day)
• Example (non-contradictory): For two years, it used to be the case
every day that John pet a dog.
In this regard, note that depending on the temporal value of the complement of
for/until and the duration of the temporal partition denoted by another distributive
operator like every day, right-adjoined durative adverbials will only be able to at-
tach either below or above the distributive operator, depending on which interval
contains which. The example in (54) represents a case where the interval of the
for/until-XP is greater than the temporal partition. On the other hand, whenever the
interval of the for/until-XP is smaller than (or equal to) the temporal partition then
the durative adverbial must attach lower, i.e. below the distributive operator, since
staying lower does not result in a logical contradiction and the composition of the
two universals receives a sensible meaning depending on the telic properties of the
predicate. This is illustrated in (55).
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(55) a. [every day [[Y did X] for 2 hours]] (every day > for 2 hours)
• Example (non-contradictory): It used to be the case every day that
John pet a dog for 2 hours.
b. [for 2 hours [every day [Y did X]]] (#for 2 hours > every day)
• Example (contradictory): Throughout an interval of 2 hours, it used
to be the case every day that John pet a dog.
Further note that switching the surface order of both universal elements around (e.g.
Y did X every day for 2 hours vs. Y did X for 2 hours every day) does not give us
a different scopal meaning between every day and for 2 hours, which demonstrates
that their constrained scope interaction may stem from a more underlying logical
relationship between the two universals.
In terms of logical strength, a logical contradiction is always stronger than
any other assertion since it is never true. However, as it can never be true, it is also
not a contingent statement, in that it does not depend on any state of the world.
Therefore, I propose modifying the current Maximize Strength constraint to the
following final version in (56).
(56) Hypothesis #4: Maximize Strength (final): Right-adjoined durative adver-
bials are low clause-bound adverbs whose canonical attachment site is the
lowest logically non-contradictory possible XP compatible with their
type, and they may not raise if it leads to weakening.
Crucially, in the new content in (56), we are redefining what the lowest base position
of a right-adjoined durative adverbial may be. A durative adverbial attaches to the
lowest possible XP, unless that leads to a logical contradiction. Its low base position
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must result in a construction that can be judged true or false once we insert the
lexical words in the clause and check the meaning against world knowledge. In this
way, in (54b) (e.g. John pet a dog every day for two years), the lowest the durative
adverbial can attach to is above the frequentative phrase every day so that it results
in a well-formed truth-conditionally dependent construction.
I will now provide, in more formal detail, the type of denotation I am assum-
ing for a frequentative-type operator like every day, which is also of type 〈〈vt, t〉,
〈vt, t〉〉, so that it conforms to the type of the predicate modifiers in our present
framework of quantificational event semantics. The denotation of every very much
resembles the meaning of for-adverbials and until-phrases in that they both activate
universal quantification over instants. For two years is given in (57b) for compari-
son.
(57) a. Jevery dayK = λV.λf.∃t[D(t)∧∀t′[1day(t′)(t)→ V (λe[f(e)∧τ(e) ⊆
t′])]]
where 1day(t′)(t) means that t′ falls within a daily partition of t. D is a
temporal domain, contextually supplied, i.e. the time frame throughout
which the daily iteration occurs.
b. Jfor two yearsK = λV.λf.∃t[years(t) = 2 ∧ t ⊆T tr ∧∀t′[C(t′)(t)→
V (λe[f(e) ∧ τ(e) = t′])]]
where C(t′)(t) means that t′ falls within a cover measure of t. The C
measure is contextually supplied.
Despite their strong similarity, note the following essential differences. First, the
time complement of every is universal in nature in that it gets universally iterated
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(universal quantification occurs over 1-day long intervals in (57a)) and the period of
time for how long this universal iteration takes place, i.e. D, has to be pragmatically
fixed if not overtly stated. On the other hand, the complement of for/until-XPs is
existential in nature (in that it gives us the total duration of the period of time which
contains universal partitions based on a cover C), and the cover measure is left
for pragmatics. A cover allows for overlapping among the subintervals, whereas
the partition of the subintervals provided by every is fixed, e.g. they are all 1-day
long subintervals which do not overlap. A second basic difference between the two
types of universals is that the running time of the subevents modified by every day
can be a subset or equal to the subintervals t′, e.g. as long as they fall within 1-
day long partitions of a pragmatically supplied time frame (but they do not need
to last the whole day). By contrast, the running time of the subevents modified by
for/until-XPs must equal the total duration of the subintervals t′ provided by the
cover measure.
Based on the denotations in (57), I give as an example the following deriva-
tion of a predicate modified by both types of temporal phrases: John took a pill
every day for two years, where the for-adverbial must outscope the every-phrase
since the time intervals introduced by every are smaller (1-day long) and must be
contained within the boundaries of the time interval introduced by the for-phrase (2
years).
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(58) a. John took a pill every day for two years. (Reading: Throughout two
years every day there was a pill that John took.)
b. [tr ≺ now ∧ ∃t1[years(t1) = 2 ∧ t1 ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′2[C(t′2)(t1) →
∃t3[D(t3) ∧ ∀t′4[1day(t′4)(t3) → ∃x[pill(x) ∧ ∃e[take(e) ∧ ag(e) =
j ∧ th(e) = x ∧ τ(e) ⊆ t′4 ∧ τ(e) = t′2 ∧ τ(e) ⊆T tr]]]]]]]
≡
c. [tr ≺ now ∧ ∃t1[years(t1) = 2 ∧ t1 ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′2[C(t′2)(t1) →
∃t3[D(t3) ∧ ∀t′4[1day(t′4)(t3) → ∃x[pill(x) ∧ ∃e[take(e) ∧ ag(e) =
j ∧ th(e) = x ∧ τ(e) = t′2 ∧ t′2 ⊆ t′4 ∧ τ(e) ⊆T tr]]]]]]]
The derivation in (58c) is equivalent to (58b), where we crucially obtain that τ(e)
must fall within t′4 and be equal to t
′
2. We know that t
′
4 are 1-day-long partitions,
which tells us that John taking a pill must be instantiated every day, and the duration
of such a taking-a-pill event is equal to t′2, a measure provided by the contextually
supplied cover. Then t1 tells us the total duration of the time frame, i.e. that such
an iteration of events took place over the course of 2 years. The composition of the
two universal adverbials works under the assumption that t1 = D (i.e. the 2-year
frame provides the domain for the universal quantifier associated with every day),
and, moreover,C ⊆ 1day (i.e. the contextually supplied cover takes on as maximal
value the appropriate 1-day partition). This is not meant as an ultimate analysis, and
one can for example conceive of ways of ‘binding’ the free variables D, C in the
semantics (and not be left for pragmatics). But this would add complexities that are
orthogonal to our present concerns.
The other example to consider is when the durative adverbial takes narrow
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scope with respect to the every-phrase, which would have to happen when the in-
terval introduced by for is smaller, as in (59), so that the for-XP can attach lower
without generating a logical contradiction. No matter what the surface order of the
temporal modifiers is, their respective semantic scope is the same: every day > for
2 hours.
(59) a. John pet a dog every day for 2 hours. (Reading: Every day there was a
dog that John pet for two hours.)
b. [tr ≺ now ∧ ∃t1[D(t1) ∧ ∀t′2[1day(t′2)(t1) → ∃t3[hours(t3) = 2 ∧
t3 ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′4[C(t′4)(t3) → ∃x[dog(x) ∧ ∃e[pet(e) ∧ ag(e) = j ∧
th(e) = x ∧ τ(e) = t′4 ∧ τ(e) ⊆ t′2 ∧ τ(e) ⊆T tr]]]]]]]
≡
c. [tr ≺ now ∧ ∃t1[D(t1) ∧ ∀t′2[1day(t′2)(t1) → ∃t3[hours(t3) = 2 ∧
t3 ⊆T tr ∧ ∀t′4[C(t′4)(t3) → ∃x[dog(x) ∧ ∃e[pet(e) ∧ ag(e) = j ∧
th(e) = x ∧ τ(e) = t′4 ∧ t′4 ⊆ t′2 ∧ τ(e) ⊆T tr]]]]]]]
Here the composition of the two universal adverbials works out if and only if
1day(t′2)(t1) is true just in case C(t
′
4)(t3) is, where t3 is a 2-hour interval within
the time frame of t1 (pragmatically provided by D) whose subintervals t′4 are con-
tained within t′2, the daily partitions. This comes out to saying that, in (59), the
running time of John petting a dog must be at most 2-hour long and fall within
daily partitions of t1, a time frame D pragmatically set.
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3.3.2.4 Are every-phrases subject to Maximize Strength?
In sentences like John pet a dog every day, the object has different scope possibili-
ties than John pet a dog for two hours, in spite of their both being universals. I take
this as an indication of the fact that the attachment site of every-adverbials is higher
than that of for/until-phrases, say vP. If every-phrases are adjoined at vP (which is,
we assume, a scope site) a QRed object can be attached below them, as illustrated








This would explain why objects can readily scope below every-phrases without hav-
ing to appeal to scope economy. On the other hand, for/until-phrases are very low
adverbials that attach at the lowest XP possible, i.e. making them VP adverbials. I
assume that the semantic constraint on the processing of extraposed adverbials only
affects very low right-adjoined durative adverbials (adverbials whose base position
can in principle be at the VP-level). As a consequence, these must actually move
to a higher position in order to take wide scope with respect to other scope-bearing
arguments in the clause, e.g. so as to be able to outscope a QR-ed object or subject
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within the vP domain.29
3.3.2.5 Summing up
In sum, regardless of the theory of durative adverbials that one adopts, there must be
some type of scopal constraint like Maximize Strength because without it nothing
else independently explains the data. I suggest that the scopal behavior of right-
adjoined for- and until-phrases is subject to a scope economy constraint to maxi-
mize their ‘informativeness.’ In particular, right-adjoined durative adverbials, such
as for/until-phrases, are low adverbs that attach to the lowest possible XP compat-
ible with their type that does not yield a logical contradiction. Such an attachment
site is usually VP. However, when another (overt/covert) distributive operator is
present in the sentence, like every day, the lowest logically non-contradictory at-
tachment may be higher than VP, e.g. above such a distributive operator. The result-
ing logical structure must be able to receive a true or false value once the content
words are inserted and the telic properties of the event are computed, i.e. it must be
contingent on a state of the world.
Once their lowest base position is established, right-adjoined durative ad-
verbials can only move to a higher position provided that this does not result in a
weaker interpretation. In a positive episodic environment, low adverbials will pro-
duce stronger interpretations by taking narrowest scope. By contrast, in downward-
entailing contexts, Maximize Strength correctly predicts that extraposition of the
29This syntactic distinction between for/until-XPs and every-phrases might potentially bear on
the inner aspect (within VP) and outer aspect (at vP) contrast concerned with telic/atelic and
bounded/unbounded features (e.g. Slabakova 2001, Nossalik 2010).
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low adverbial to a higher position, say above PolP, will be allowed considering
that such environments reverse logical strength, hence accounting for the potential
ambiguity between a ‘not-throughout’ and a ‘throughout-not’ reading and the ac-
ceptability of non-iterative telic predicates with downward entailing DP-arguments
(e.g. few people arrived until 2 vs. #many people arrived until 2).
3.4 Conclusions
This chapter has offered a scopal account of the puzzle of punctual until for En-
glish, in close parallelism with for-adverbials, hence suggesting that such an ac-
count might be able to have broader applications, e.g. so as to capture the behavior
of right adjoined durative adverbials in general. For this, I have updated Mittwoch’s
(1977) original scopal proposal to event semantics within a framework based on
Champollion’s (2015) analysis of event quantification, where the event variable is
closed within the lexical entry of the verb, so that it takes lowest possible scope. It
follows that within such an approach, we can only translate durative adverbials as
universal quantifiers by following Dowty’s (1979) proposal (and not Krifka’s 1989,
1998 proposal). By doing so, and assuming a Chierchia/Charlson approach to bare
plurals as kinds (with Derived Kind Predication or the idea that kinds can be directly
merged at themes of events)—which are independently motivated assumptions—
the basic cases simply follow from the supposition that right-adjoined durative ad-
verbials are low VP adverbs. However, their scope behavior is conditional on a
syntactic/semantic constraint, Maximize Strength, reminiscent of other scope econ-
omy conditions. Extraposition of such low adverbs to a higher scopal position is
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allowed if and only if it does not lead to a weaker interpretation in terms of logical
strength, i.e. an interpretation already entailed by the base position. This predicts
the acceptability of until-phrases with non-iterative telic predicates in negative en-
vironments without having to stipulate an NPI-until. But how do we capture the





account of temporal for-adverbials
and until-phrases in English
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3 I offered a unified account of the scopal facts of for-adverbials and
until-phrases. The theoretical system I proposed thus far predicts that right-adjoined
durative adverbials can scope above negation, which explains why non-iterative
telic predicates can be modified by durative adverbials in the presence of negation.
Nonetheless, so far, nothing captures the non-defeasible factive inference that arises
with the use of until under those circumstances (John didn’t arrive until 2 pm, #and
in fact he never arrived). This is what makes the use of punctual until in negative
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environments theoretically unique, in contrast to the use of other durative adverbials
like for-adverbials under the same conditions (John didn’t arrive for 2 hours, and
in fact he never arrived).
In this chapter, I propose an exhaustification-based approach that captures
this difference between for-adverbials and until-phrases in terms of having ‘inac-
tive’ vs. ‘active’ scalar alternatives, respectively. The relevant scalar alternatives
that until-phrases obligatorily activate are factored into meaning and must be ex-
haustified, as in recent theories of scalar implicatures. Such a combined analysis
of scope and scalarity will induce special scopal interactions between a durative
adverbial and its alternatives, negation, and a covert exhaustification operator. Ul-
timately, this analysis will account for the emergence of the non-defeasible factive
inference associated with until in the appropriate contexts, plus other interpretative
facts I discuss below.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In §2, I combine our scope-based
account with an exhaustification-based approach that captures the difference be-
tween for-adverbials and until-phrases in terms of factivity. Other scalar inferences
that durative adverbials may elicit will also be predicted via exhaustification. In
§3, I offer a tentative account of the “later-than-expected” inference, another im-
plication that has been claimed to be associated with the use of punctual until (e.g.
Condoravdi 2008), but which is absent with the use of for. I suggest that this may be
related to an underlying notion of probability triggered only by until-XPs, which,
in turn, also prompts the use of another exhaustification operator. The conclusions
of this chapter are summarized in §4.
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4.2 How until becomes factive
In what follows, I further augment the scopal analysis outlined in Chapter 3 with an
exhaustification-based approach that takes into account the scalar temporal nature
of durative adverbials and their active scalar alternatives. This will account for the
emergence of various inferences, including the factive inference, and their relative
strengths both in the positive and negative environments.
4.2.1 The empirical data
So far we have analyzed for-adverbials and until-phrases in a unified fashion, since
they share most of their properties, with one crucial exception: until-phrases when
combined with negated telic predicates seem to give rise to a stronger inference than
for-adverbials do about the actualization of the event. I have referred to this infer-
ence as the ‘factive inference’, which until exhibits more clearly, as the following
contrast in (1) illustrates.1,2
(1) a. John didn’t get divorced from his wife for all his life→ No divorce
took place.
b. # John didn’t get divorced from his wife until he died → John di-
vorced his wife as a zombie.
1I would like to thank Danny Fox for suggesting such minimal pairs to me.
2English has the expression ‘until the day I die’ which might look, at first, as a counterexample
since it does not trigger factivity, as shown in (i).
i. The pope will not resign until the day he dies.
However, I believe this is a fixed expression that means something like ‘ever/never’ and not a coun-
terexample to the present theory. I would like to thank Stephen Wechsler for pointing that out to
me.
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The sentence in (1b) sounds odd because the factive inference (John getting di-
vorced from his wife at some point after John’s death) is non-cancellable, as op-
posed to (1a). For uniformity across for-adverbials and until-phrases, I still call
such inferences factive inferences, the only difference being that the one generated
by until-phrases seems to be non-defeasible (similar to what is traditionally known
as an entailment), whereas the one that arises from the use of for-phrases is defea-
sible (similar to what is traditionally known as a conversational implicature).
Moreover, this non-defeasible factive inference is still licensed by until-XPs
even within a context that explicitly refutes it, as in (2).
(2) John was all set to cook, but then he got distracted and didn’t start cooking
until 9 pm. #At that point he changed his mind and went out for dinner.
→ John started cooking.
Thus, the inference generated by the use of until with negation and a telic predicate
is indeed very strong, and it is impossible to cancel it even in extreme cases that
involve epistemic uncertainty, such as when the until-XP is preceded by at least, as
in (3).3
(3) [A detective is trying to figure out whether John, the husband, poisoned
his wife, who was found dead in their house. They estimate that she
died around 2 pm. Before, they thought that John might have poisoned
her by adding cyanide in her meal when cooking, but after finding new
evidence the detective says the following:]
It’s clear now that John didn’t start cooking at least until 2 pm. In fact, this
3It might be also due to the fact that it is hard to epistemically construe a negative eventive.
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new piece of evidence shows that ?? he didn’t cook at all, so I now believe
he’s innocent.
In sum, negated telic predicates modified by both for-adverbials and until-phrases
give rise to a factive inference. However, the factive inference is non-defeasible
(non-cancellable) in the case of until and defeasible (cancellable) in the case of for.
But what happens with negated atelic predicates? The picture here is more
complicated since we may have two different scopal interpretations: narrow scope
of the durative adverbial with respect to negation (base position) or wide scope of
the durative adverbial with respect to negation (extraposed subject to Maximize
Strength). The extraposed configuration is the same as in the cases above with
negated telic predicates, interpreted as ‘throughout-not.’ However, with the ‘not-
throughout’ reading, no factive inference arises, as contrasted in (4).4
(4) John didn’t study until 2 pm.
a. ‘Throughout-not’ [∀ > ¬] John didn’t study until 2 pm.
→ XFactive inference: John started studying after 2 pm.
b. ‘Not-throughout’ [¬ > ∀] John didn’t study until 2 pm, but until 1 pm.
→ 7 Factive inference.
If there is an inference under the ‘not-throughout’ reading in (4b) it is that the
studying event stopped before 2 pm. Indeed, we might be able to even negate the
4Observe the contrast between (4) and (i), where the latter only acquires a high scope reading of
the durative adverbial with a factive inference.
i. John didn’t study anything until 2 pm.
→ John started studying after 2 pm.
The object ‘anything’ in (i) disambiguates the sentence, where only a ‘throughout-not’ interpretation
gives us a sensible meaning. This is similar to John didn’t study at all until 2 pm.
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fact that there was any studying event at all: It is not the case that John studied until
two, ?and in fact he didn’t study at all. Perhaps such an inference is non-defeasible
as well, but it certainly is of a different character.
We are then left with an additional puzzle: (i) how is it that the non-defeasible
factive inference emerges with the use of until-phrases (as opposed to a defeasible
factive inference with the use of for-adverbials) and (ii) what it is that causes it to
appear only under a specific set of conditions, e.g. under a ‘throughout-not’ reading.
I claim that the nature of scalarity in for-adverbials and until-phrases gives us the
factive inference, which is obligatory for the case of until and non-obligatory for
the case of for. For this, I adopt the analysis that scalar inferences can be obtained
as a form of exhaustification of the assertion, in some cases obligatorily, building
on a view put forth in recent literature (e.g. Chierchia 2004, 2013, 2017, Fox 2007,
Chierchia et al. 2012) that certain linguistic items can (and may always) introduce
alternatives that must be factored into the meaning through exhaustification. I will
show that such an analysis is advantageous over other ways of analyzing factivity
(e.g. as an entailment or presupposition) in that it will provide one unique mecha-
nism that explains all types of inferences with for-adverbials and until-phrases that
may emerge in different scopal situations.
4.2.2 Scalar, only-based exhaustification analysis
In the remainder of this section I illustrate how the scalarity of universal time ad-
verbials plays an essential role in the emergence of scalar inferences as a result of
active alternatives that may be associated with the use of durative adverbials. Then
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the grammar exhaustifies such alternatives via covert alternative-sensitive operators
that must apply at some point in the derivation in order to ‘run through’ the active
alternatives.
First of all, in the same way that numbers, such as modified numerals, are as-
sociated with a scale—something very much agreed upon—time is also scalar. Time
is usually viewed of as linear and ordered, a key defining property of scales. Krifka
(1998: 8) specifically defined temporal structures as a type of “one-dimensional di-
rected path structure” and paths are widely regarded as defining a type of scale.
Beavers (2012) in particular suggests that paths can serve as a general model of
scales in lexical semantics. Therefore, it emerges from general properties of times
and more specifically how they are treated in some literature that they are scalar
in nature. If time is scalar then so are temporal adverbials, opening the possibil-
ity of them giving rise to quantity implicatures. With regard to modified numerals,
consider the scale in (5), where Rooth (1985, 1992) claimed that the relevant alter-
natives are brought about in association with focus, where the focus semantic value
consists of a set of alternatives.5
(5) a. John studied [most]F of the lessons.
b. Alternatives (ALT):{John studied a few of the lessons, John studied
some of the lessons, John studied many of the lessons, John studied
most of the lessons, John studied all of the lessons}
c. Scalar Inference (SI): John didn’t study all of the lessons.
Rooth refers to this set of alternatives in (5b) as C (a silent restrictor variable that
5[ ]F indicates the focal-stress bearing element.
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ranges over the alternatives), which I will refer to as ALT. This set of alternatives,
which are contextually relevant to one another, are propositions obtained by replac-
ing the focused expression with expressions of the same semantic type, and are
ranked by entailment. The implicature is obtained by denying stronger alternatives.
More formally speaking, it is obtained by applying an overt only or covert counter-
part thereof, which returns something that states that the assertion (also known as
prejacent, the sister to the focus-operator) is true and, moreover, any member of the
set of alternatives which is true must be entailed by the prejacent. The meaning I
am assuming for such a covert operator, labeled as O, is the following in (6).
(6) JOALT φK = φ ∧ ∀p ∈ φALT [p→ [φ ⊆ p]] (where ⊆= entails)
(The prejacent φ is true and any alternative p in ALT not entailed by φ is
false.)6
The operator O as in (6) takes the assertion φ as its input, which then returns as its
output in addition to the negation of any non-entailed alternative by φ in ALT. In
other words, O asserts that the prejacent is true and any member of the set of alter-
natives that is not entailed by the prejacent must be false, which thereby exhaustifies
the meaning of the assertion. Note that a difference between overt and covert only
is that O asserts rather than presupposes that its prejacent is true.
This variant of focus semantics gives us all the ingredients we need for an
exhaustification-based approach to the factive inference of until. Nevertheless, fo-
cus is not a necessary condition for having active alternatives. Scalar items naturally
6Note that the set ALT in the denotation of O still contains both stronger and weaker relevant
alternatives. All that (6) says is that if an alternative is true then that alternative must be weaker than
the prejacent.
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trigger quantity implicatures, as widely accepted for the elements that naturally
constitute Horn-scales (since Horn 1972): <one, two, three...>, <a, many, most,
every...>, <or, and>, etc. It could be argued that such items are already lexically
predisposed to triggering alternatives ranked by entailment along a scale. Due to
the scalarity of time, for-adverbials and until-phrase also form scales, whose alter-
natives are also naturally ranked to one another in terms of entailment: <for 1 hour,
for 2 hours, for 3 hours...> and <until 1 pm, until 2 pm, until 3 pm...> (with the
same contextually understood origin).
If the context is such that the alternatives are relevant, then they will be ac-
tivated and factored into meaning via an exhaustification operator, which, in turn,
is present if and only if the alternatives are active. Most importantly, at this point
I posit a critical difference between for-adverbials and until-phrases, which is that
the lexical semantics of until always carries an active set of alternatives, regardless
of context, whereas for-adverbials optionally activate their alternatives depending
on contextual relevance. This is all ultimately an issue of lexicalization (see §4.3.5.
for why the alternatives to for may be optional).7 This explains why the factive
inference is defeasible in the case of for but non-defeasible in the case of until. Se-
mantically speaking, one can conceive of this difference by assuming that until-XPs
are defined as long as the set of alternatives triggered by the time interval, i.e. the
complement of until, is not a singleton so that it contains more than one alternative
other than itself (since any lexical entry is an alternative to itself). Having an active
7Differently put, the alternatives associated with for may be ‘pruned’ in context, while those
associated with until may not be pruned. For alternative ways of formalizing this, see e.g. Spector
(2003, 2007), Fox (2007), Magri (2009), Chierchia (2013).
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alternative different from the prejacent will make exhaustification of the assertion
non-vacuous, hence obligatorily triggering inferential content. This is schematized
in (7) below.8
(7) JUntil 2 pmKALTt0 is defined iff the set of alternatives triggered by the scalar
item [t0, 2] is not a singleton.
(where JαKALTt0 is the set of temporal alternatives for any expression α)
In (7), the singleton constraint is essential because it forces until-phrases to have
active alternatives other than the assertion itself, i.e. the prejacent. As a conse-
quence, an exhaustification operator must obligatorily intervene at some point in
the derivation, since the alternatives are operated on by O. The details of my imple-
mentation, which I keep very basic, remain fully negotiable. Syntactically speaking,
we could adopt a syntax-driven account a` la Chierchia (2013) in terms of feature
checking/agreement, where O enters in some kind of agreement with its target. For
instance, the scalar item until 2 pm could take a value “+” feature which must be
checked off by O. The alternatives of the numeral in [t0, 2] would come with an
obligatory feature that needs to be valued and is passed on to the phrase, which
the operator O can then target (see Chierchia 2013 for details of an implementation
along these lines). But there are other ways to implement this, e.g. see Fox (2007),
where O is not always present in the architectural system. For the purposes of this
chapter I will not give a fully complete formalization at the level of detail in the
preceding chapter since many of these formal details will not matter for the point at
hand. Rather, the key point is that exhaustification operators, be they present in the
8This is comparable to assuming that until-XPs take a third argument, similar to a presupposition,
other than the interval and the predicate of sets of events—that is, a set of alternatives.
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syntactic configuration or not, will figure into the meaning and this will derive the
right results, and they will also interact with other scopal operators in interesting
ways. The crucial idea is that until-XPs in one way or another obligatorily activate
a set of canonical scalar alternatives that must be factored into meaning, and can-
not be pruned. This contrasts with for-adverbials, where the set of alternatives is
optional, and thus it acquires the appearance of a traditional Gricean implicature.
With such an assumption, we are then able to capture the behavior of until-phrases
(in contrast to for-adverbials) via exhaustification, as we shall see.
I have indicated the set of alternatives triggered by until in (7) above as
ALTt0 because they are of the form until n time, i.e. intervals that share the same
contextually determined left boundary t0 with the prejacent but differ as to when
the right-boundary is set: such as until one, until one thirty, until two, until three,
and so on and so forth. A representation of such a scale of alternatives triggered by
until, which I call the temporal scale since it is provided by the already established
scalarity of time, is given in (8). In what follows, n represents the time interval
complement of until; n+t, a superset interval that shares the same left boundary;
and n−t a subset interval with also the same t0.
(8) Temporal Scale: ALTt0 (until n) = {until n− t, until n, until n+ t, ...}
It follows that in an upward-entailing context, subset intervals will be entailed by
the prejacent while superset intervals will not. In more formal terms, the set of
alternatives can be defined as follows, as in (9).
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(9) JUntil 2 pmKALTt0 = {λV.λf.∃t[hours(t) = [t0, n]∧ t ⊆T tr∧∀t′[C(t′)(t)→
V (λe[f(e) ∧ τ(e) = t′])]] : n ≥ 2 or n<2}
(defined iff the set of alternatives is not a singleton)
In (9), the alternatives are obtained by replacing the interval complement of until
for supersets or subsets of the prejacent. In the remainder of the chapter I will be
using the even more simplified formalization in (10) that omits the cover, referential
time, τ(e), and the f argument. The specifications of our framework do not change.
This is again a pure notational change for expository purposes.
(10) JUntil 2 pmKALTt0 (simplified) = {λP [∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, n] → P (t′)]] : n ≥ 2 or
n<2}
(defined iff the set of alternatives is not a singleton)
A final assumption before presenting the basic details of the execution of the anal-
ysis is that the temporal alternatives obligatory activated by until can only be ex-
haustified by the covert operator O, as they may enter in agreement with such an
operator. In other words, active temporal alternatives of right-adjoined durative ad-
verbials cannot be picked out and consequently exhaustified by other alternative
sensitive operators, such as overt only and also (e.g. see Beaver and Clark 2008 for
discussion on overt focus-sensitive operators applied within a framework of alter-
native semantics).
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4.2.3 Execution of the O-exhaustification analysis
4.2.3.1 Upward-entailing contexts
Obligatory exhaustification of the active alternatives of until in an upward entailing
context when it modifies an atelic or iterative telic predicate gives us what I refer
to as the interruption inference, i.e. the predicate ceases to hold when the interval
ends. This prediction is in line with what we would expect from natural facts about
the physical world since an event cannot hold indefinitely. I illustrate this with an
example in (11).
(11) a. John studied until 2 pmALTt0 .
b. ALTt0 (John studied until 2 pm):{John studied until 1 pm, John studied
until 2 pm, John studied until 3 pm}9
c. Entailment Relation: [t0, 1] x [t0, 2] x [t0, 3] (where the arrow
shows the direction of entailment: Ax B means that B entails A)
John studied until 2 pm ⊆ John studied until 1 pm but * John studied
until 3 pm.
Notice that in a positive environment, such as in (11), earlier intervals that share
the same contextually-determined left boundary (i.e. subset intervals) are entailed
by the prejacent while later intervals that share the same left boundary (i.e. superset
intervals) are not. Therefore, the assertion in (11a) does not entail that John also
studied at any relevant time interval following 2 pm. Since the use of until obliga-
torily activates the relevant alternatives, these must be factored into meaning and
9From now onwards, in the examples, I am simplifying the notion of the alternatives by only
looking at n− 1, n, and n+ 1.
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are consequently exhaustified via covert O, which ensures that any alternative not
entailed by the prejacent does not hold. The derivation of applying this exhausti-
fication operator is sketched in (12c) and how the scalar inference comes about in
(12d), in a simplified manner for clarification purposes.
(12) a. OALTt0 (John studied until 2 pm
ALTt0)
b. ALTt0:{∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 1] → P (t′)],∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2] → P (t′)],∀t′[t′ ⊆
[t0, 3]→ P (t′)]}
c. OALTt0 (∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)]) = ∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)]
∧ ∀p ∈ ALTt0 [p→ [[∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)]] ⊆ p]]
d. SI : ¬∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 3]→ P (t′)] ≡ ∃t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 3] ∧ ¬P (t′)]
The mechanics of how to derive a scalar inference by negating non-entailed al-
ternatives gives us that there must exist some subinterval within [t0, 3] where the
predicate no longer holds. As we know that the assertion must hold for all the rel-
evant subintervals until 2 pm, it is safe to conclude that at some point after 2 pm
the predicate does no longer hold, i.e. John’s studying event is interrupted. To put
it more informally, John studied until 2 pm entails John studied until 1 pm but not
John studied until 3 pm. Exhaustification under O negates the non-entailed alterna-
tives while maintaining the truth of the prejacent John studied until 2 pm, deriving
the interruption inference that John stopped studying at or after 2 pm as a sort of
entailment arising from the scalar alternatives.10 How strong an inference one gets
in positive cases depends on the ‘granularity of the scale.’
10In an example as in (i), the relevant alternatives could be ‘before the end of time’, ‘at the end of
time’, and ‘after the end of time.’
i. The universe exists until the end of time.
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What do I mean by the granularity of the scale? If nothing else is specified,
by default one infers that the interruption inference occurs right after the tempo-
ral right-boundary indicated by the complement of until, i.e. within the immediate
superinterval of the interval denoted by until. Nevertheless, such a right-boundary
introduced by until could in principle be stretched and set at some point later on the
temporal spectrum, as shown in (13).
(13) [Did John study until 2 pm]?
Yes, indeed he studied until 4 pm.
In (13), the relevant scale in question could be formed by <2, 5...> instead of an
hourly scale such as <2, 3...>, where the degree of granularity varies from scale to
scale. We are allowed to answer “yes” because even though it is true that John did
study throughout [t0, 2], that assertion may not be exhaustive. Given the granularity
of the relevant scale in question, an exhaustive answer could be that he studied until
4 pm. The interruption inference is then placed within the most immediate non-
entailed relevant interval. If the relevant scale here is <2, 5...>, the interruption
inference would be placed at 5 pm or afterwards. Despite the fact that the right-
boundary may be ‘corrected’ depending on the granularity of the scale, what is not
under discussion though is the obligatoriness of the interruption inference because
at some point in time the event must stop holding, due to facts that follow from how
the world works. In downward-entailing contexts, things change. We then need to
If ‘after the end of time’ is a relevant alternative to (i), the sentence obligatorily implicates that the
universe will no longer exist after the end of time. If we do not consider anything else beyond the
end of time as relevant, then the exhaustified assertive content in (i) simply conveys the meaning of
the assertion itself, as all the other alternatives are entailed by the prejacent and exhaustification is
rendered vacuous. This is again relative to what is relevant in context and the granularity of the scale
in question.
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consider different scopal cases, to be explicated below.
4.2.3.2 Downward-entailing contexts with telic predicates
Recall that Maximize Strength predicts that until-phrases can be extraposed in
downward-entailing environments to scope above any DE operators within the clause,
e.g. negation, because this does not give rise to a weaker interpretation. We have in
principle two scopal possibilities: a low base position of the durative adverbial, and
a higher extraposed position. Whether those scope configurations ultimately make
sense or not will depend on the telic properties of the predicate being modified. In
this section, we are focusing only on non-iterative telic predicates, such as arrive.
Let us consider first what happens if the until-phrase stays in its low base
position, as illustrated in (14), and we try to exhaustify above negation. In what
follows, 7 indicates that exhaustification would be trivial:
(14) 7 OALTt0 ¬ (John arrived until 2 pmALTt0)
The result from exhaustification in (14) is always trivial with a non-iterative telic
predicate and, thus ruled out, since a sentence such as it is not the case that John
(repeatedly) arrived until 2 pm is tautologous as it is always judged true. We obtain
a trivial result when we apply O to something already tautologous since by virtue of
its logical content it is already ‘grammatically trivial’ and its alternatives and hence
exhaustification, obviously, retain the same status. Another possibility could be ex-
haustifying below negation, since negation now gives us two scopal positions with
respect to the O operator. Yet again exhaustification below negation of the until-XP
alternatives with a non-iterative telic predicate is not necessary either. This is shown
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in (15). In the derivation, before the application of O, the use of until already comes
out deviant as #John arrived until 2 pm cannot satisfy the subinterval property. In
the present theory, this deviance cashed out as an ‘ungrammatical contradiction’.
More specifically, the iteration of a predicate such as John arrived for all relevant
subintervals within a given interval clashes with common knowledge, generating a
lexical contradiction.11 Since the alternatives to the prejacent in (15) have the same
shape as (15), exhaustifying with respect to them will still be contradictory.
(15) 7 ¬ OALTt0 (John arrived until 2 pmALTt0)
In (15), O is vacuous since #John arrived until 2 pm can never be true and hence
we cannot add any scalar inference to the assertion to strengthen its meaning.
But this does not happen when until outscopes negation, since this scope
configuration gives rise to a plausible and contingent meaning. It thus follows that
exhaustification of a negated non-iterative telic predicate modified by until can only
take place above negation once the until-phrase has already been extraposed, in line
with Maximize Strength. This is the case we are considering next, as the structure in
(16a) shows. The set of alternatives that is generated when until outscopes negation
is exemplified in (16b), in a simplified form, where subset intervals are again en-
tailed by the assertion whereas superset intervals are not, as the entailment pattern
illustrates in (16c).
(16) a. XOALTt0 ([until 2 pmALTt0 [John did not arrive]]) ≡
OALTt0 (∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ ¬P (t′)])
11A contradiction in the traditional sense, one that takes into account how the lexical terminal
nodes are replaced in the structure.
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b. ALTt0:{∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 1] → ¬P (t′)],∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2] → ¬P (t′)],∀t′[t′ ⊆
[t0, 3]→ ¬P (t′)]}
c. Entailment Relation: [t0, 1]x [t0, 2]x [t0, 3]
Until 2 pm, John didn’t arrive ⊆ Until 1 pm, John didn’t arrive but *
Until 3 pm, John didn’t arrive.
In (16), if it is the case that by 2 pm John had not arrived, it is also the case that
by earlier times he had not arrived. However, the prejacent leaves open the possi-
bility of John’s arrival after 2 pm. Since the alternatives are obligatory factored into
meaning, they must be exhaustified: non-entailed alternatives (i.e. superintervals)
are negated. As a result, this gives us the factive inference, i.e. the instigation of the
event at some point within the most immediate relevant superinterval, e.g. [t0, 3], as
derived in (17) below. It is important to note here that in this case the scalar infer-
ence (from ¬P to P ) cannot be rendered vacuous by the choice of granularity of
the scale since P must occur.12 Furthermore, pragmatic considerations may lead to
set the switch from ¬P to P close to the time mentioned in the until-phrase.
(17) a. OALTt0 (∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ ¬P (t′)]) = ∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ ¬P (t′)]
∧ ∀p ∈ ALTt0 [p→ [[∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ ¬P (t′)]] ⊆ p]]
b. SI : ¬∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 3]→ ¬P (t′)] ≡ ∃t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 3] ∧ P (t′)]
After exhaustification, the scalar inference that winds up beind added to the asser-
tion maintains that there is an instantiation of the main event, i.e. an arrival of John
within [t0, 3]. As the prejacent asserts that there is no arrival of John within [t0, 2],
12The intuition behind this is that a switch from P to ¬P as in the interruption inference could be
vacuously satisfied, e.g. after John’s natural death.
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the truth of the prejacent is preserved while the actualization of the event is placed at
some point after 2 pm within [t0, 3]. This corresponds to the meaning of the factive
inference. Obligatory O-exhaustification due to until having its alternatives ‘active’
(vs. for) thus accounts for until’s non-defeasible factivity. Even though such an in-
ference cannot be cancelled, there is again a degree of granularity as to when the
right-boundary of the non-entailed interval is set (though the choice of granularity
cannot make this inference vacuous):
(18) John didn’t arrive until 2 pm, if not later. (#[...] indeed John never arrived)
The follow-up in the sentence in (18) shows that John does not need to arrive shortly
after 2 pm and yet John’s arrival eventually must occur and cannot be cancelled.
However, a certain degree of granularity may apply (as long as it is after the right
boundary expressed by the prejacent). This depends on when the next relevant su-
perinterval, alternative to the prejacent, is set along the granular scale.
All in all, negated telic predicates modified by until obligatory elicit the
factive inference. We now turn to a consideration of atelic predicates. Does the hy-
pothesis that until has obligatory active alternatives still hold? The scopal ambiguity
between negated atelic predicates and until may seem, at first glance, to present a
challenge, to say the least.
4.2.3.3 Negation with atelic predicates
The assumption that until obligatorily activates its alternatives is challenged when
the durative adverbial modifies a negated atelic predicate, as demonstrated by the
following data:
149
(19) a. John didn’t study until 2 pm. (XFactive inference: He started after 2
pm)
b. John didn’t study until 2 pm, but until 1 pm. (He stopped before 2 pm)
c. John didn’t study until 2 pm, but until 3 pm. (He continued after 2 pm
and stopped later)
The interpretation in (19a) is the one we expect, as it corresponds to the factive
inference. This could be obtained in the same fashion as explained for telic predi-
cates above by having the until-XP scoping above negation (until 2 pm, John didn’t
study) and the O-exhaustification operator applying even further above it (O (until 2
pm, John didn’t study). However, as already seen, atelic (or iterative punctual type
of) predicates are ambiguous between a ‘throughout-not’ and a ‘not-throughout’
reading. How can we account for the at-first-sight contradictory interpretations in
(19b, c), which seem to cancel one another, and as such suggest that whichever
temporal scalar inference they trigger, it should in principle be defeasible (i.e. non-
obligatory)? This challenges our current hypothesis in that until-XPs may have no
obligatory implications after all.
However, the interpretations in (19b, c) are in fact predicted in our exhaustifi-
cation-based analysis. They come from the LF [¬ [study until-XP]], correspond-
ing to the ‘not-throughout’ reading. This LF opens up two exhaustification posi-
tions from the moment the until-phrase scopes below the negation operator: O-
exhaustification of the alternatives generated by the until-XP can now apply (i)
above negation, or (ii) below negation in the derivation, i.e. [O¬[study until-XP]]
or [¬O[study until-XP]]. O-exhaustification below negation is marked, that is, it
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must be justified, e.g. by a continuation inconsistent with higher exhaustification.
As Chierchia (2013) notes, it comes with a typical Hornian metalinguistic flavor.
I first demonstrate the interpretation that emerges from O-exhaustification
above negation whenever the until-phrase stays in its low base position. The ‘not-
throughout’ reading in (20) corresponds to the interpretation that it is not the case
that John studied until 2 pm. The use of until obligatorily activates its tempo-
ral scalar alternatives, i.e. subset and superset intervals. If exhaustification applies
above the downward-entailing operator, such as negation, while the until-XP is em-
bedded below it, then the order of entailment of the alternatives is reversed, in
comparison to their entailment pattern in a positive environment or whenever the
until-XP scopes above negation. Thus, under these circumstances, superset inter-
vals are entailed by the prejacent, whereas subset intervals are not. If John did not
study for all relevant subintervals within [t0, 2], it follows that John didn’t study for
all relevant subintervals within [t0, 3], but he may have still studied for all relevant
subintervals within [t0, 1].
(20) a. OALTt0 (¬ [John studied until 2 pmALTt0]).
b. OALTt0 (¬∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)])
c. ALTt0:{¬∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 1]→ P (t′)],¬∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)],¬∀t′[t′ ⊆
[t0, 3]→ P (t′)]}
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d. Entailment Relation: [t0, 1]y [t0, 2]y [t0, 3]
(where Ay B indicates that A entails B)
It is not the case that John studied until 2 pm ⊆ It is not the case that
John studied until 3 pm but * It is not the case that John studied until
1 pm.
As the change in direction in the entailment relation in (20) illustrates, the relevant
alternative that it is not the case that John studied until 1 pm is not entailed by the
assertion and it must thus be negated in the exhaustification process, as outlined in
(21).
(21) a. OALTt0 (¬∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)]) = ¬∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)]
∧ ∀p ∈ ALTt0 [p→ [[¬∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)]] ⊆ p]]
b. SI : ¬[¬∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 1]→ P (t′)]] ≡ ∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 1]→ P (t′)]
The negation of the non-entailed subset interval gives us the following scalar infer-
ence for the ‘not-throughout’ reading: some instantiation of the event in question
must have occurred, e.g. some studying of John must have taken place (in line with
the common intuition that otherwise one would just say that John didn’t study, i.e.
without overtly specifying any time interval). Such an interpretation correlates with
one of the potential interpretations pointed out in (19)—e.g. John didn’t study until
2 pm, but until 1 pm—from which we deduce that the eventuality did not hold over
the course of the whole interval, but only for a subset of such an interval. This read-
ing is expected to be the default: it has the same alternatives as in the positive, just
opposite entailment pattern.
Yet the continuation of ‘but until 3 pm’ in (19c) contradicts this state of
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affairs. How can we get out of it? I posit that such an inference of John stopping
before 2 pm can be voided by exhaustifying the assertion below negation. This is
an option for (19c) because exhaustification above negation is incompatible with
the common ground ‘but until 3 pm.’ In addition, it is only possible for atelic or
iterative telic predicates (but not for non-iterative telic predicates) because the use
of until without negation does not lead to a deviant interpretation before negation
applies. As will be illustrated below, once negation applies above the exhaustified
assertion, this brings about the interpretation that John did not stop studying at 2 pm
and carried on studying until a later time, consistent with the continuation in (19c).
First I show in (22) the entailment relation among the active scalar alternatives when
considered before the application of negation in the derivation.
(22) a. ¬ OALTt0 (John studied until 2 pmALTt0).
b. ¬ OALTt0 (∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)])
c. ¬ ALTt0:{∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 1] → P (t′)],∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2] → P (t′)],∀t′[t′ ⊆
[t0, 3]→ P (t′)]}
d. Entailment Relation of ALT below negation:
[t0, 1]x [t0, 2]x [t0, 3]
John studied until 2 pm ⊆ John studied until 1 pm but * John studied
until 3pm.
When the O-exhaustification operator applies, later intervals (e.g. John studied until
3 pm) are not entailed by the asserted content, that is, we have the same entailment
pattern as in the positive cases. Thus, (i) in the first place O-exhaustification gives us
the interruption inference in the same way as it does in upward-entailing contexts,
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and (ii) second, negation applies, which negates the conjunction of the asserted
content with the interruption inference (e.g. it is not the case that [John studied
until 2 pm and stopped]), as outlined in (23).13
(23) a. OALTt0 (∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)]) = ∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)]
∧ ∀p ∈ ALTt0 [p→ [[∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)]] ⊆ p]]
b. SI below negation: ¬∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 3]→ P (t′)]
c. ¬OALTt0(∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)])=
¬[∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)] ∧ ¬∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 3]→ P (t′)]] ≡
¬∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)] ∨ ¬[¬∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 3]→ P (t′)]] ≡
¬∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)] ∨ ∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 3]→ P (t′)]
As (23) shows, exhaustification occurs before negation applies in the derivation.
In such a case, negation targets the already exhaustified assertion, where the in-
terruption inference has been added to the assertive content (John studied until 2
pm and stopped at 2 pm). Second, negation applies. Since the first conjunct, which
corresponds to the assertive content, cannot de denied, negation ends up refuting
the second conjunct, which corresponds to the interruption inference, i.e. the inter-
pretation that John no longer studied at time intervals after 2 pm, thus opening the
possibility that John could have continued studying. This is roughly equivalent to
13As assumed in the recent literature on ‘obligatory implicatures’ (non-defeasible inferences), I
also assume that after O intervenes obligatory exhaustified alternatives are conjoined into the as-
serted content, which can then be targeted by other operators, such as negation or other exhaus-
tification operators. For instance, this is essential in cases of recursive exhaustification: when one
exhaustifies with respect to pre-exhaustified alternatives. This is necessary to capture the range of
interpretations of disjunction and what is known as the free choice effect, attested when a disjunctive
sentence is embedded under an existential modal operator (e.g. you may have ice cream or cake).
See e.g. Fox (2007) and Chierchia (2013) for further discussion.
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saying the following: John studied until 2 pm and it is not the case that he stopped
then, thus giving us back the last potential interpretation given in (19), i.e. John
didn’t study until 2 pm, but until 3 pm.
4.2.4 Summing up
In sum, I have proposed that exhaustification of the scalar alternatives is optional in
the case of for-adverbials (depending on context)—eliciting a defeasible inference,
similar to a Gricean quantity implicature—whereas it is obligatory in the case of
until-phrases—giving rise to non-defeasible inferences.
Certain circumstances seem to challenge such a hypothesis. This is the case
when superficially we seem to be able to cancel the obligatoriness of scalar impli-
cations triggered by a negated atelic predicate modified by until when until takes
narrow scope—since we can say something like but until 1 pm and but until 3 pm for
what looks like the same utterance on the surface. However, this is precisely what
we would expect by having two exhaustification positions in the LF throughout the
derivation process: (i) above negation, or (ii) below negation, even though the latter
is a much weaker reading (because we are adding inferential material to the asserted
content before negation applies) and requires a special context (such as a continua-
tion or common ground that clashes with the result from O-exhaustification above
negation). In either case, O-exhaustification of the obligatory active alternatives that
until bears still takes place. What differs is the position where it occurs during the
derivation, thus still conforming to our obligatory exhaustification-based analysis
of until. In the case of negated telic and atelic predicates with until taking wide
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scope, O-exhaustification clearly takes place, as it results in the non-defeasible fac-
tive inference. Finally, in positive environments, O-exhaustification simply gives us
the interruption inference, which we would inevitably already expect from natural
facts about the physical world. A table that summarizes the different possible infer-
ences that derive from O-exhaustifying an atelic predicate modified by an until-XP
in positive and negative environments is given below considering the relevant scale
of <1 pm, 2 pm, 3 pm>:
Scopal position Type of inference Example
O (John studied until 2 pm) interruption inference John studied until 2 pm and not until 3 pm.
¬ O (John studied until 2 pm) ¬ interruption inference John didn’t study until 2 pm, but until 3 pm.
O ¬ (John studied until 2 pm) inference from ‘not-throughout’ reading John didn’t study until 2 pm, but until 1 pm.
O (until 2 pm, John didn’t study) factive inference from ‘throughout-not’ reading John didn’t study until 2 pm, he studied after 2 pm.
Table 4.1: A summary of the various scopal possibilities of O-exhaustification of
English until-XPs
However, there is one last question. Are there alternative analyses that would
also make all the right predictions? For instance, one could capture the obligatori-
ness of the factive inference in more traditional terms by evaluating it as an entail-
ment (or even a presupposition), as stated in previous literature for punctual until
(e.g. Karttunen 1974) (which mostly focused on factivity with negated telic pred-
icates). Nevertheless, there are several advantages of pursuing an exhaustification-
based analysis, as sketched above. For one, we can predict the various inferences
triggered by all uses of temporal for-adverbials and until-phrases in a unified fash-
ion by using a unique machinery which gives rise to all of them—with the sole
difference being whether O is obligatory or optional, and when it is present, where
in the derivation it applies. Second, as an entailment (or even much worse as a pre-
supposition) the factivity would have no scopal interaction with negation to capture
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all potential readings. For example, if the meaning of until 2 pm were something
like “P throughout [t0, 2] and ¬P after 2”, it might be able to give us the interrup-
tion inference in the positive cases and the factive inference in the negative cases
with telic predicates. But it cannot predict the “but until 1 pm” or “but until 3 pm”
implications from ‘not-throughout’ readings with atelic predicates. For that matter,
the reversal of the scalar alternatives could not interact with the entailment of un-
til to simply get the fact that the eventuality stopped before 2 pm. All in all, it is
hard to see how, in such unified manner, alternative analyses (e.g. by building the
factivity into the lexical content) could derive all (scope-sensitive) implications that
right-adjoined durative adverbials may elicit.
4.3 Loose ends and issues for further research: Prob-
ability associated with temporal until
In addition to the factive inference, another inference often associated with the use
of punctual until is the ‘later-than-expected’ inference, or as I call it, the ‘proba-
bility’ inference. For instance, on hearing The bomb did not explode until 2 pm we
infer that the bomb was expected to explode before 2 pm. Note, otherwise, that if
the bomb had been programmed to explode at 3 pm, the use of punctual until in
the aforementioned sentence would be odd. This section is intended to shed some
light on how this probability inference comes about, though there are aspects of
the analysis that remain to be further examined. Here I posit a preliminary notion
to be further developed. I will principally claim that such a probability inference
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emerges from the intervention of another covert exhaustification operator, one based
on the focus particle even (as also used in current exhaustification-based theories,
e.g. Crnic˘ 2012, Chierchia 2013). Eventually, as outlined in the conclusions, it will
be very interesting to view this proposal against other uses of until-like particles in
other languages. For example, recall that the counterpart of until in languages like














‘Even Juan came to the party.’
Furthermore, such until-like particles may also acquire an even-like connotation
when modifying a goal in a motion construction to implicate that despite the odds,
the subject was even able to reach the spatial goal (see e.g. Beavers 2008a and
Bassa-Vanrell 2013 for further discussion on this). A chief objective for future re-
search is to fully develop the connection between such temporal and spatial uses of
‘until’ to scalar additive even (see Chapter 6 for some additional discussion of these
uses). These preliminary ideas will help us better understand how and why, across
languages, it is a common development for temporal and spatial ‘until’ uses to be
associated with even-like meanings, through which speakers may convey their per-
ception of likelihood on the occurrence of events. All that said, this section consists
of some unfinished speculation, which contains promising ideas and working hy-




As noted above, another inference originating from the use of until-phrases, but
not for-adverbials, is what Condoravdi (2008: 4) reports as “the time of occurrence
could well have been earlier.” I refer to this inference as the probability inference.
This inference is clearly present with negative telic predicates modified by until-
phrases, unlike negative telic predicates modified by for-adverbials. For instance,
consider the contrast in acceptability that arises in (25) with the use of until-phrases,
but not with the use of for-adverbials.
(25) a. [Mary is 6 months pregnant. Mary’s due date is in 3 months, but
she unexpectedly already goes into labor.]
i. Mary did not give birth for the first 6 months of pregnancy.
ii. # Mary did not give birth until her 6th month of pregnancy.
b. [Mary is 9.5 months pregnant. Mary’s due date was 2 weeks ago,
and she finally goes into labor.]
i. Mary did not give birth for the first 9.5 months of pregnancy.
ii. Mary did not give birth until her 9.5 month of pregnancy.
In (25a.ii), the until-XP somehow comes with the inference that Mary’s giving birth
after her 6th month of pregnancy is less expected/likely than Mary’s giving birth
after, say, her 5th month of pregnancy, which explains the deviance of such an
example, since she is not actually expected to go into labor until later. By contrast,
such an inference is absent in (25a.i) with the use of the for-adverbial. On the other
hand, whenever the context indicates that the eventuality was expected to occur
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earlier but has not happened yet, then both until-phrases and for-adverbials are fine.
In (25b.ii), the until-XP carries a probability inference along the following lines:
Mary’s giving birth was late and was expected to have already taken place. The fact
that the use of until is constrained by the emergence of a probability inference in
(25a.i) suggests that this kind of inference is also non-defeasible, as its obligatory
projection would hinder the use of until in the (a) situation.
Therefore, we are addressing here an additional essential difference between
for-adverbials and until-phrases when it comes to the type of inferences that they
license. Until-phrases seem to obligatorily give rise to a probability inference on top
of an obligatory factive inference. Instead, for-adverbials lack obligatoriness in both
regards, and perhaps lack the probability inference all together. Finally, I would like
to point out that probability inferences have received attention in the literature for
other temporal adverbials as well, e.g. as a ‘later-than-expected’ inference for still
and yet in English and erst and noch in German in opposition to an ‘earlier-than-
expected’ inference for already, as discussed in Lo¨bner (1989), van der Auwera
(1993), Michaelis (1996), Krifka (2000), Ippolito (2007), and more recently Beck
(2016), inter alia.
4.3.2 The probability scale and even-based exhaustification
I claim that in addition to a temporal scale until also activates a probability scale.
The probability scale, as shown in (26), consists of linearly ordered alternatives that
are subintervals of the interval introduced by the prejacent. I call such a set of al-
ternatives ALTP , which also share the same contextually determined left-boundary
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t0 with the prejacent and differ as to when the right-boundary is set, e.g. until one,
until one thirty, until two, etc. Note that superintervals of the prejacent are not in-
cluded along the scale in (26). In what follows t stands for a time interval measure,
which is substracted from the interval complement of until.
(26) Probability Scale: ALTP (until n) = {until n− t, until n}
Such alternatives are clearly also scalar expressions, as time is ordered and scalar.
Thus, the alternatives can be straightforwardly ordered according to entailment. For
instance, whenever the until-XP is in an upward-entailing context, subset intervals
(i.e. earlier times) in (26) will be entailed by the prejacent, while superset intervals
are disregarded, since the interval introduced by the prejacent is the endpoint of the
probability scale I am assuming in (26). The intuition behind this scale truncation is
that whenever we associate until with some notion of probability, we only seem to
consider its linearly ordered preceding alternatives. The use of until appears to in-
dicate that the interval that it picks is more unlikely compared to its corresponding
preceding times, as will be illustrated with examples below. So far this remains an
observation to be further justified.14 For downward entailing contexts, the picture
will be slightly more complicated (depending on the scope position of the exhaus-
tification operator with respect to negation), which may posit a challenge due to the
reversal in the order of entailment, to be dealt with in the sections below.
Before that, however, note that such alternatives are also obligatory factored
14“Scale truncation” of scalar alternatives has been justified for other scalar elements as an avail-
able strategy of handling scales for non-end-of-scale/indefinite NPIs, so that one can uniformly
understand what scalar characteristics might, for instance, warrant NPI behavior (see e.g. Chierchia
2013). Along these lines, modulo ‘scale truncation’ we can explain why until may pick the least
likely element that corresponds to an end of a scale, since otherwise a temporal scale is infinite and
has no end per se.
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into meaning, since the prejacent must activate probability alternatives other than
itself, as further specified by the singleton condition in (27). Having an active alter-
native other than the prejacent will make exhaustification non-vacuous.
(27) JUntil 2 pmKALTP is defined iff the sets of alternatives triggered by the
scalar item [t0, 2] is not a singleton.
(where JαKALTP is the set of probability alternatives for any expression α)
In more formal terms, the set of probability alternatives, ALTP , can be defined as
follows:
(28) JUntil 2 pmKALTP = {λV.λf.∃t[hours(t) = [t0, n]∧ t ⊆T tr∧∀t′[C(t′)(t)→
V (λe[f(e) ∧ τ(e) = t′])]] : n≤2}
(defined iff the set of alternatives is not a singleton)
In (28), the alternatives other than the assertion itself are obtained by strictly replac-
ing the interval complement of until for subsets of the prejacent. In the remainder
of the section I will be using the even more simplified formalization in (29), purely
for expository purposes.
(29) JUntil 2 pmKALTP (simplified) = {λP [∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, n]→ P (t′)]] : n ≤ 2}
(defined iff the set of alternatives is not a singleton)
Therefore, the obligatorily triggered probability alternatives need to be exhaustified,
which calls for another alternative sensitive operator. Besides the exhaustification
operator O, based on focus-sensitive only, there are other exhaustification operators
available in the grammar. A covert operator based on focus-sensitive even, E, would
be an instance of an exhaustification operator (e.g. Krifka 1995, Crnic˘ 2012, Chier-
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chia 2010, 2013) which naturally brings about a probability measure and seems to
be the appropriate operator to generate probability inferences.
For example, observe a clear instance of a covert even in (30), where the
focally stressed subject in B’s assertion requires some kind of even-like operator,
since an only-like operator would not be appropriate given the context of a success-
ful party where many people showed up (and not only one person did).
(30) A: So how did the party go? Did many people show up?
B: Yes. Imagine that [my ex]F came.
[Adapted from E-exhaustification in Chierchia (2013): 147, ex (7)]
B’s assertion means something like Yes. Imagine that even [my ex]F came. How-
ever, focus is not a prerequisite for the application of this covert alternative sensitive
operator, in the same way as overt focus is not a precondition for the application
of O-exhaustification as long as the scalar item is already lexically endowed with
active alternatives that are factored into meaning. This would be the case for un-
til-XPs. Additionally, I propose that the result from E-exhaustification via a covert
operator in (30) expresses that the prejacent (φ) (e.g. my ex came) is the least likely
among the alternatives (p) inALTP (e.g. Bill came, Mary came, etc.) with respect to
some contextually relevant probability measure. Hence, the meaning I am assuming
for E is along the lines described in (31).15
15Following Chierchia (2013), the additive presupposition of even in that some other alternative
must be true has been omitted for simplicity. Chierchia (2013) also notes that the scalar component
of the exhaustification operator E is given as part of the assertion, rather than being part of the
presuppositional content, so that it is closer in resemblance to the semantics we have been assuming
for O.
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(31) JEALTP φK = [φ ∧ ∀p ∈ φALTP [ φ<µ p ]] [E(even)-operator]
where ‘φ<µ p’ says that the prejacent is less likely than p with respect to
some contextually relevant probability measure µ.
As Chierchia (2013) points out, when a “set of alternatives is totally ordered by
entailment, then it is also totally ordered with respect to any probability measure µ,
for it must be the case that whenever (φ)⊆ (ψ), µ(φ)≤µ µ(ψ), for any µ. This might
be regarded as a case of structural salience” (p. 153). In this regard, I believe that
some probability measure condition of this sort is clearly salient with the use of until
simply due to evident entailment relations between the alternatives. Moreover, there
appears to be an additional even connotation associated with the use of until, mostly
noticeable when until modifies negative telic predicates. Thus, the E-operator and
until-XPs show all the properties that suggest that they are a natural fit. Finally, it
is important to note that for purposes of this dissertation, I am assuming that E and
O do not scopally interact.16 With the above pieces in place, the basic details of the
execution of the analysis are illustrated next.
16An issue I leave for future research is to fully work out the details of O and E scopal interactions
if they do interact. For the time being, if we assume that they do not scopally interact, it could be that
two types of unrelated asserted content are created: the content with O but not E, and the content
with E but not O. The core preposition P ends up being asserted twice but in conjunction it derives
the different O and E scalar inferences. This could be reminiscent of Potts (2007), where expressive
meaning is computed separately from asserted content.
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4.3.3 Execution of the E-exhaustification analysis
4.3.3.1 Upward-entailing contexts
The alternatives that until-XPs trigger within ALTP are all entailed alternatives in
positive environments, since earlier times are entailed by the prejacent. It thus fol-
lows that the prejacent must be less likely than such alternatives, since the assertion
will be true in fewer situations (e.g. Crnic˘ 2012, Chierchia 2013). Even though in
positive contexts such a probability inference may not be as salient, I argue that it
is in fact still present (yet it may be seen as trivial).
The relevant active subset alternatives constitute the set in ALTP and are ex-
haustified by E. The inference that ends up being added to the assertion is that the
prejacent is less likely than any of the alternatives in ALTP , which conforms to nat-
ural facts about the physical world: any eventuality extending/holding for a longer
period of time will usually be less likely or more noteworthy than one holding for
a shorter period of time. The longer the interval in question is throughout which
an eventuality holds, the more likely that something will happen that can interrupt
that state of events. This is in line with the interruption inference that also emerges
in positive contexts via O-exhaustification; as argued above, an event cannot hold
indefinitely.
For example, the sentence John studied until 2 pm asserts that “for all rele-
vant subintervals within [t0, 2] John studied” and implicates that “John’s studying
until 2 pm is more notable than John’s studying until earlier times (e.g. 1:30 pm,
until 1 pm, until noon, etc.).” The execution of the analysis is fairly automatic, as
outlined in (32).
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(32) a. EALTP (John studied until 2 pm
ALTP )
b. ALTP :{John studied until 1 pm, John studied until 2 pm}
c. Entailment Relation: [t0, 1]x [t0, 2]
John studied until 2 pm ⊆ John studied until 1 pm
d. EALTP (∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)]) = ∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)]
∧ ∀p ∈ ALT [[∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)]] <µ p]
e. Probability inference (PI) : ∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2] → P (t′)] <µ ∀t′[t′ ⊆
[t0, 1]→ P (t′)]
Subset intervals must be less notable than the prejacent as they are true in more
situations (e.g. John studied until 2 pm entails that John studied until 1 pm). Af-
ter E-exhaustification, we obtain that the prejacent, John studied until 2 pm, is less
likely than earlier relevant times, John studied until 1 pm. This corresponds to the
probability inference associated with the use of until in positive contexts: the expec-
tation that the longer an eventuality holds the more noteworthy it is in the sense that
it is more likely that something could interrupt the eventuality. Next, I show how
E-exhaustification captures the prominent probability inference associated with the
use of until within negative environments.
4.3.3.2 Telic predicates with negation
As we previously saw with O-exhaustification, the only possible position where an
exhaustification operator can apply whenever until modifies a negated telic predi-
cate is above negation, since until, in turn, must also scope above the downward-
entailing operator so that the outcome is a contingent utterance. Therefore, in this
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section we are concerned with E-exhaustification applying last in the derivation of
a ‘throughout-not’ reading.
First, recall the examples in (25) above about Mary’s not giving birth until a
certain time, which carry the strong inference that Mary’s giving birth was expected
to have occurred earlier. How such a probability inference comes about is outlined
in (33), where preceding relevant times are also entailed by the prejacent. In (33)
the prejacent indicates that Mary has not given birth by her 9.5th month of preg-
nancy. This entails that she has not given birth by, say, her 9th month of pregnancy.
This alternative, when E-exhaustified, gives us back the expectation that the time
of occurrence of the event in question was supposed to have taken place earlier:
not having given birth at 9.5 months of pregnancy is less expected/likely than not
having given birth at 9 months of pregnancy.
(33) a. EALTP ([Until her 9.5th month of pregnancy
ALTP [Mary did not give
birth]])
b. ALTP :{Until her 9th month of pregnancy, Mary did not give birth; Until
her 9.5th month of pregnancy, Mary did not give birth}
c. Entailment Relation: [t0, 9mo]x [t0, 9.5mo]
Until 9.5th month > Mary did not give birth⊆ Until 9th month > Mary
did not give birth
d. EALTP (∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 9.5mo] → ¬P (t′)]) = ∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 9.5mo] →
¬P (t′)]∧ ∀p ∈ ALT [[∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 9.5mo]→ ¬P (t′)]] <µ p]
e. PI : ∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 9.5mo]→ ¬P (t′)] <µ ∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 9mo]→ ¬P (t′)]
Roughly, the probability inference that the meaning of E-exhaustification contributes
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states that Mary’s not giving birth past 9.5 months of pregnancy is less likely than
Mary’s not giving birth earlier, say right after 9 months of pregnancy. This is in line
with our expectations from world knowledge: giving birth after 9.5 months of preg-
nancy is considered too late and unlikely as the event is expected to occur around
the 9 month due date. These expectations correlate with the meaning of the prob-
ability inference that winds up being added to the assertion, hence explaining its
acceptability.
On the other hand, the emergence of such a probability inference predicts
the strange state of affairs that derives from the use of until in contexts where the
actualization of the event is expected to occur later, and not earlier. This is illustrated
in (34). The assertion that Mary had not given birth by her 6th month of pregnancy
activates subset intervals as probability alternatives, say, that Mary had not given
birth by her 5th month of pregnancy, where the prejacent entails its alternatives.
E-exhaustification states that the assertion is less likely than its alternatives, which
results in oddness:
(34) a. EALTP ([Until her 6th month of pregnancy
ALTP [Mary did not give
birth]])
b. ALTP :{Until her 5th month of pregnancy, Mary did not give birth; Until
her 6th month of pregnancy, Mary did not give birth}
c. Entailment Relation: [t0, 5mo]x [t0, 6mo]
Until 6th month > Mary did not give birth ⊆ Until 5th month > Mary
did not give birth
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d. EALTP (∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 6mo]→ ¬P (t′)]) = ∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 6mo]→ ¬P (t′)]
∧ ∀p ∈ ALT [[∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 6mo]→ ¬P (t′)]] <µ p]
e. PI : ∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 6mo]→ ¬P (t′)] <µ ∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 5mo]→ ¬P (t′)]
The obligatory probability inference in (34) asserts that Mary’s not giving birth by
her 6th month of pregnancy is less likely than Mary’s not giving by her 5th month
of pregnancy. In other words, E-exhaustification expresses that our expectations are
that Mary is likely to have already given birth by that date. However, this probability
inference clashes with world knowledge, since the expectation is that the occurrence
of the event should not occur for at least three more months, near the 9-month due
date, which explains the strange use of the until-phrase in this example as it clashes
with the inference that “the time of occurrence could well have been earlier.”
Thus far E-exhaustification confirms our expectations about the occurrence
of an event modified by until: it gives rise to the inference that the eventuality may
well have stopped earlier in upward entailing contexts (i.e. the interruption of the
eventuality could well have happened) or that the actualization of the event may
well have occurred earlier in ‘throughout-not’ interpretations (i.e. the instigation
of the eventuality was expected to occur earlier). However, does E-exhaustification
make the right predictions with atelic (or iterative telic) predicates when a ‘not-
throughout’ interpretation is also possible?
4.3.3.3 E-exhaustification with ‘not-throughout’ interpretations
Recall from O-exhaustification that an LF that corresponds to a ‘not-throughout’ in-
terpretation opens two exhaustification-based positions from where the alternatives,
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obligatorily activated by until, could be exhaustified. The until-phrase attaches low
in its base position at VP and is thus embedded in the downward-entailing context
by scoping below negation. Under those conditions, the default position of the al-
ternative sensitive operator is above negation. However, it could, in principle, also
take place below negation. Even though exhaustification below negation is marked,
it is justified if something clashes with higher exhaustification.
I show, first, the result from E-exhaustification above negation, which results
in a contradiction. This justifies the need to try E-exhaustification below negation,
which will be shown next. For this, I use the example John didn’t study until 2 pm
under the interpretation that it is not the case that John studied for all the relevant
subintervals until 2 pm. The result from E-exhaustification above negation is shown
in (35) where now previous alternatives along the probability scale are not entailed
by the prejacent, as the entailment pattern has been reversed. E-exhaustification
indicates that the prejacent is less likely than the alternatives that entail it, which is
contradictory because the alternatives are true in fewer situations.
(35) a. EALTP (¬ [John studied until 2 pmALTP ])
b. ALTP :{It is not the case that John studied until 1 pm, It is not the case
that John studied until 2 pm}
c. Entailment Relation: [t0, 1]y [t0, 2]
It is not the case that John studied until 2 pm * It is not the case that
John studied until 1 pm
d. EALTP (¬∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)]) = ¬∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)]
∧ ¬∀p ∈ ALT [[∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)]] <µ p]
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e. PI above negation : ¬∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)]<µ ¬∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 1]→
P (t′)]
The derivation in (35) concludes that it is not the case that John studied until 2 pm
is less likely than it is not the case that John studied until 1 pm. Since the latter
entails the former, this yields a contradiction.
However, we are still left with another potential exhaustification position
that could save the use of until in it is not the case that John studied until 2 pm. This
is E-exhaustification below negation (where the entailment pattern has not been
reversed yet). What happens when we attempt to exhaustify the alternatives below
negation is illustrated in (36). The inference (John studying until 2 pm is less likely
than John studying until 1 pm) is added by conjunction into the assertive content
(John studied until 2 pm) before negation applies.
(36) a. ¬ EALTP (John studied until 2 pmALTP )
b. ALTP :{John studied until 1 pm, John studied until 2 pm}
c. Entailment Relation: [t0, 1]x [t0, 2]
John studied until 2 pm ⊆ John studied until 1 pm
d. EALTP (∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)]) = ∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)]
∧ ∀p ∈ ALT [[∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)]] <µ p]
e. PI below negation : ∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2] → P (t′)] <µ ∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 1] →
P (t′)]
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f. ¬ EALTP (∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2] → P (t′)]) = ¬[∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2] → P (t′)] ∧
∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)] <µ ∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 1]→ P (t′)]] ≡
¬∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)] ∨
¬[∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 2]→ P (t′)] <µ ∀t′[t′ ⊆ [t0, 1]→ P (t′)]]
After negation applies, we obtain that either it is not the case that John did not study
until 2 pm or that it is not the case that John studying until 2 pm is less likely than
John studying until 1 pm. Since the second disjunct cannot be true (the fact that a
weaker alternative is less likely than a stronger alternative), we are left with the first
disjunct, which corresponds entirely to the meaning of the ‘not-throughout’ read-
ing. In other words, the probability inference obtained from E-exhaustification be-
low negation with an atelic predicate is trivial since the inferential meaning added
to the assertive content does not survive when negation applies above it and E-
exhaustification ends up giving us back the meaning that corresponds to the ‘not-
throughout’ reading. Most importantly, no contradiction arises, in line with the fact
that a ‘not-throughout’ interpretation is felicitous. E-exhaustification would simply
be trivial, which further correlates with the fact that probability inferences do not
arise with ‘not-throughout’ readings. Hence, our hypothesis that until always ac-
tivates its probability scale persists because probability inferences emerge in the
right contexts (with ‘throughout-not’ readings), and are predicted to disappear in
the contexts where they are absent (with ‘not-throughout’ readings).
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4.3.4 Summing up
In sum, in this section I have put forth the idea that until also obligatorily triggers a
probability scale, which consists solely of earlier relevant alternatives. Such alterna-
tives are factored into meaning and thus must be exhaustified. I have suggested that
exhaustification of probability alternatives happens via another alternative-sensitive
operator, E, roughly equivalent to covert even.
Our assumption that until obligatorily activates a probability scale of alter-
natives, in addition to a temporal scale of alternatives does not get in the way in the
outcome of any attested interpretation in both positive and negative contexts. In the
less salient cases, i.e. in positive cases, the probability inference corroborates what
we would already naturally expect from facts that follow from the physical world.
In ‘not-throughout’ interpretations, such an inference does not survive negation and
goes away. But, perhaps even more importantly, in ‘throughout-not’ readings, it
gives us the salient inference that the actualization of the event was expected to oc-
cur earlier. This predicts the oddness of the use of until-XPs in contexts where the
actualization of the event is not expected until later. Finally, I would like to empha-
size again that this section mostly consisted of a series of ideas and speculations
in progress. Of course, there is more to be said; for example, I have not discussed
cases in positive environments in which our own perception of likelihood taking
into account the semantics of a verb may interfere with the physical view that the
more an event holds the more likely it is to be interrupted. This does not obviously
fit into what I am saying here, but I leave these cases for future work.
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4.3.5 For-adverbials and the lack of a salient probability/entailment
measure
Before closing this chapter, I would like to acknowledge a larger question looming
here: Why is it that for-adverbials, as opposed to until-phrases, may not obliga-
torily activate a probability scale? (Or even the temporal scale?) It is not clear to
me, at present, what the answer is, but I would like to start by hypothesizing the
following. The measure µ of likelihood is based on relations of entailment based
on precedence and linear order on the temporal scale (e.g. subintervals vs. super-
intervals that share the same left boundary). An entailment relation of precedence
is inconclusive when the prejacent of a for-adverbial is compared to its alternatives
(e.g. longer or shorter intervals) without specifying its referential position on the
temporal spectrum. The prejacent of a for-adverbial focuses on the measure of an
interval but such an interval may consist of a sum of non-contiguous intervals, i.e.
non-adjacent intervals (e.g. Dowty 1979). Such subintervals may simultaneously
precede and follow a relevant alternative. This makes it difficult to automatically
resort to a probability measure µ.
For example, imagine a context in which John studied from 2 pm to 3 pm
and then again from 7 pm to 8 pm. Someone can say John studied for two hours
today to refer to such a situation and this is still judged true. A relevant alternative
may be John studying from 2 pm to 3:30 pm (i.e. an alternative with the same
left boundary but shorter), and yet it is inconclusive whether such an alternative
precedes or follows the prejacent, impeding the possibility of directly resorting to a
contextually relevant probability measure µ.
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All in all, the prejacent of for-adverbials may consist of a sum of non-
contiguous intervals where, as a consequence, the alternatives (shorter or longer
alternatives that share the same left boundary t0) cannot be automatically classified
as subsets or supersets per se. Such alternatives thus cannot be instinctively ordered
in terms of entailment depending on a relation of precedence/succession along a
temporal scale. I suggest that this may be intrinsically related to (i) the fact that
for-adverbials do not active probability alternatives, and (ii) the optional activation
of their temporal scalar alternatives.17
4.4 Conclusions
In sum, if we put together the scopal account of right-adjoined durative adverbials
built in Chapter 3 with an exhaustification-based approach to scalar alternatives
put forth in this chapter (similar to current proposals of obligatory scalar implica-
tures), not only the factivity of punctual until but also other scalar inferences are
predicted in a unified fashion. It is furthermore appealing that the difference in be-
havior between for-adverbials and until-phrases with regard to factivity consists of
a simple parametric measure (the optional/obligatory choice): the temporal scalar
alternatives associated with until-phrases are always ‘active’ and must be obligato-
17Note that other temporal adverbials that take definite, and what also looks like contiguous, time
intervals as complements, such as before 2 pm, do not obligatorily give rise to factive readings either,
suggesting that they also do not obligatorily activate their scalar alternatives: John didn’t arrive
before 2 pm, and indeed he never arrived. However, I believe that the definiteness and contiguity
of the interval complement of before is not comparable to the case of until. The reason why before
is not factive may be because it lacks the universal component to begin with. This is supported by
the fact that before can modify non-iterative telic predicates in positive environments: John arrived
before 2 pm. I would like to thank David Beaver and Daniel Margulis for discussion on this issue,
which remains to be investigated in future work.
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rily factored into meaning, whereas the temporal alternatives of for-adverbials do
not necessarily need to be ‘active.’ As a result, the potential cancellability of the
inferences triggered by for-adverbials is contingent on context. Finally, a combined
scopal and exhaustification-based analysis is preferred for the case of until in En-
glish over any lexical ambiguity theory because we do not have to stipulate the
existence of an NPI-until, for which English does not make any overt lexical dis-
tinction. A question that arises here is then the following: can we extend an analysis
such as this to other languages that also do not make a lexical distinction between
their until-counterpart uses? A language that falls into this category is Spanish,
which is investigated in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5
A plural implicature-based approach
of Spanish durative adverbial hasta
‘until’
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter I analyze the behavior of Spanish hasta in comparison to English
until in the temporal domain.1 At first sight, the characteristics of hasta seem quite
parallel to until. Nevertheless, when taking a closer look at these two related forms,
a number of critical differences emerge which have to date gone unnoticed in the
literature, making it nonviable to pursue a uniform analysis of both Spanish hasta
1Hasta in Spanish can also mark the goal of a motion construction, as in Juan corrio´ hasta la
tienda ‘Juan ran up to the store’ or be used as a scalar additive particle similar to even as in Hasta
Juan vino a la fiesta ‘Even Juan came to the party’, among other more abstract uses, such as function
as a degree modifier. For the purposes of this chapter, I only focus on the uses of hasta in the temporal
domain. See Chapter 6 for more on these other uses.
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and English until, and, per extension, between Spanish hasta and for-adverbials.
I will propose that hasta-phrases are existential temporal frame adverbials
that measure out plural events, instead of universally-based adverbials like English
until (and for-adverbials). I will argue that the semantic contribution of the du-
rative component of hasta is a non-defeasible multiplicity inference, as has been
suggested for plural morphology on DPs (e.g. Spector 2007, Mayr 2015). Com-
paring the contrast between existential vs. universal types of until with the two
major approaches to temporal measure-phrases we find in the literature, the analy-
sis I suggest for hasta is a modified version of Krifka’s (1998) analysis of durative
adverbials (albeit one that does not involve a fusion-based treatment of negation),
whereas the analysis I proposed for until in Chapter 3 and 4 consists of an updated
version of Dowty’s (1979) analysis of durative adverbials. Proposing two distinct
types of ‘until’ has further cross-linguistic consequences when we expand our em-
pirical focus. In particular, I will suggest that the existentially-based analysis can
have a natural NPI-counterpart, which may be what is overtly realized in languages
like Greek.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In §2, I discuss the close resem-
blance between English until and Spanish hasta, which suggests a similar treat-
ment for the two adverbials. However, in §3, I introduce crucial contrastive data
that will make it impossible to maintain the same analysis for both. In §4, I put
forth a novel analysis for Spanish hasta, which is reminiscent of Krifka’s (1998)
analysis of durative adverbials. Hasta is an existential plural modifier where the
durative component of hasta is built in the form of a plural implicature. In §5, the
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factivity of hasta, as well as other inferences, arise as scalar implicatures within
an exhaustification-based system. Finally, in §6, I suggest a potential implication
of the proposed analysis that arises when we expand the typological basis of the
present work. The conclusions are given in §7.
5.2 Parallelism between English until and Spanish hasta
Durative English until and Spanish hasta share several well-known properties for
measure-phrases in the temporal domain. First, just as English until only modifies
durative predicates (statives, activities, and iterated telic predicates), Spanish hasta
also seems to only modify atelic predicates (or iterated telic predicates), as in (1a),
and appears to be unable to modify non-iterative punctual predicates in a positive






















# ‘Juan arrived until 2.’
A second parallelism with until-phrases is that whenever a predicate is negated, not
only can atelic and iterative telic predicates be modified by hasta-phrases but also
non-iterative telic predicates, as shown in (2).
2In §5.3. we will see that under special circumstances non-iterative punctual predicates may be
modifiable by hasta when they can receive a cumulative interpretation.
3I simultaneously introduce the Spanish and English data for comparison, as I give the trans-
lations of the Spanish examples in English. I also indicate whether the English counterparts of the



























‘Juan didn’t arrive until 2.’
Third, the use of hasta in (2b), similarly to punctual until, also gives rise to a non-
cancellable factive inference about the actualization of the event (e.g. Juan’s arrival)





















‘Juan didn’t arrive until 2. #In fact he never arrived.’
Finally, in addition to the properties of durativity and factivity that hasta-phrases
share with until-phrases, hasta also seems to take narrow scope with respect to
other scope-bearing elements in the clause, such as a singular indefinite object. For
example, in (4) the same wrong phone number must be dialed again and again
throughout the given interval. Even though a narrow scope interpretation of the





















‘Juan dialed a wrong phone number until 2.’
This narrow scope behavior of right-adjoined hasta-phrases explains the oddity of
a sentence as in (5a) when the predicate is a non-iterative telic predicate that takes
a singular indefinite object. The strange meaning obtained in (5a) resembles the
interpretation in (5b), where the predicate takes a referential object instead: the
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same rabbit is being killed over and over again. Hence, thus far, hasta-phrases show
the same constrained scopal pattern as until-phrases, noticed since Carlson (1977a,
b).4































# ‘Juan killed the rabbit until 2.’
As predicted by Differentiated Scope (e.g. Carlson 1977b), the examples in (5)
become acceptable when the object is a bare plural as in (6), which can be regarded













‘Juan killed rabbits until 2.’
The interpretation that arises in (6) is the acceptable meaning of different rabbits
being killed over the course of an interval that ends at two.
Thus far the behavior of hasta-phrases in Spanish mirrors the behavior of
until-phrases in English. This is not especially surprising since they are two cross-
linguistically related forms, counterparts of each other in ‘close enough’ languages,
which share their main function in the temporal domain, both indicating how long
a durative eventuality holds. However, under closer scrutinity, hasta appears to be
4In the remainder of the dissertation, DOM in the glosses stands for Differential Object Marking
in Spanish. For a recent discussion on the status of DOM in today’s European Spanish, see e.g. von
Heusinger and Kaiser (2007, 2011), Bassa-Vanrell (2011), and Bassa-Vanrell and Romeu (2014).
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more permissive in terms of the number of interpretations that it triggers than until.
This is discussed next.
5.3 The puzzle: Contrast between English until and
Spanish hasta
Recall that English until is unacceptable when a non-iterative punctual predicate
takes a plural quantified theme in upward-entailing environments, as illustrated in
(7).
(7) # Thirty/many/some people arrived until 2 pm.
• Distributive reading: every member of the group kept arriving until 2 pm.
The sentences in (7) sound substandard because they acquire a distributive reading,
wherein every member of the group (of e.g. 30/many/some people) kept arriving
until 2 pm. This follows from the analysis of until-phrases (and other right-adjoined
durative adverbials like for-phrases) as universal quantifiers that take narrow scope
with respect to the quantified DP-subject/object.
We find a striking and unexpected contrast when comparing the sentences
in (7) to their corresponding Spanish counterparts. In Spanish, such sentences are
perfectly acceptable and receive a cumulative reading, as illustrated in (8).5
5“Cumulative” here is meant in opposition to a distributive reading, following e.g. Champollion














# ‘Thirty/many/some people arrived until 2.’
• Cumulative reading: a total of 30/many/some people arrived non-simulta-
neously over the course of an interval that ended at 2 pm.
The cumulative interpretation in (8) corresponds to something along the follow-
ing lines: ‘there was a plural arriving event whose cumulative theme is a set of
thirty/many/some people that lasted until 2.’ This additional durative meaning of
hasta is not predicted by a universal quantification approach of durative adverbials
a` la Dowty (1979), since, for instance, in every relevant time subinterval until 2 pm,
thirty/many/some people should have arrived, which would result in deviance since
it describes a nearly impossible situation wherein the same group of people kept
arriving over and over again.
Another case where hasta-XPs seem to be more permissive is when modify-
ing accomplishments, even when the eventuality described by the accomplishment
predicate has culminated. For example, the following sentences in (9) are acceptable
across the board in Spanish, while they may sound fairly odd in English, especially












































?? ‘Juan drank a bottle of wine until midnight.’
It seems that in these examples hasta simply introduces the duration of the eventual-
ity, where the accomplishment may have culminated or not: Juan may have finished
the entire book or he may have read only part of it. On the other hand, the deviance
of the English sentences is explained on a distributive reading of the predicate over
all the subintervals of the interval in question because, for example, for all relevant
subintervals Juan needs to completely build one house/drink one bottle of wine. But
how can we explain the acceptability of the Spanish examples?
The more general question thus is the following: how do we accommo-
date the English vs. Spanish difference within the traditional approach to measure
phrases, such as Dowty (1979) and Krifka (1998), which are meant to capture the
behavior of English until but as they stand cannot predict the various ‘new’ durative
meanings of Spanish hasta? In other words, what kind of parameter is responsible
for this variation, and which of the available theories is better equipped to explain
it? This constitutes the core questions of the next section.
5.4 Hasta as an existential adverbial of temporal fram-
ing
As a brief recap, recall that two major traditional approaches have been proposed
for English for-adverbials (and per extension, until-phrases): (i) Dowty’s approach
(cf. 10a), which treats measure phrases as universals (where the verbal predicate
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must hold of all relevant subintervals), and (ii) Krifka’s approach, which translates
them as existential adverbials of temporal framing with a divisiveness/pluractional
selectional requirement (cf. 10b). (In what follows, t0 is a contextually supplied left
boundary, [t0, n] a closed time interval, and τ(e) the duration of the event e.)
(10) a. Dowty’s (1979) approach: Juntil n-timeK =
λP. λt[[t0, n] = t ∧ ∀t′[t′ ⊆ t→ P (t′)]]
b. Krifka’s (1998) approach: Juntil n-timeK =
λP. λe : atelic (P )[P (e) ∧ τ(e) = [t0, n]]
We opted for a scopal account of English until in Chapter 3 to capture the accept-
ability of telic predicates under negation, i.e. its punctual behavior. The original mo-
tivations for pursuing a scopal theory based on Dowty’s approach for English until
were mainly (i) to include the universal component of until as part of its assertive
content so as to naturally account for the durative requirement of the adverbial and
(ii) for until to be able to uniformly scope below and above negation while avoiding
a fusion analysis of negation. This would have not been possible if the universal
component had been placed in the presuppositional content of until, constituting
the pluractional selectional requirement, as proposed by Krifka (1998). However, it
is not obvious how to extend such an approach to incorporate the additional atelic
meanings of hasta, since if we do that the acceptable examples in (8) above (involv-
ing telic predicates with plural quantified DPs) will be predicted to be infelicitous.
Let us therefore turn to the alternative, Krifka’s approach, and see whether that fares
better. I begin by revising the pluractional condition imposed on until-XPs so that
they can capture the essence of hasta-XPs while also challenging the need for a
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fusion analysis of negation.
To start, I propose that Spanish hasta-XPs are existential temporal framing
adverbials that simply place the eventuality within an interval and assert that there
are events e (one or more) whose durations fall, for example, between t0 and 2 pm,
similar to the assertive content of durative adverbials a` la Krifka (1998). Within
our current framework, based on quantificational event semantics in the spirit of
Champollion (2015), such a denotation for hasta would be the following:
(11) Jhasta las 2K (to be modified) = λV.λf [V (λe[f(e) ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2]])]
However, this is not enough, as it overgenerates. For example, the sentences in
(5) that describe a singular non-iterative punctual predicate, repeated here as (12),
would be predicted to be felicitous, yet they are not.































# ‘Juan killed the rabbit until 2.’
Specifically, hasta las 2 as in (11) would just indicate that the killing-of-the-rabbit
event falls between t0 and 2, which is a plausible meaning, contrary to what the
judgements for such sentences are:6
6Existential hasta already predicts a wide scope interpretation of the object a rabbit within the
present framework, where the theme is just one rabbit due to lexical cumulativity even if the pred-
icate kill were pluralized (i.e. there are one or more killings of the same rabbit). See, for example,
Kratzer (2008: 19-24) for further discussion.
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(13) a. JJuan mato´ a un conejo hasta las 2K (to be modified) = λf.∃x[a rabbit(x)∧
∃e[killing(e) ∧ f(e)∧ ag(e) = Juan ∧ th(e) = x ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2]]]
b. JJuan mato´ al conejo hasta las 2K (to be modified) = λf.∃e[killing(e)∧
f(e) ∧ ag(e) = Juan ∧ th(e) = the rabbit ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2]]
Instead, the (pragmatically bizarre) reading in (13) is that the same rabbit was killed
over and over again. Therefore, hasta-XPs must still be subject to an atelic/plurality
condition, which is responsible for its ‘durative’ requirement and explains why
hasta cannot modify a unique punctual event (i.e. a punctual predicate that takes
a singular DP-argument), as in (14a), while still allowing for plural punctual events
(i.e. the sum of multiple punctual events, which occurs when a punctual predicate
takes a plural DP-argument), as in (14b).























#‘Thirty people arrived until 2.’
I claim that hasta-XPs are inherently plural: they select for properties of
events that are plural and state that there are several events (i.e. more than one)
within the time frame. For this, let us assume that there are plurality of events,
namely events that are durative and hence contain subevents, and hasta is a mod-
ifier of such a plural property. One way to capture the restriction of hasta-XPs to
plural events would be by encoding plurality into the meaning, e.g. as a sort of
atelic/pluractional prerequisite following Krifka (1998). However, we want this re-
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striction to vanish under negation, in order to avoid the imposition of plural negative
events. The example in (15) is interpreted as there not being any arrival of Juan be-
tween t0 and 2, and not as there not being a plural/durative arrival of Juan between













‘Juan didn’t arrive until 2.’
Following current approaches to plural morphology on DPs, in particular Spector
(2007) and Mayr (2015), the semantic contribution of plurality can instead be better
formulated as a non-defeasible inference within a system of obligatory implicatures
via exhaustification operators that negate non-entailed alternatives, similar to the
one presented in Chapter 4 to account for the scalar inferences of English until. The
reason for this is that the meaning of plural morphology in DPs does not behave
like an entailment or a presupposition, as it also disappears under negation. In what
follows, I first discuss plurality in event semantics in general. I then present the
basic proposal of Spector (2007) on plurals, which will be comparable to our own
analysis.
5.4.1 Plural event structures
Before I propose the main analysis of this chapter, I briefly present what I will be
assuming about plurality and event structures. In the same way that we construe
plural individuals as sums of atoms and we maintain that the domain of individuals,
De, is closed under sum formation (e.g. following Link 1983), we will assume that
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the domain of eventuality E is similarly closed under a join operator ‘∪.’ In other
words, the domain of eventualities E forms a join-semilattice, partially ordered by
a part-of relation ‘≤’ and verb meanings are sublattices. We assume, furthermore,
that eventualities get mapped into time intervals via a temporal trace function τ(e);
for any e, τ(e) is the duration of e. An atom is defined in the usual way:
(16) AT(e) = ∀e′[e′ ≤ e→ e = e′]
(an atom has no proper parts)
In connection to (16), the notion of P-atoms is also relevant to the present discus-
sion, that is, an atomic event relevant to a predicate P, following Krifka (1998: 3
(5)). Note that things that are atoms are P-atoms but not all P-atoms are atoms:
(17) P-AT(e) = ∀e′[e′ ≤ e ∧ P (e′)→ e = e′]
(an atom with no proper parts of the relevant verb type7)
We do assume that E contains a set of atoms A. However, we leave it open whether
E is wholly atomic (i.e. generated by A) or not as any given verb meaning may
or may not be generated from a set of atoms (or P-atoms) and if all are, then E
is as well. In particular, that depends on what one wants to do with activities, like
running, or states, like being on the roof, and whether one wants to assume that
there are singular/atomic running activities or states of being on the roof. Following
primarily Kratzer (2008), I assume that all verbs denote sets of eventualities closed
under ∪, regardless of their Aktionsart.8
7Recall that since we are assuming a Neo-Davidsonian framework, the denotation of the predi-
cate excludes any arguments other than the event argument. Therefore, the subevents e′ of e here are
in relation to the verb type.
8For different accounts on atomicity of events and event plurality see e.g. Rothstein (2004, 2008).
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In what follows, I illustrate with a few examples the minimal assumptions
we will need for present purposes (i.e. spelling out the plural oriented nature of
until-phrases). The simplest understanding is to assume that achievements (non-
durative predicates) have an atomic structure. Thus, for instance, arrive will denote
the closure under sum of a set of atomic events. In a world in which there are
only three arrivals, two by John at different times (eJ,1, eJ,2—where subscripted J
indicates the theme) and one by Bill (eB,3), the denotation of the verb arrive will be
the following:
(18) eJ,1 ∪ eJ,2 ∪ eB,3JarrivewK = eJ,1 ∪ eJ,2 eJ,1 ∪ eB,3 eJ,2 ∪ eB,3
eJ,1 eJ,2 eB,3
A plural event in this setup is clearly defined and isomorphic to the notion of
plural individuals. Furthermore, achievements may sometimes be coerced into ac-
complishments in context (often aided by the imperfective or progressive aspect)
(Rothstein 2004) or via reconceptualization of paths as extended or not in context
(Beavers 2012). One such interpretation is a “filmstrip” reading where you slow the
event down at a finer granularity than normal and view it as unfolding over time. In
that case what might have been thought of as an atomic event e in the denotation of
the achievement is treated as decomposed into a series of events e1,...,en. Therefore,
those atoms in (18) might not be pure atoms relative to E for at least some achieve-
ments like arrive (but not for some like notice since for notice it may well be as it
is usually thought not to be coercible). However, in the context of a non-coerced in-
terpretation of the verb the smallest events in the denotation of the verb are P-atoms
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(if not atoms) to say the least. From here onwards, I make the simplifying assump-
tion that all achievements ground out in real atoms, but if one were to conceive that
this is not quite right,9 we could exchange the notion of ‘atoms’ in the forthcoming
discussion for ‘P-atoms’ and the key proposal of the analysis would not be altered.
With regard to other types of predicates, I am inclined to assume that the
structure of durative eventualities, like accomplishments and activities, is somehow
similar to that of arrive, with the important difference that atoms of running or read-
ing are harder to determine (and some might argue that it is not knowable whether
there are such). But for example one might imagine that readings by John are or-
dered in a manner similar to (18). Suppose that John read a sentence of three words,
that recognizing parts of a word is not deemed reading, and that no other reading
goes on. Then the denotation of read would be exactly isormophic to (18), with
readings of single words playing the role of atoms.10
All in all, I assume that a plural event is a sum of subevents of the same
kind, and has proper parts in the sense of the algebraic structure E. Atelic predi-
cates are, as it were, inherently plural, in a manner perhaps parallel to that of mass
nouns, and will always be true of eventualities that typically have proper parts. By
9For instance, Beavers (2008b) defined the smallest events inside of achievements as consisting
of two smaller subevents, corresponding to the initial and final states defining the transition. In that
case, arguably both the initial and final state subevents would then be in E, even though they are
not in the denotation of the achievement predicate. Furthermore, it may be argued that an arriving
event that involves simultaneously moving across a threshold while holding down a button allowing
the threshold to be crossed, also has subevents in E even if not in the denotation of the achievement
predicate. Nevertheless, what matters is that in both circumstances while these subevents would be
in E they are not P-atoms, i.e. they would not be in the non-coerced verb meaning so they are not
significant for the present purposes.
10For example, Beavers (2012) suggests that this is possibly contextual, in that atoms are deter-
mined in context.
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the same token, predicates that denote accomplishments, such as readings, which
are also durative, will consist of events with proper subevents, down to their min-
imal components of the same type (i.e. which can still be regarded as readings).
However, I assume that (non-coerced) achievements are strongly atomic and de-
note a set of atoms (or P-atoms) closed under sum formation, just like count nouns.
Therefore, achievements such as arrive are generated by a set of atoms, and one can
legitimately talk of singular arrivals.
5.4.2 Spector’s (2007) implicature-based analysis of plurality
Spector (2007) offers an implicature-based account to capture the contrast in (19).
(19) a. The homework contains difficult problems.→ The homework contains
at least 2 difficult problems.
b. The homework doesn’t contain difficult problems. → The homework
does not contain at least 1 difficult problem (≈ not even 1 difficult
problem).
[Adapted from Spector (2007), ex. (1)]
The puzzle in (19) is that the b) sentence is not equivalent to the logical negation
of the a) sentence: (19a) conveys that the problem contains at least two difficult
problems, whereas (19b) does not mean that the homework does not contain at least
two difficult problems. Rather, it expresses that the homework does not contain
even one single difficult problem. The plurality encoded by the morpheme -s in the
DP problems in a positive environment disappears under negation. The goal is to
compute such a plural meaning as an implicature.
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Spector (2007) suggests that the semantic contribution of ‘DP-plural’ (e.g.
problems) is calculated in comparison to ‘a DP-singular’ (e.g. a problem). In this
way, the interpretation of plurality is strengthened by taking into account the mean-
ing that would have been obtained from using indefinite singular morphology in-
stead. For this, Spector (2007) assumes the scale <DPpl, a DPsg>, where the
use of ‘a DPsg’ gives rise to a stronger inference, ‘exactly one’, as in (20b). This
stronger reading becomes an alternative to consider when using ‘DPpl’ that must
be factored into its meaning and exhaustified.
(20) a. The homework contains difficult problems.
• means that the homework contains one or more difficult problems.
• implicates→ the homework contains at least 2 difficult problems.
b. The homework contains a difficult problem.
• means that the homework contains one or several difficult problems.
• implicates→ the homework contains exactly 1 difficult problem.
The implementation that Spector (2007) puts forth is a mechanism of higher-order
implicatures because ‘DP-plural’ not only takes into account the literal meaning of
its competitor ‘a DP-singular’, which would be something like at least one diffi-
cult problem in (20b), but also its strengthened meaning, i.e. its pragmatic import
after its scalar implicatures have been computed into its meaning. For instance,
in a Gricean framework, based on general conversational principles, upon hearing
(20b), one infers that the homework contains exactly one difficult problem. Spector
argues that this is so because we take into account the scale <a, several>, another
scale that ‘a DP-singular’ triggers (e.g. the homework contains a difficult problem
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in opposition to the homework contains several difficult problems). This stronger
meaning of ‘a DP-singular’ (‘exactly one’) is in turn an alternative to ‘DP-plural’,
as it is the strengthened meaning from its only competitor. From here onwards, the
take-home message on how plural implicatures are formulated is the following: the
sentence in (21a) competes with the alternative in (21b), which is in turn derived
via an implicature.
(21) a. The homework contains difficult problems.
b. The homework contains exactly one difficult problem.
By exhaustifying (21a) with respect to (21b), i.e. asserting (21a) and negating its
stronger alternative in (21b), one gets the following meaning in (22), which corre-
sponds to the at-least-2 reading originally stated for plural morphology in positive
environments.
(22) The homework contains one or more difficult problems but not exactly
one.→ The homework contains at least two difficult problems
This hypothesis for the semantic contribution of plural morphology on DPs makes
a direct prediction: the at-least-2 implicature triggered by plural morphology in up-
ward entailing contexts will disappear in the usual way in downward entailing en-
vironments due to the reversal of entailment patterns (e.g. the alternative the home-
work doesn’t contain exactly one difficult problem is now weaker than the prejacent
the homework doesn’t contain difficult problems). I suggest that something similar
to the disappearance of plural meaning takes place with hasta-XPs under negation,
which is why singular achievements are acceptable in such a context (e.g. Juan
no llego´ hasta las 2 ‘Juan didn’t arrive until 2’). Thus I adopt the central claim in
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Spector (2007) that plurality is a special kind of scalar implicature. In extending this
approach to events, we assume that what makes an event-predicate plural is entering
in competition with alternatives parallel to (21b). We will leave open how exactly
such alternatives come about (i.e. whether through a higher order implicature, as
Spector argues, or in some other way) as this is orthogonal to our present issue.
5.4.3 How hasta becomes plural
Natural languages are known to have operators that pluralize properties of events
(e.g. Zimmermann 2002, Yang 2001, Kratzer 2008), even when these events do
not have any plural DP-arguments. In other words, phrasal plurality is not neces-
sarily associated with nominal plurality. Even though Spanish is not a language
that has overt pluractional marking on the verb (unlike the overt singular/plural
noun distinction with overt morphemes), there are languages that do present overt
pluractionality, such as Karitiana, a language spoken in the Western Amazon. For
instance, Karitiana makes use of pluractional markers that are verbal affixes that
signal the occurrence of multiple events, e.g. via reduplication, and such a plural-
ization operation excludes singular atomic events. This is illustrated in (23), where
reduplication has been used to express a plural lifting event.




















‘Inacio lifted Nadia today (more than once).’
[Adapted from Sanchez-Mendes and Mu¨ller 2007, ex. (29-30)]
The pluralization operation in (23) clashes when applying to a singular event, but is
allowed otherwise (Sanchez-Mendes and Mu¨ller 2007, cf. Lasersohn 1995, Sanchez-
Mendes 2006). Similarly, German jeweils produces plural interpretations of sen-



















‘On each occasion, one can of milk produced one pound of cheese.’
(Kratzer 2008, ex. (36))
The sentence in (24) refers to “the sum of multiple events where one can of milk
produced one pound of cheese” (Kratzer 2008: 36). A similar phenomenon would
be triggered by the use of hasta in Spanish. Based on the assumption that hasta
is an event modifier whose plural component is couched as an implicature, hasta-
XPs assert that events (one or more) have taken place within the given time frame,
but end up implicating ‘not just one.’ Therefore, in light of a derived theory of
plurality a` la Spector, I propose that hasta’s plural semantic contribution comes
from obligatorily activating (at the propositional level) an alternative of the form
indicated in (25b), equivalent to there being ‘exactly one’ event, which competes
with the meaning of there being events (one or more) of the prejacent in (25a). The
subscript ‘V ’ in the subevent condition (‘≤V ’) of the uniqueness clause in (25b)
indicates that the subevents are restricted to those that are in the meaning of the
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given verb as determined in context. Overall, the set of alternatives triggered by a
plural event modifier hasta, which I refer to as ALTNo , is given in (25c), wherein
singularity is only encoded in the meaning of the alternative. The plural component
of hasta will have to be derived.
(25) a. Assertion = ∃e[P (e) ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, n]]
b. Alternative (uniqueness clause) = ∃e[P (e) ∧τ(e) ⊆ [t0, n] ∧ ∀e′[e′ ≤V
e ∧ τ(e′) ⊆ [t0, n]→ e′ = e]]
c. ALTNo = {∃e[P (e) ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, n]],∃e[P (e) ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, n] ∧
∀e′[e′ ≤V e ∧ τ(e′) ⊆ [t0, n]→ e′ = e]]}
The assertion in (25a) states that there are events (one or more) in [t0, n]. The al-
ternative in (25b) indicates that all events e′ in [t0, n] that are part or equal to the
relevant event e in [t0, n] must be the same as e and cannot be a proper part of it.
In general terms, the alternative ends up asserting that there is exactly one and only
one unique event with no proper parts in the relevant interval. The alternative is
clearly stronger, as (25b) entails (25a). For example, if there is exactly one single
event between t0 and 2, it is true that there is one or more events between t0 and 2,
but not the other way around. The assertion and uniqueness clause along the lines
specified in (25a, b) compose the alternatives in ALTNo , a set obligatorily activated
by hasta-XPs. As a consequence, I propose that this set cannot be a singleton in
order for hasta to be defined, i.e. the uniqueness clause must be included other than
the assertion itself.
The obligatory activation of singular alternatives induces a process of ex-
haustification in a way familiar to the theory of scalar implicatures by negating any
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stronger, non-entailed, relevant alternatives (e.g. Spector 2007, Chierchia 2013). I
suggest using our covert exhaustification operator modeled on only introduced in
Chapter 4, and repeated here for illustrative purposes in (26) (where it combines
with an assertion φ at the propositional level).
(26) JOALT φK = φ ∧ ∀p ∈ φALT [p→ [φ ⊆ p]] (where ⊆= entails)
(The prejacent φ is true and any alternative p in ALT not entailed by φ is
false)
Let us first consider what happens in positive environments. I start by looking
into non-iterative punctual predicates such as llegar ‘arrive’, for a sentence such
as #Juan llego´ hasta las dos ‘Juan arrived until two.’ The literal meaning of the
assertion and its active singular alternative are displayed in (27).11
(27) a. #Juan llego´ hasta las dosALTNo (#‘Juan arrived until two’)
b. Assertion: ∃e[arriving(e) ∧Th(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2]]
(there was one or more arrivals of Juan between t0 and 2: WEAKER
interpretation)
c. ALTNo: ∃e[arriving(e) ∧ Th(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧ ∀e′[e′ ≤V
e ∧ τ(e′) ⊆ [t0, 2]→ e′ = e]]
(There was a unique arrival of Juan between t0 and 2: STRONGER
alternative)
The alternative in (27c) is not entailed by the assertion, since (27b) can be true while
11For simplification purposes, in all the illustrations of the derivations in this chapter I am ignoring
tense/closure, but that should not interfere in any way in the results from derived plurality discussed
in this chapter. When the alternatives come into play I am assuming that the f function has been
closed already.
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(27c) is false. Such an alternative, which is factored into the meaning of hasta,
must be O-exhaustified, as illustrated in (28). O-exhaustification gives us back the
semantic contribution of plurality: (28) asserts that there was one or more arrivals
of the same person between t0 and 2 and implicates not just one.
(28) OALTNo (Juan llego´ hasta las dos
ALTNo ) = (27b) ∧¬ (27c)
≡ ∃e[arriving(e)∧Th(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧ ¬∀e′[e′ ≤V e ∧ τ(e′) ⊆
[t0, 2]→ e′ = e]]
≡ ∃e[arriving(e)∧Th(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧ ∃e′[e′ ≤V e ∧ τ(e′) ⊆
[t0, 2] ∧ e′ 6= e]]
e′ is not identical to e but a proper part of e
(There was one or more arrivals of Juan between t0 and 2, and not just
one)
As shown in (28), the implicature that winds up being added to the meaning of
hasta refers to there being a plurality of events that are part of the same event. In
other words, the relevant event contained in the interval must have proper parts of
the relevant type. For punctual predicates such as in Juan llego´ hasta las dos ‘Juan
arrived until two’, the only way to satisfy this is if e consists of a sum of arrivals of
Juan between t0 and 2, call it e∗, whose proper parts e′ are the individual arrivals
of Juan.12 For a non-iterative punctual predicate realized by the same subject/object
this result is deviant, since it describes a nearly impossible situation.13 This deviance
12I would like to point out that I am using the term “punctual” with caution, since I do not want
to suggest that it takes no time at all for someone to arrive. But such predicates are assumed to
have no proper parts of the same type. The distinction between instants and intervals is outside the
scope of this dissertation. See Beavers (2008b) for further discussion on how punctual events may
be decomposed into subevents of different types.
13Further recall, as specified in §5.4.1., that I am assuming non-coerced readings for achieve-
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of hasta with a non-iterative punctual predicate contrasts with the acceptability of
hasta with an iterative punctual predicate (e.g. semelfactive) such as Juan tosio´
hasta las dos ‘Juan coughed until two’, as shown in (29).
(29) a. Juan tosio´ hasta las dosALTNo (‘Juan coughed until two’)
b. Assertion: ∃e[coughing(e) ∧Ag(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2]]
(there was one or more coughing events by Juan between t0 and 2:
WEAKER interpretation)
c. ALTNo: ∃e[coughing(e) ∧Ag(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧ ∀e′[e′ ≤V
e ∧ τ(e′) ⊆ [t0, 2]→ e′ = e]]
(there was a unique coughing event by Juan between t0 and 2: STRONGER
alternative)
d. OALTNo (Juan tosio´ hasta las dos
ALTNo ) = (29b) ∧¬ (29c)
≡ ∃e[coughing(e) ∧ Ag(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧ ¬∀e′[e′ ≤V
e ∧ τ(e′) ⊆ [t0, 2]→ e′ = e]]
≡ ∃e[coughing(e) ∧ Ag(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧ ∃e′[e′ ≤V
e ∧ τ(e′) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧ e′ 6= e]]
e′ is not identical to e but a proper part of e
(There was one or more coughing events by Juan between t0 and 2, and
not just one)
The uniqueness clause in (29c) is stronger than the assertion in (29b) and hence it
ments. Coerced achievements would be treated as accomplishments since from the moment they are
durative they have proper parts of the relevant verb type and, as rightly predicted, are modifiable by
hasta in Spanish: e.g. Juan estuvo llegando hasta las dos ‘John was arriving until two.’ However,
coerced cases require the imperfective aspect in Spanish. This would take me too far afield and is
outside the scope of this dissertation.
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must be O-exhaustified. This gives us the plural implicature which is added to the
meaning of the assertion in (29d): the coughing event between t0 and 2 must consist
of proper parts of the relevant verb type. In other words, it is the sum of multiple
coughing events that occurred between t0 and 2. In this case, the sum of more than
one coughing event realized by the same subject within a specific time frame gives
rise to a felicitous interpretation. Hence, so far, the plural implicature added to the
assertion of hasta-XPs captures the fact that hasta can modify iterative punctual
predicates but not a non-iterative punctual predicate.14
On the other hand, whenever a non-iterative telic predicate takes a non-
atomic subject/object (i.e. a definite/indefinite plurally quantified DP-subject/object)
14Observe the following context, which might seem problematic at first:
i. [Juan arrived at his office at 1 pm, but then he realized that he had forgotten his planner

















# ‘Juan arrived until two in the afternoon.’
The fact that (i) is not acceptable given the aforementioned context might be surprising and po-




















# ‘Two people arrived until two in the afternoon.’
However, remember from Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 that we are following recent theories of scalar
implicatures, such as Magri (2009), which put forth a system in which such implicatures are com-
puted ‘blindly’ to common knowledge and if the result clashes with it then deviance ensues. The
plural implicature would still be derived in (i) but that clashes with world knowledge of a non-
iterative predicate such as arrive, which is that people either arrive or not arrive only once at a point
in question within a bound interval. Despite the given context in (i), we assume that there is only one
relevant arrival event, which mismatches with the plurality condition. This must be due to a deeper
grammatical issue, similar to the unacceptability of #John died for an hour, even when the dying
event lasted one hour. I would like to thank Aron Hirsch for discussion on this point.
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as in 30 personas llegaron hasta las dos ‘30 people arrived until two’, the singular
alternative will always be analytically false (as the plural subject/object will have
parts that are not identical to the whole). This proposed analysis automatically pre-
dicts the ability of existential hasta, unlike universal until, to give rise to cumulative
readings since no distributive effect necessarily unfolds. All the plural implicature
requires is the relevant event to have proper parts of the appropriate type: a cumu-
lative event, call it e∗, will always have a subpart e′ that is not identical to e∗ but is
instead a proper part of e∗, e.g. the arrival of person #1, the arrival of person #2, ...,
the arrival of person #30.15 This is illustrated in (30).
(30) a. 30 personas llegaron hasta las dosALTNo (#‘30 people arrived until
two’)
b. Assertion: ∃x∃e[30 people(x)∧ arriving(e)∧Th(e) = x∧ τ(e) ⊆
[t0, 2]]
c. ALTNo: ∃x∃e[30 people(x) ∧ arriving(e) ∧ Th(e) = x ∧ τ(e) ⊆
[t0, 2] ∧ ∀e′[e′ ≤V e ∧ τ(e′) ⊆ [t0, 2]→ e′ = e]]16
d. OALTNo (30 personas llegaron hasta las dos
ALTNo ) = (30b) ∧¬ (30c)
≡ ∃x∃e[30 people(x)∧arriving(e)∧Th(e) = x∧τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧
∃e′[e′ ≤V e ∧ τ(e′) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧ e′ 6= e]]
(There is at least a subevent e′ of the arrival of the 30 people that is a
proper part of it, i.e. e is a plural arriving event whose cumulative theme
15Under those circumstances, the achievement predicate llegar ‘arrive’ is behaving more like an
accomplishment in the sense that it has proper parts of the relevant type. This is in line with Beavers
(2012: 48-50) discussion about the ways that theme and scalar mereological complexity interact to
derive whether a predicate of change temporally behaves like an achievement or an accomplishment.
16This is never true if an event is cumulative.
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is 30 people)
Thus far, the proposal that hasta is an existential time-frame adverbial whose use
leads to a plural implicature captures the main divergence between English until
and Spanish hasta. It predicts the ability of hasta to modify a telic predicate that
takes a plural quantified DP as an argument, since the plural DP-argument already
gives us phrasal plurality while also implicating a cumulative reading.
The same line of reasoning applies in capturing the ability of hasta-phrases
to modify accomplishments. Even though accomplishments are telic predicates in
the sense that they have a definable endpoint, they are durative and thus they will
always be composed of events that are proper parts of the main event in question.
Hence, it follows that the singular alternative will also always be analytically false
and will not interfere in the literal meaning of the assertion. An example is provided
in (31).
(31) a. Juan leyo´ un libro hasta las dosALTNo (‘Juan read a book until two’)
b. Assertion: ∃x∃e[a book(x) ∧ reading(e) ∧ Ag(e) = j ∧ Th(e) =
x ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2]]
c. ALTNo: ∃x∃e[a book(x) ∧ reading(e) ∧Ag(e) = j ∧Th(e) = x ∧
τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧ ∀e′[e′ ≤V e ∧ τ(e′) ⊆ [t0, 2]→ e′ = e]]
d. OALTNo (Juan leyo´ un libro hasta las dos
ALTNo ) = (31b) ∧¬ (31c)
≡ ∃x∃e[a book(x)∧ reading(e)∧Ag(e) = j∧Th(e) = x∧ τ(e) ⊆
[t0, 2] ∧ ∃e′[e′ ≤V e ∧ τ(e′) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧ e′ 6= e]]
(The reading-of-a-book event by Juan has proper parts)
Therefore, the plural inference of the relevant event consisting of subparts predicts
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that accomplishment predicates are also modifiable by hasta, which is borne out.
As far as atelic predicates are concerned, since these are quintessentially
durative, it automatically follows that hasta phrases will also be able to modify
them since any event described by an atelic predicate can be decomposed into mul-
tiple subevents that are part of the main event. For example, for a sentence such
as Juan corrio´ hasta las dos ‘Juan ran until two’, without presupposing anything
about atelicity, the singular alternative would indicate that there is a unique atomic
running event. In the hypothetical case that we can conceive of such a scenario, it
would be a situation in which the hasta phrase introduces such a small interval that
the contextual left boundary is placed, along the temporal spectrum, (almost) at the
same spot where the right boundary is. When the assertion is exhaustified, this non-
entailed alternative is negated, and we derive that the interval must be large enough
to contain a plural instantiation of the atelic event, e.g. multiple runs of Juan that
are proper parts of the maximal run by Juan between t0 and 2, as shown in (32).
(32) a. Juan corrio´ hasta las dosALTNo (‘Juan ran until two’)
b. Assertion: ∃e[running(e) ∧Ag(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2]]
c. ALTNo: ∃e[running(e) ∧ Ag(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧ ∀e′[e′ ≤V
e ∧ τ(e′) ⊆ [t0, 2]→ e′ = e]]
d. OALTNo (Juan corrio´ hasta las dos
ALTNo ) = (31b) ∧¬ (31c)
≡ ∃e[running(e)∧Ag(e) = j∧τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧∃e′[e′ ≤V e ∧ τ(e′) ⊆
[t0, 2] ∧ e′ 6= e]]
(The running event by Juan has proper parts)
Atelic predicates are inherently plural and as such the agreement between hasta
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phrases as plural modifiers and atelic predicates, as derived in (32), is straightfor-
ward.
5.4.4 The ‘abutment’ condition on plurality of hasta
Up to this point, the proposed analysis of plurality rightly predicts the behavior of
hasta phrases in positive environments when it comes to the type of predicates that
such durative adverbials can modify. While this seems to be on the right track, we
may want to add a requirement about the distribution of events within the temporal
frame identified by the adverbial.17 This would be in line with the tendency of plu-
ralities to take up their available space (temporal, in such cases).18 The distribution
of the multiple events within the interval of hasta is evenly spread all throughout.
Something stronger than just saying that the events fall between t0 and 2 must be
going on. I suggest including an ‘abutting’ condition for non-atomic events, which
does not affect the previous discussion, along the lines specified in (33). This is a
simple way of accounting for this condition that suffices for our purposes.
(33) Jhasta las 2K (final) = λV.λf [V (λe[f(e) ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧ [¬AT(e)→
τ(e) abuts [t0, 2]]])]
17I would like to thank Irene Heim for suggesting to me the addition of a distributive condition.
18A property of plural predicates within an interval is that they take up the space of the interval
in question evenly. Note, however, the contrast between antes ‘before’ and hasta ‘until’, as was
pointed out to me by Irene Heim. Atelic predicates (intrinsically plural) do not necessarily show
such a property with other temporal adverbials, like antes. In Juan corrio´ antes de las dos ‘Juan ran
until two’, Juan does not need to have been running all throughout before two. Nevertheless, I would
like to draw attention to the fact that antes may not be a closed interval on both sides, e.g. with no
relevant left boundary, as non-iterative punctual predicates are modifiable by such an adverbial: Juan
llego´ antes de las dos ‘Juan arrived before two.’ This suggests that the plurality condition or universal
quantification of hasta/until, respectively, do not apply here, and before/until (or antes/hasta) are not
a ‘comparable’ pair in this regard. Further contrasts between the two are left for future research.
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The abutting constraint in (33) ensures that instantiations of plural events must reach
(or be very next to) the borders on both sides of the interval introduced by hasta.
For instance, getting back to the example in (32), the maximal running event by
Juan between t0 and 2 must abut the interval [t0, 2], meaning that it must occupy the
given space.19 As an example, since running is not atomic the final assertion of (32)
is provided in (34).
(34) a. Juan corrio´ hasta las dosALTNo (‘Juan ran until two’)
b. Assertion (final): ∃e[running(e) ∧ Ag(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧
τ(e) abuts [t0, 2]]
c. Assertion + implicature (final): ∃e[running(e)∧Ag(e) = j∧τ(e) ⊆
[t0, 2] ∧ τ(e) abuts [t0, 2] ∧ ∃e′[e′ ≤V e ∧ τ(e′) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧ e′ 6= e]]
By contrast, only punctual telic predicates that take singular DP-arguments (but not
plural DPs) satisfy the description of atomicity in (33). For example, as discussed
above, Juan’s arrival has no proper parts of the relevant type. Therefore, the final
denotation of a sentence such as Juan llego´ hasta las dos ‘Juan arrived until two’
remains the same as in (27), given again in (35) together with its plural implicature.
The result in (35c) warrants its deviance because there cannot be multiple arrivals
of Juan, as already argued.
(35) a. #Juan llego´ hasta las dosALTNo (#‘Juan arrived until two’)
b. Assertion (final): ∃e[arriving(e) ∧ Th(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2]]
19The ‘abutment’ condition is not factored into the meaning of the singular alternative (‘unique-
ness clause’) as it would be trivial. Recall that this alternative to hasta refers to there being a singular
atomic event within the interval in question, which, of course, cannot abut the interval considering
that the ‘abutment’ condition can only come into play when there is more than one event of the rele-
vant verb type. In the final denotation of hasta, this ‘non-atomic’ constraint is indicated by ¬AT(e).
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c. Assertion + implicature (final): ∃e[arriving(e)∧Th(e) = j∧τ(e) ⊆
[t0, 2] ∧ ∃e′[e′ ≤V e ∧ τ(e′) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧ e′ 6= e]]
Finally, whenever a punctual telic predicate takes a plural DP-argument, as in the
case of 30 personas llegaron hasta las dos ‘Thirty people arrived until two’, then
the ‘abutting’ condition also comes into play, as the event described is no longer
‘atomic.’ The final denotations of (30) above are given in (36).
(36) a. 30 personas llegaron hasta las dosALTNo (#‘30 people arrived until
two’)
b. Assertion (final): ∃x∃e[30 people(x) ∧ arriving(e) ∧Th(e) = x ∧
τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧ τ(e) abuts [t0, 2]]
c. Assertion + implicature (final): ∃x∃e[30 people(x) ∧ arriving(e)∧
Th(e) = x ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧ τ(e) abuts [t0, 2] ∧ ∃e′[e′ ≤V
e ∧ τ(e′) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧ e′ 6= e]]
The use of hasta in (36) does not give rise to a reading in which all thirty peo-
ple arrived at the very exact same time. A further consequence of the ‘abutting’
condition is that it appropriately rules out such a reading, in favor of a cumulative
interpretation along the given time frame. The different thirty arrival events must
apply distributively in the close interval.
In sum, I have claimed that hasta is a plural existential quantifier, where
plurality is to be couched as an implicature. Hasta-XPs assert that one or more
events of the same kind described by the predicate fall within an interval, and if
more than one, the events abut such an interval. Additionally, its use obligatorily
activates an alternative whose meaning is stronger in positive environments, as it
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asserts that exactly one and only one event with no parts falls within the interval in
question. When exhaustified, hasta-XPs end up implicating that the relevant event
must have proper parts of the appropriate type. For telic predicates with plural DPs,
this gives us the scopeless cumulative interpretation, which until-phrases in English
lack (e.g. Champollion 2010).
5.4.5 The behavior of hasta-XPs under negation
The reason we redefined how the plurality requirement is built in an account of
durative adverbials in the spirit of Krifka (1998) now pays off. An important further
consequence of the present approach is that it also predicts the acceptability of hasta
with the presence of negation despite the type of predicate used. In particular, I show
that the plural implicature disappears due to the reversal of entailment patterns,
and hence no pragmatically deviant situations may arise. This is advantageous over
a presuppositionally-based atelic/pluractional condition a` la Krifka, which must
resort to a fusion-based treatment of negation so that the adverbial can measure out
an atelic ‘negative event’. I test such a derived prediction with a non-iterative telic
predicate in (37) below.
Hasta-XPs cannot modify a non-iterative telic predicate in positive environ-
ments since the derived plural implicature requires there to be multiple instantia-
tions of the event so that hasta can measure out the sum of those events. However,
if negation is present, then no plural implicature arises since the strongest alterna-
tive becomes the weakest alternative and no deviance ensues with such predicates.
This is shown in (37).
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(37) a. Juan no llego´ hasta las dosALTNo (‘Juan did not arrive until two’)
b. Assertion: ¬∃e[arriving(e) ∧Th(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2]]
(There was no arrival of Juan between t0 and 2: STRONGER interpre-
tation)
c. ALTNo: ¬∃e[arriving(e)∧Th(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧ ∀e′[e′ ≤V
e ∧ τ(e′) ⊆ [t0, 2]→ e′ = e]]
(There was no unique arrival of Juan between t0 and 2: WEAKER al-
ternative)
d. Plural Implicature: N/A
The alternative in (37c) is now entailed by the prejacent in (37b) and hence we do
not need to exhaustify it. A plural implicature does not arise with other types of
predicates either. An illustration of this with the atelic predicate run is provided
below:
(38) a. Juan no corrio´ hasta las dosALTNo (‘Juan did not run until two’)
b. Assertion: ¬∃e[running(e) ∧Th(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧
τ(e) abuts [t0, 2]]
(There was no running event by Juan between t0 and 2 [and that abuts
t0 and 2]:20 STRONGER interpretation)
c. ALTNo: ¬∃e[running(e)∧Th(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧ ∀e′[e′ ≤V
e ∧ τ(e′) ⊆ [t0, 2]→ e′ = e]]
20As we will see in §5, the ambiguity generated by the inclusion of the ‘abutting’ condition
under negation will give us the ambiguity between ‘throughout-not’ and ‘not-throughout’ readings
generated with atelic and iterative telic predicates in negative environments. Hence, the fact that
hasta carries a distributive condition further predicts the emergence of the two readings with an
existentially-based ‘until’-like word.
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(There was no atomic run of Juan between t0 and 2: WEAKER alterna-
tive)21
d. Plural Implicature: N/A
The plural implicature will always vanish under negation. Such behavior resembles
the semantic contribution of plural morphemes on DPs in §5.4.2, which was deci-
sive in motivating that plurality is an implicature. As a consequence, when plurality
is not a selectional precondition and emerges in the form of an implicature, we can
use negation logically, instead of a fusion-based treatment of negation.
It is worth noting, however, that contra the behavior of plural morphology
on DPs, the plural implicature does not seem to disappear in downward entailing
environments other than negation (e.g. in the antecedent of an if -clause, inside the
restrictor of an every phrase, in questions, etc.). These environments also reverse
the entailment pattern and, as a result, in principle predict the absence of plurality.
Yet, as the unacceptability of the examples in (39) illustrates, this is not the case
since a plural implicature must still arise.22













































# ‘Every person who has arrived until two will be awarded.’
21This is always analytically true for a durative predicate.


















# ‘Did Juan arrive until two in the afternoon?’
Furthermore, even constructions with neg-raising verbs disprefer the use of hasta

















# ‘I don’t believe that Juan arrived until two.’
However, the data in (39) and (40) suggests a fairly simple analysis: O-exhaustifica-
tion of the alternatives is locally constrained within the clause boundaries. In other
words, the alternatives need to be checked very locally within the most immediate
TP, and not beyond.23,24
In sum, local (clause-internal) exhaustification of singular alternatives that
hasta-XPs activate predicts that no plural implicature will emerge with sentential
negation. This rightly captures that no matter what the type of predicate it is that is
negated, hasta will be able to modify it. The ‘throughout-not’ and ‘not-throughout’
readings as well as the factive and other scalar interpretations that arise with the use
of negation will be discussed in §5.25
23Such a locality constraint could be evidence for further pursuing a syntax-based implementation
of exhaustification similar to feature-checking/agreement as these also show minimality/blocking
effects. A more worked out implementation of such a system is outside the scope of this dissertation.
See Chierchia (2013) for more details on how a version of this could be implemented.
24Punctual hasta is not an NPI, but we would expect that if it were one it would be a ‘sufficiently’
strong one. Such an NPI-counterpart to ‘until’ should in principle be a strong NPI triggered by
sentential negation (as has been reported in the literature). Nevertheless, we also seem to predict that
such an NPI could potentially still be possible with downward-entailing quantified-DPs, such as less
than thirty people or few people because the reversal of entailment patterns under those conditions
occurs locally enough, within TP. Further investigation of the strong character and behavior of an
overt NPI in languages like Greek remains for future research.
25I would like to point out one open issue for future investigation (suggested to me by a blind
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5.4.6 Extending the analysis: Definite DPs and distributivity
With regard to the main contrast between English until and Spanish hasta, so far
we have examined the ability of Spanish hasta to give rise to cumulative readings
when it modifies predicates that take plurally quantified DPs. A significant point
to consider here is whether a contrast between hasta and until still holds whenever
the plural DP-subject/object is definite. Prima facie, it appears to be the case that
predicates that take plural definite DPs as in (41a, b) (vs. plural quantified DPs, as
in (41c)) tend to be understood distributively (and not cumulatively).26
reviewer), which has to do with the scopal interaction between a quantified DP-argument and nega-
tion. Negated punctual predicates that take quantified DPs sound relatively odd in Spanish, specially
when these are not specific indefinites and are interpreted as taking scope under negation (e.g. ¬ >

















‘A person/thirty people did not arrive until two.’
If the interpretation in (i) is that no person arrived until 2 pm, corresponding to negation taking scope
over the existential DP, the sentence sounds bizarre (nadie llego´ hasta las dos ‘nobody arrived until
two’ is preferable). Note that whenever we make the indefinites specific, and they take scope above

























‘A person/thirty people out of the fifty people registered did not arrive until two.’
Finally, it looks like this is a more general constraint not only exclusive to telic predicates, since















‘A person did not study until two.’
This interaction between quantified DP-arguments in subject position and negation remains to be
further examined.
26I would like to thank David Beaver for pointing out this issue to me.
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# ‘Juan and Marı´a arrived until two.’






























# ‘Two people arrived until two.’
(≈ A total of two people arrived over the course of an interval that
ended at two)
In this case, a cumulative reading in (41a) in Spanish seems to be absent, similar
to English. Rather, the reason the examples in (41a) sound strange is because they
are interpreted distributively (i.e. as two separate punctual arrival events each of
which is modified by an until-phrase): Juan and Marı´a each arrived until two. This
interpretation licenses the strange state of affairs of there being multiple arrivals
of Juan as well as a plurality of arrivals of Marı´a between t0 and 2. Whenever
the definite DP-argument is interpreted cumulatively as a group, as in (41b), the
acceptability of the Spanish example improves. Finally, indefinite plural DPs as in
(41c) pose no problem, as already exemplified in §5.4.3.
Observe, however, that for Spanish hasta, unlike English until, a cumula-
tive reading is still possible for telic predicates that take plural definite DPs: over
the course of an interval that ended at two, Juan and Marı´a arrived. This conforms
to the meaning that the plural implicature derives for punctual predicates, wherein
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when a punctual predicate is plurally modified by hasta it must be able to consist
of the sum of different atomic subevents, e.g. the arrival of Juan plus the arrival of
Marı´a. Such a cumulative reading overrides the default distributive reading when
the hasta-phrase is preposed, as in (42a), or with some sort of contextual sup-
port that triggers cumulativity, as shown in (42b)-(42e). For instance, this can be
achieved by including an overt adverbial phrase, like the use of the adverbial suce-
sivamente ‘successively’, which makes it explicit that there are at least two different
and relevant arrival events that are part of the main cumulative event being modified
by hasta, as in (42b, c), or by including another predicate modifier (e.g. the sum of
different locative XPs) that favors a summing interpretation of the different arrival































































# ‘Juan, Marı´a, Pedro and Susana arrived successively until two.’27
27When the number of participants of type e in a cumulative event increases, explicit contextual













































# ‘That group of professors arrived at their offices until two.’
All in all, the data in (41) and (42) suggests that plural definite DPs, in opposition
to plural quantified DPs, favor distributive readings of predicates modified by hasta
over cumulative ones although a cumulative reading is still possible.
It is not clear to me at present why this is so, but for the time being I pro-
pose that definiteness of a DP by default activates the use of a distributive operator
D (roughly equivalent to each), along the following lines in (43) (e.g. Link 1987,
Gajewski 2005). Such a D operator is not obligatory, since it seems to be dispens-
able when a cumulative interpretation takes priority, as represented in the structures
above in (42). This remains as an observation that will be investigated in future re-
search. The distributive operator D as defined in (43) takes a definite DP (assuming
that definite DPs are of type e) and returns a generalized quantifier over individu-
als. Furthermore, following Gajewski (2005), the presupposition in (43) states that
whenever a distributive predicate is true or false, it is also true or false, respectively,
for all of its proper parts.
(43) JDK = λx.λP〈e,t〉 : ∀y ≤atom x→ P (x) or ∀y ≤atom x→ ¬P (x).∀y[y ≤atom
x→ P (y)] (where atom = ∀z[z ≤ y → y = z])
(Whenever a distributive predicate is true/false, it is true/false for all of its
28I would like to thank Kate Davidson for suggesting this kind of example to me, involving the
sum of a plural location.
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proper parts)
The presupposition in (43) is needed to rightly capture the fact that whenever a
predicate with a definite plural DP subject/object is negated, the negated predicate
applies to each of the atomic members of the plural DP, as will be seen below.
Let us focus first on positive environments. I show the result from combining
the distributive operator with a definite DP in a sentence such as #Juan y Marı´a
llegaron hasta las dos #‘Juan and Marı´a arrived until two.’ The definite DP, which
combines with D and results in a generalized quantifier over individuals, QRs and
adjoins to vP. This gives rise to the following interpretation in (44b), where the
predicate applies to Juan and Marı´a each. Finally, when the assertion is exhaustified
(after taking into account the uniqueness clause in (44c)), deviance ensues, because
there must be a plurality of arrivals of Juan and a plurality of arrivals of Marı´a
betwen t0 and 2, as illustrated in (44d).
(44) a. #Juan y Marı´a llegaron hasta las dosALTNo #‘Juan and Marı´a arrived
until two’
([vP ′[D(Juan and Marı´a)]1 [vP [arrived x1] until two]])
b. Assertion: ∀y[y ≤atom j ∪m→ ∃e[arrive(e)∧Th(e) = y ∧ τ(e) ⊆
[t0, 2]]]
(≈ There is one or more arrivals of Juan between t0 and 2 and there is
one or more arrivals of Marı´a between t0 and 2)
c. ALTNo: ∀y[y ≤atom j ∪m → ∃e[arrive(e) ∧ Th(e) = y ∧ τ(e) ⊆
[t0, 2] ∧ ∀e′[e′ ≤V e ∧ τ(e′) ⊆ [t0, 2]→ e′ = e]]]
(≈ There is a unique arrival of Juan and a unique arrival of Marı´a be-
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tween t0 and 2)
d. OALTNo (Juan y Marı´a llegaron hasta las dos
ALTNo ) = (44b) ∧¬ (44c)
≡ ∀y[y ≤atom j ∪m→ ∃e[arrive(e)∧Th(e) = y ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧
∃e′[e′ ≤V e ∧ τ(e′) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧ e′ 6= e]]]
(≈ Juan and Marı´a each arrived multiple times between t0 and 2)
On the other hand, in negative environments, the presence or absence of a
distributive operator with definite DPs does not interfere with the overall acceptabil-
ity of hasta-phrases. The alternative will also be weaker in such cases, and thus no
plural implicature arises. The presupposition of D ensures that the universal quanti-
fier of the distributive DP takes scope above negation. For example, a sentence like
Juan y Marı´a no llegaron hasta las dos ‘Juan and Marı´a didn’t arrive until two’ is to
be interpreted such that Juan and Marı´a each did not arrive until two, where neither
of them arrived in the given interval, as specified in (45c). This contrasts with an
unavailable interpretation in which either only Juan or only Marı´a did not arrive
until two, as illustrated in (45b). Last, the singular alternative in (45d) is entailed by
the assertion in (45c) and as such cannot be denied.
(45) a. Juan y Marı´a no llegaron hasta las dosALTNo ‘Juan and Marı´a did not
arrive until two’
([[D(Juan and Marı´a)]1 [TP¬[vP [arrived x1] until two]]])
b. Unavailable Assertion (ruled out by the presupposition of D):
¬∀y[y ≤atom j ∪m→ ∃e[arrive(e) ∧Th(e) = y ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2]]]
(≈ It is not the case that there are arrivals of Juan and arrivals of Marı´a
between t0 and 2)
217
c. Assertion: ∀y[y ≤atom j ∪m→ ¬∃e[arrive(e)∧Th(e) = y∧ τ(e) ⊆
[t0, 2]]]
(≈ There are no arrivals of Juan and no arrivals of Marı´a between t0
and 2)
d. ALTNo: ∀y[y ≤atom j ∪m → ¬∃e[arrive(e) ∧ Th(e) = y ∧ τ(e) ⊆
[t0, 2] ∧ ∀e′[e′ ≤V e ∧ τ(e′) ⊆ [t0, 2]→ e′ = e]]]
(≈ There is no unique arrival of Juan and no unique arrival of Marı´a
between t0 and 2)
e. OALTNo (Juan y Marı´a no llegaron hasta las dos
ALTNo ) = N/A
Regardless of the activation or absence of a D operator triggered by a plural definite
DP-argument, the result is always felicitous in negative environments. Even if a
D operator intervenes, the plural implicature does not emerge, since the alternative
will always be entailed by the prejacent. Therefore, the insertion of a D operator that
modifies plural definite DPs only makes a difference in the acceptability of hasta-
phrases with non-iterative punctual predicates in positive contexts. When present,
the result is predicted to be infelicitous even if the definite DP-argument taken by a
non-iterative punctual predicate is plural.
All in all, in this section I have posited that a plural definite DP-subject/object
in a clause being modified by hasta favors a distributive interpretation over a cu-
mulative one. As a result, the plural definite DP by default triggers the use of a
distributive operator, which ends up forcing the reading that the plural event being
modified by hasta must apply for every atomic member of the DP. This results in
deviance in positive environments when the predicate under consideration is a non-
218
iterative punctual predicate (unless contextual support overrides the use of such a
distributive operator). The precise reasons why definiteness plays a role and how
and when the implementation of D can be overriden are left for future research.
5.4.7 Summing up
Very generally speaking, I have so far proposed that while a version of the universal
analysis of durative modifiers a` la Dowty is right for English until, a version of the
existential analysis a` la Krifka is right for Spanish hasta. I suggest that the latter
is an existential time-frame adverbial subject to a plurality condition. This plurality
condition is derived as an implicature, which disappears under negation and rightly
predicts the ability of durative until to modify any type of predicate in negative
environments. On a higher level, this universal vs. existential cross-linguistic picture
of durative untils (posited as a parametric choice across languages) produces two
different cross-linguistic patterns. It opens up the possibility for durative untils to
be able to license a scopeless cumulative interpretation in languages that choose the
existential variant, and also apply to accomplishment predicates.
5.5 Scalar reasoning with hasta-phrases
In the same way that until-phrases in English derive scalar inferences, hasta-phrases
in Spanish do so as well. Recall that the scalarity of time, and per extension, the
scalarity of temporal adverbials, gives rise to quantity implicatures leading to the
factive interpretation of until in English, as well as inferences about interruption. In
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Chapter 4 I proposed that the nature of such inferences is non-defeasible for English
until, which can be captured in a system where the temporal scalar alternatives are
obligatorily factored into meaning and must be exhaustified via our exhaustification
operator O. Likewise, I claim that the use of Spanish hasta comes with an active set
of temporal alternatives, ALTt0, where the non-defeasible inferences are obtained
via exhaustification of the assertion. This will account for hasta’s factivity with
telic predicates in negative environments, and will also be able to explain other
scalar inferences that derive from the use of atelic predicates in positive and negative
environments, such as the interruption inference, as well as the ‘not-throughout’ and
‘throughout-not’ readings.29
Further recall that the set of active alternatives cannot be singleton, since ev-
ery prejacent has itself as an alternative. In other words, hasta-phrases must activate
temporal alternatives other than itself. These alternatives are of the form [t0, n], i.e.
relevant subintervals and superintervals, where n precedes or follows the time indi-
cated by the complement of hasta, yet the contextually determined left boundary,
t0, is kept constant. Thus, the temporal scale is the same as for the case of English,
repeated here in (46).
(46) Temporal Scale: ALTt0 (until n) = {until n− t, until n, until n+ t, ...}
In more formal terms, the set of alternatives of hasta-XPs can be defined as follows:
29Unlike for the case of universal until, the ‘not-throughout’ and ‘throughout-not’ readings under
the existential approach are obtained via scopal interactions of negation with respect to the covert
exhaustification operator O. Under the existential analysis, it does not matter whether the adverbial
scopes above or below negation since, as defined, it always ends up taking lowest scope, because it
simply introduces the time frame that modifies an already existentially-bound event.
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(47) JHasta las dosKALTt0 = {λV.λf [V (λe[f(e)∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2]∧ [¬AT(e)→
τ(e) abuts [t0, 2]]])] : n ≥ 2 or n<2}
(defined iff the set of alternatives is not a singleton)
The basic details of the execution of the analysis are presented below.
5.5.1 Durative predicates in upward entailing environments
Recall that O-exhaustification of universal until in upward entailing contexts gives
us the interruption inference: the predicate stops applying at intervals that follow
the prejacent. This follows from the fact that later intervals are not entailed by the
prejacent. Exhaustification negates the non-entailed alternatives while preserving
the truth of the prejacent. The same line of reasoning applies for Spanish hasta
since, despite it being existential, we observe the same entailment pattern when
hasta modifies plural eventualities (e.g. statives, activities, accomplishments, and
achievements with plural DP-arguments) in positive environments thanks to the ap-
plication of the ‘abutting’ condition. The ‘abutting’ condition comes into play in
positive environments because all predicates modifiable by hasta are considered
plural. It follows that if plural eventualities abut a given interval, they do not neces-
sarily abut any superinterval. I illustrate this with the atelic predicate run in (48).
(48) a. Juan corrio´ hasta las dosALTt0 ‘Juan ran until two.’
b. ∃e[running(e) ∧Ag(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧ τ(e) abuts [t0, 2]]
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c. Entailment Relation: [t0, 1]x [t0, 2]x [t0, 3]
(where the arrow shows the direction of entailment: Ax B means that
B entails A)
plural running by Juan abuts [t0, 2] ⊆ plural running by Juan abuts
[t0, 1] * plural running by Juan abuts [t0, 3]
If a plural running event by Juan abuts [t0, 2] (in the sense of uniformly taking up the
whole space of the given interval), then it also abuts [t0, 1], but there is no abutting
on [t0, 3]. This relevant non-entailed alternative is negated by the O-exhaustification
operator, resulting in the interruption inference. In other words, O-exhaustification
gives rise to the implication that no running event by Juan takes place at some point
after the time denoted by the hasta-phrase. This is shown in (49), considering an
hourly scale of <1, 2, 3, 4,...>, where the most immediate non-entailed superinter-
val by the prejacent is [t0, 3].
(49) a. Assertion: ∃e[running(e) ∧Ag(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧
τ(e) abuts [t0, 2]]
b. Non-entailed ALTt0: ∃e[running(e)∧Ag(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 3] ∧
τ(e) abuts [t0, 3]]
c. OALTt0 (Juan corrio´ hasta las dos
ALTt0) = (49a) ∧¬ (49b)
≡ ∃e[running(e)∧Ag(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧ τ(e) abuts [t0, 2] ∧
¬∃e[running(e)∧Ag(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 3] ∧ τ(e) abuts [t0, 3]]]
≡ ∃e[running(e)∧Ag(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧ τ(e) abuts [t0, 2] ∧
[¬∃e[running(e)∧Ag(e) = j ∧τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 3]]∨¬∃e[running(e)∧
Ag(e) = j ∧ τ(e) abuts [t0, 3]]]]
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As indicated in (49c), the truth of the prejacent is maintained while the meaning
of the inference is added to it. The prejacent asserts that there are running events
by Juan between t0 and 2 and that abut [t0, 2]. The added inferential content asserts
that either there is no running event at all within [t0, 3] or that the maximal running
event does not abut [t0, 3]. The first disjunct clashes with the truth of the prejacent.
Thus only the second disjunct of the added inferential material can be true, namely
that the maximal running event does not extend up to 3. We hence obtain that the
predicate ceases to apply at some point after two.
Last, remember that the interruption implicature is in line with facts about
the physical world and will eventually be satisfied since the predicate will stop
holding at some point. Facts about the world make the inference that P transitions to
¬P vacuous. As to when this transition will occur, it will depend on the granularity
of the scale in question, as exemplified in §4.2.3.1 in Chapter 4. By default, we
infer that the interruption inference applies right after the time indicated by the
hasta-phrase.
5.5.2 Durative predicates under negation
The other crucial environments under consideration are with the presence of nega-
tion, where logical strength is reversed. When the predicate is durative, several in-






































































‘Juan didn’t run until two, but until three.’
The fact that we are able to say ‘but until one’, ‘not at all’, or ‘but until three’
posits a challenge to the obligatory status of the inferences, as these interpretations
may cancel one another. However, as we shall see, they correspond to different
scopal interpretations between negation and the O operator. The reading in (50a)
can be obtained from what I have been referring to as the ‘not-throughout’ reading
for English until. The interpretation in (50b) now follows from O-exhaustification
below negation (unlike English until). Finally, in a way similar to English until,
(50c) also derives from O-exhaustification below negation.
To start with, let us consider O-exhaustification above negation30, where the
entailment pattern has been reversed in comparison to the relation of hasta with
respect to its scalar alternatives in positive environments as in (48) above. The as-
sertion indicates that there is no running event by Juan that takes the whole interval
between t0 and 2. It thus follows that no running event by Juan abuts an even greater
interval, e.g. from t0 to 3. However, smaller intervals are not entailed, as illustrated
in (51).
30Remember that on an exhaustification-based account, O-exhaustification above negation is
preferred over O-exhaustification below negation, where in the latter an implicature is added to
the meaning of the assertion before negation applies, hence weakening its meaning (while O-
exhaustification above negation leads to strengthening). See Chierchia (2013) for further discussion
on this.
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(51) a. Juan no corrio´ hasta las dosALTt0 ‘Juan didn’t run until two’ (but until
one)
b. ¬∃e[running(e)∧Ag(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧ τ(e) abuts [t0, 2]]
c. Entailment Relation: [t0, 1]y [t0, 2]y [t0, 3]
no running by Juan abuts [t0, 2] ⊆ no running by Juan abuts [t0, 3] *
no running by Juan abuts [t0, 1]
Since previous alternatives are not entailed, consider [t0, 1] to be the relevant non-
entailed alternative, which must thus be exhaustified. The result from O-exhausti-
fication is specified in (52).
(52) a. Assertion: ¬∃e[running(e) ∧ Ag(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧
τ(e) abuts [t0, 2]]
b. Non-entailed ALTt0:¬∃e[running(e)∧Ag(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 1] ∧
τ(e) abuts [t0, 1]]
c. OALTt0 ¬ (Juan corrio´ hasta las dosALTt0) = (52a) ∧¬ (52b)
≡¬∃e[running(e)∧Ag(e) = j∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2]∧ τ(e) abuts [t0, 2]∧
∃e[running(e) ∧Ag(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 1] ∧ τ(e) abuts [t0, 1]]]
The interpretation in (52) asserts that Juan did not run all throughout until two, as
the maximal running eventuality is not abutting [t0, 2]. The relevant non-entailed
alternative asserts that the maximal running eventuality is, to say the least, not abut-
ting [t0, 1], which is not entailed by the prejacent. On negating such an alternative,
the implicature that winds up being added to the assertion is that there was some
running by Juan until a previous time, say abutting [t0, 1]. This reading corresponds
to the ‘not-throughout’ (‘but until 1’) interpretation exemplified in (50a).
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We are now left with the readings in (50b) and (50c), and with another avail-
able exhaustification position for durative predicates, which we have not tried yet:
O-exhaustification below negation. Since hasta-phrases can modify durative predi-
cates (plural eventualities) in positive environments giving rise to a felicitous inter-
pretation, such a felicitous reading could be O-exhaustified before negation applies.
Remember that this exhaustification position requires some contextual support—
since we are weakening the negated assertion by adding inference material to it
before negation applies. The continuation of ‘not at all’ or ‘but until three’ in (50b)
and (50c), respectively, would clash with common ground and with the speaker’s
intentions if O-exhaustification applied above negation (as e.g. the example above
could not give rise to such readings). Therefore, the default O-exhaustification po-
sition can be overridden and we can exhaustify below negation, as shown in (53).
(53) a. • (i) Juan no corrio´ hasta las dos, no corrio´ para nada ‘Juan didn’t run
until two, he did not run at all’ OR
• (ii) Juan no corrio´ hasta las dos, pero hasta las tres ‘Juan didn’t run
until two, but until three.’
b. OALTt0 (Juan corrio´ hasta las dos
ALTt0) = ∃e[running(e) ∧Ag(e) =
j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧ τ(e) abuts [t0, 2] ∧¬∃e[running(e)∧Ag(e) =
j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 3] ∧ τ(e) abuts [t0, 3]]]
c. ¬OALTt0(Juan corrio´ hasta las dosALTt0) =¬∃e[running(e)∧Ag(e) =
j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2] ∧ τ(e) abuts [t0, 2] ∨∃e[running(e)∧Ag(e) =
j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 3] ∧ τ(e) abuts [t0, 3]]]
O-exhaustification of the positive assertion gives us back the interruption inference,
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which is added to the asserted content, as in (53b): Juan ran until 2 and he stopped
running at 2. When we negate such a result, we obtain either that (i) it is not the
case that there is a running event of Juan between t0 and 2 abutting [t0, 2] or that (ii)
there are running events within a larger interval that does not stop at 2. The former
disjunct can give us the ‘not at all’ reading corresponding to the ‘throughout-not’
interpretation. In other words, if there is no running event by Juan at all it also
follows that there is no running abutting [t0, 2]. This first option conforms to the
common ground of ‘in fact he didn’t run at all’ in (50b). On the other hand, the
second disjunct in (53c) can give us the ‘but until 3’ interpretation when this is the
one salient in context. The second disjunct in the resulting derivation expresses that
there are instantiations of e within a larger interval, one that for example ends at 3.
This corresponds to the reading in (50c): it is not the case that Juan ran until 2 and
stopped at 2, since he continued until (say) 3.
In sum, the existential analysis of Spanish hasta can also capture the various
interpretations that arise when a time-frame adverbial modifies durative predicates
in negative environments. From O-exhaustification above negation we can obtain
the inference that derives from a ‘not-throughout’ interpretation (e.g. ‘but until 1’).
However, when necessary, taking into account the given common ground, we can
also O-exhaustify below negation and end up negating either the existence of any
eventuality at all (leading to a ‘throughout-not’ reading) or the interruption infer-
ence obtained from positive contexts (corresponding to a ‘but until 3’ reading). Ob-
serve that a further consequence of the existential analysis is that factivity does not
obligatorily arise with durative predicates under ‘throughout-not’ interpretations.
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At best, it is left as an ignorance inference. It could simply be obtained as a conver-
sational implicature from the ‘throughout-not’ reading, in line with the fact that in
Spanish we can easily follow with a ‘not at all’ interpretation.
5.5.3 Atomic punctual predicates under negation and factivity
With regard to atomic punctual predicates (i.e. punctual predicates that take singular
DP-arguments), hasta can modify them in negative environments since the plural
implicature disappears. Furthermore, recall that these do not trigger the ‘abutting’
condition as they satisfy the atomicity condition. When this is the case, the use of
hasta gives rise to a factive inference, which is also non-defeasible in Spanish. The
example in (54) sounds odd because Juan is somehow expected to get married after













# ‘Juan didn’t get married until he died.’
In (55) I exemplify how factivity comes about for a negated punctual predicate like
Juan no llego´ hasta las dos ‘Juan didn’t arrive until two.’ The assertion just states
that there are no arrivals of Juan between t0 and 2. The ‘abutting’ condition cannot
apply here since the arriving event is atomic. The entailment pattern that we obtain
with negated existential hasta and with the absence of the ‘abutting’ condition is
that superintervals are not entailed by the prejacent whereas subintervals are, as
shown below in (55).
(55) a. Juan no llego´ hasta las dosALTt0 ‘Juan didn’t arrive until two.’
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b. ¬∃e[arriving(e) ∧Ag(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2]]
c. Entailment Relation: [t0, 1]x [t0, 2]x [t0, 3]
no arrival of Juan in [t0, 2] ⊆ no arrival of Juan in [t0, 1] * no arrival
of Juan in [t0, 3]
If there is no arrival of Juan between t0 and 2, that entails that there is no arrival
of Juan within any subset of the relevant interval, but there could be an arrival of
Juan in a superinterval. Suppose [t0, 3] is such a relevant superinterval. Hence, the
alternative ‘Juan didn’t arrive until three’ is factored into the meaning and must be
obligatorily denied. Such a derivation is illustrated in (56).
(56) a. Negated Assertion: ¬∃e[arriving(e) ∧Ag(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2]]
b. Not entailed ALTt0: ¬∃e[arriving(e)∧Ag(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 3]]
c. Factive Inference: OALTt0(Juan no llego´ hasta las dosALTt0) = (56a)
∧¬ (56b)
≡ ¬∃e[arriving(e)∧Ag(e) = j ∧ τ(e) ⊆ [t0, 2]∧∃e[arriving(e)∧








A sentence such as Juan no llego´ hasta las dos ‘Juan didn’t arrive until two’ indi-
cates that there is no arrival of Juan between t0 and 2. This does not entail that there
is no arrival of Juan between t0 and 3. When exhaustified, the assertion implicates
that there is an arrival of Juan between t0 and 3 placed at some point after 2 (since
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the truth of the prejacent is maintained). Overall, the factive inference originates
with punctual predicates that take singular DP-arguments under negation. The actu-
alization of the negated punctual predicate is expected to occur at some point after
the time indicated by the hasta-phrase. An exhaustification-based account for exis-
tential hasta is able to predict such an inference in the same way as universal until is
but only for non-durative predicates, those for which the ‘abutting’ condition does
not apply (as otherwise the ‘abutting’ condition reverses the entailment pattern, as
illustrated in §5.5.2).
In contrast with durative predicates, exhaustification below negation is not an
option for non-iterative punctual predicates that take singular DP-arguments since
their assertion in positive environments already comes out deviant due to the fact
that they cannot satisfy the plural implicature that winds up being added to their
meaning. For instance, Juan llego´ hasta las dos ‘Juan arrived until two’ is deviant.
In the present theory, this cashes out as a contradiction because the plural impli-
cature associated with it clashes with common knowledge. The alternatives will
have the same shape as the assertion and exhaustifying with respect to them will
still be contradictory (i.e. saying that ‘John arrived until two’ is the only relevant
alternative that is true is clearly as contradictory as the prejacent). Exhaustification
is hence trivial and ruled out. The symbol ‘7’ below indicates that exhaustification
below negation of a non-iterative punctual predicate modified by hasta is trivial:
(57) 7 ¬ OALTt0 (Juan llego´ hasta las dos) ‘Juan arrived until two’
All in all, factivity of punctual predicates with singular DPs under negation
directly follows from an exhaustification-based account of existential hasta and no
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other inferences are predicted, conforming to the facts described above. A very in-
teresting prediction about the existential setup is that factivity is only clear with
punctual predicates. For example, the exhaustification-based analysis of Spanish
hasta captures the factivity that arises with punctual predicates in a very straight-
forward manner, whereas the factivity with durative predicates is left open, as seen
in §5.5.2 above. This is significant when compared against the literature on the puz-
zle of punctual until. Recall that an observation introduced in §2.2.1 in Chapter 2
was that in languages that seem to use a different lexical item to give rise to the
factive inference, their durative until when combined with atelic predicates under
negation is not factive in that the actualization of the event does not arise. This was
illustrated for German, Dutch, and Greek. The behavior in these languages seems
to parallel the predictions we are obtaining for an existential-type of ‘until.’
5.5.4 Summing up
An exhaustification-based account where relevant temporal alternatives of the pre-
jacent are factored into meaning and exhaustified correctly explains the various
meanings of factivity and interruption inferences based on scalar reasoning asso-
ciated with hasta-phrases, where, for instance, factivity of hasta is a direct predic-
tion. Finally, even though underlyingly the logical components of existential hasta
are different from English until, we reach practically the same conclusions as with
universal until when it comes to temporal scalarity and scalar reasoning. No matter
whether durative until is expressed universally or existentially in a given language, it
will give rise to almost the same temporal scalar inferences, which further explains
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the close parallelism between English until and Spanish hasta. The only difference
is that the factivity of Spanish hasta is not derived when O-exhaustifying negated
durative predicates (in line with the fact that for those it seems to be cancellable
since other interpretations may obtain, e.g. ‘but until 1’, ‘but until 3’, or even ‘not
at all’). This suggests interesting cross-linguistic consequences between languages
that have existential vs. universal quantification in their untils that remain to be fur-
ther investigated in future work.31 A table summarizing the various inferences that
can emerge from O-exhaustification of durative and punctual predicates modified
by hasta-phrases is provided below with examples that suppose <1, 2, 3> to be the
relevant scale:
Scopal position Type of inference Translated example
O (Juan corrio´ hasta las 2) interruption inference Juan ran until 2 (and not until 3 pm).
¬ O (Juan corrio´ hasta las 2) ¬ interruption inference Juan didn’t run until 2, but until 3.
OR ¬ O (Juan corrio´ hasta las 2) ‘not at all’ reading John didn’t run until 2 pm, he didn’t run at all.
O ¬ (Juan corrio´ hasta las 2) inference from ‘not-throughout’ reading Juan didn’t run until 2, but until 1.
O ¬ (Juan llego´ hasta las 2) factive inference with singular punctual events John didn’t arrive until 2, he arrived after 2.
Table 5.1: A summary of the various possibilities of O-exhaustification of Spanish
hasta-XPs
31Even though I have not included the inferences that would derive from an even-based exhaus-
tification operator in the present discussion for Spanish hasta, a ‘later-than-expected’ inference is
expected to also arise with punctual predicates. This would originate in the same way as it did for
English until in Chapter 4, since the same entailment patterns between the prejacent and its relevant
temporal alternatives hold under those circumstances.
232
5.6 A potential cross-linguistic prediction from exis-
tential vs. universal ‘until’
A final implication of positing a cross-linguistic contrast between languages that
realize their corresponding durative until existentially, as in Spanish, vs. languages
that embody it universally, as in English, is the prediction that languages that have
an overt NPI counterpart, like Greek, may be restricted to those with the existential
variant of durative until. For this, recall that NPIs are usually interpreted with ex-
istential semantics (e.g. Krifka 1995, Chierchia 2004, 2006, 2013). The contrast in
Greek would ideally consist of a simple PPI/NPI contrast, where there is a natural
variant that lexicalizes differently under negation (e.g. similar to some/any).
First, recall the overt Greek PPI/NPI contrast in (58), where Greek para
mono ‘NPI variant’ is used instead of Greek mehri ‘PPI durative until’ with a punc-
































‘Gianis didn’t arrive until two.’ (but arrived at some point after two)
If it is indeed the case that Greek chooses to realize such an existential time-frame
adverbial available at UG for durative mehri ‘until’, another immediate prediction
follows: such a language should also not block cumulative readings. This predic-
tion is indeed borne out, as observed in (59), where durative mehri allows for a
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# ‘Thirty people arrived until two.’
Such a prediction of at least this major cross-linguistic correlation calls for addi-
tional research, which is left for future work.
5.7 Conclusions
All in all, in this chapter we have observed that by comparing two closely related
functions, such as English until and Spanish hasta, we still find significant variation
in their behavior in logical terms to the point that a unified analysis of durative until
and hasta is not viable.
Different logical terms are the basis of such variation. My proposal is that
while until is indeed a universal quantifier as proposed by Dowty, Spanish hasta is
an existential quantifier that modifies plural events, where plurality is to be couched
as an implicature. The plurality requirement on hasta-phrases accounts for the im-
possibility of hasta combining with non-iterative punctual predicates that take sin-
gular DP-arguments. This has two further important consequences: (i) cumulative
readings are possible and (ii) the plural implicature disappears under negation, ex-
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plaining why punctual events are grammatical in such contexts. This predicts at
least two major cross-linguistic patterns in the nature of durativity of until-XPs.
Finally, with the help of recent theories of scalar implicatures, and taking
into account that time is scalar, the factive behavior associated with punctual pred-
icates modified by hasta in negative environments can be automatically captured
by assuming that temporal scalar alternatives are always ‘active’, and hence obliga-
torily factored into meaning. In a manner similar to the exhaustification-based ap-
proach to English until, different interpretations may obtain depending on whether
exhaustification of the scalar alternatives takes place above or below negation. But,
most importantly, regardless of whether the ‘atelic requirement’ is encoded in the
assertive content via universal quantification or as a plural implicature that disap-
pears under negation, practically the same scalar inferences can be derived for both
English until and Spanish hasta. However, there is one crucial difference: under
the existential analysis, factivity is only obvious with punctual predicates under
negation. Hence, in choosing between the existential- and the universal-based ver-
sions of ‘until’, (i) cancellable factivity with atelic predicates under ‘throughout-
not’ readings as well as (ii) a broader acceptability of durative meanings, such as





In this dissertation I have argued that a unified account of words that describe tem-
poral delimitation, in particular ‘until’-like phrases that bound events in time, is
desirable, and I have developed a monosemy theory that shows how this is possible.
In order to do so, I argued that the ambiguity exhibited between durative until and
punctual until intralinguistically is not lexical for languages like Spanish or English
that do not make a lexical distinction, contra fairly recent accounts in the spirit of
Giannakidou (2002) and Condoravdi (2008) proposing instead a scopal analysis.
This analysis explained a range of facts about the properties of ‘until’ words across
languages. For example, a well-known characteristic that these ‘until’ words typi-
cally have in common is their inability to modify non-iterative telic predicates save
for in negative environments (e.g. #John arrived until 2 pm vs. John didn’t arrive
until 2 pm). When negation is present, they furthermore trigger a factive inference
236
about the occurrence of the event described by the negated telic predicate in a future
time (John didn’t arrive until 2 pm entails John’s arrival at 2 pm or sometime there-
after). However, when we compared this general assumption of ‘until’-like phrases
between English until and Spanish hasta, there emerged a few critical differences
between the two, which suggest that the two words do not have the same meaning.
Spanish hasta is less restrictive than English until in that it might be able to modify
non-iterative telic predicates as long as they are durative, such as accomplishments,
or achievements on scopeless cumulative readings (e.g. 30 personas llegaron hasta
las 2 vs. #‘30 people arrived until 2’). Despite all their other close similarities, this
key distinction between these two closely related forms of ‘until’s made it non-
viable to give them exactly the same denotation in logical terms. This lead us to
conclude that within the monosemy theory there must be parameterization in the
quantification that ‘until’ words in different languages exhibit. Such a conclusion
has interesting consequences cross-linguistically, which I outline next.
On the one hand, English until can be articulated in terms of universal quan-
tification over time intervals for which the modified predicate must hold following
an account in the spirit of Dowty (1979). For this, I refined an account such as this
within a framework of event semantics a` la Champollion (2015), where a verb’s
event variable is existentially bound at the verb level so that it takes the lowest
possible scope. Additionally, if we further assumed that until-phrases must attach
as low as possible where the result does not generate a logical contradiction and
that they can only be extraposed in case of strengthening their meaning, then the
atelic vs. telic distinction of until simply followed from semantic scopal economy
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considerations, reminiscent of Fox (1995). As a consequence, this scopal account
of universal ‘until’ predicts that in English until behaves on a par with other low
universal temporal adverbials, like for-adverbials, which since Carlson (1977a, b)
have also been known to take low scope with respect to other scope bearing ele-
ments in the clause. Such a prediction was indeed borne out. Yet, beyond scope,
one crucial differentiation was at stake: their ability or inability to give rise to non-
defeasible factive inferences. I demonstrated that it is also possible to capture this
contrast in a unified fashion. Taking into account the scalarity of time, it followed
that temporal phrases showed active temporal scalar alternatives. However, there is
parameterization in whether they do so obligatorily or optionally. English until does
so obligatorily and its factivity, together with other scalar inferences that it triggers,
simply emerges in the form of an obligatory scalar implicature. For only option-
ally triggers scalar inferences, explaining the cancelability of the factive inference.
Overall, I showed that it is possible to rescue Mittwoch’s (1977) scopal account of
English until-phrases by updating it to a quantificational event semantics with the
help of an exhaustification-based approach to scalar inferences, e.g. along the lines
specified in Chierchia (2013).
On the other hand, Spanish hasta can be translated as an existential adverbial
of temporal framing in line with an account in the spirit of Krifka (1998). I have put
forth an analysis in which the durative component of hasta is linked with plural-
ity of events and emerges as a plural implicature, following recent accounts of DP
plurality such as Spector (2007). This proposal of existential ‘until’ predicted that
hasta-phrases in positive contexts are only able to bind plural events in time, i.e.
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when the relevant eventuality described by the predicate can be decomposed into
subevents of the same kind (e.g. primarily following Kratzer 2008). Additionally,
the way we defined plurality opened the possibility for an existential-type adver-
bial to acquire a cumulative interpretation. This more complicated route eventually
paid off when the plural requirement vanished under negation, since negation could
be treated logically with no need to resort to a fusion-based treatment. Ultimately,
when factoring into their meaning their temporal scalar alternatives, in a way famil-
iar from English until, non-cancellable factivity is only a direct prediction for punc-
tual predicates under negation, as supported by the data in Spanish. The existential
version of ‘until’ is thus quite distinct from other universal measure phrases. This
gives rise to additional atelic interpretations and predicts the possibility of finding
languages in which their punctual ‘until’ counterpart has lexicalized differently un-
der negation, considering the rarity of NPIs with ‘universal’ semantics (e.g. Krifka
1995, Chierchia 2004). Thus, this is what, for example, I suggest has happened in
the case of Greek.
The cross-linguistic picture of ‘until’-like words in the temporal domain is
schematized in the table below. Note that the proposed lexical semantic contrast
between an existential and a universal ‘until’ word is attested across languages and
not within one language.
Existential Universal
Single lexical entry Spanish hasta English until & for-adverbials
Double lexical entry Greek mehri vs. para mono N/A
Table 6.1: The cross-linguistic parametric picture of temporal ‘until’-like particles
I
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A further generalization that seems to emerge from Table 6.1 is that we might ex-
pect to find an existential variant of for-adverbials in certain languages, in the same
way as there is a universal and existential version of until. I would like to end this
existential vs. universal typological pattern by leaving the following hypothesis for
future work. English in weeks (in-XPs), as in John hasn’t met Mary in weeks (vs.
#John met/has met Mary in weeks) could potentially be the NPI-counterpart of an
existential version of for-adverbials. If such a version were to be overt, we could
begin by looking into during-type adverbials. At a first glance, these do seem to be
more permissive than for-adverbials in terms of durative interpretations that they
receive since, for example, they seem to allow for scopeless cumulative interpreta-
tions, as in Many/thirty people arrived during a period of two hours. Needless to
say, this is an appealing path worth pursuing as it would fit right into the typological
picture, but requires further investigation.
Last, we also predict that there could be another parameter at play in the
cross-linguistic picture of words that describe durations of events: obligatory vs.
optional exhaustification of their temporal alternatives. Above I had suggested that
only ‘until’-phrases and not ‘for’-adverbials obligatorily exhaustify. However, this
was left largely as a lexical fact, and it is at least possible in principle for this prop-
erty to vary independently, predicting further cross-linguistic variation.1 In prin-
ciple, we might expect there to be a language whose existential or universal for-
counterpart obligatorily has active temporal alternatives that need to be brought
into its meaning and exhaustified. For instance, if that were the case, we would ex-
1I would like to thank Hans Kamp for discussion on the parametric picture that we are predicting.
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pect to find a language whose for counterpart can generate non-defeasible factive
inferences in negative contexts when modifying telic predicates. Table 6.1 can be
finally augmented to include this additional parameter:
Existential Universal
Single lexical entry Spanish hasta English until & for-adverbials
Double lexical entry Greek mehri vs. para mono N/A
‘Until’ Counterpart ‘For’ counterpart
Obligatory exh Spanish hasta, Greek para mono, English until ?
Optional exh Greek mehri for-adverbials
Table 6.2: The cross-linguistic parametric picture of temporal ‘until’-like particles
II
‘Until’ counterpart in Table 6.2 refers to durative adverbials that express the right-
boundary of the duration of the interval, whereas ‘for’ counterpart stands for measure-
phrases that express the total duration of the interval, i.e. when the noun phrase gov-
erned by ‘for’ is a genuine measure phrase. I would thus like to take a more cross-
linguistic approach in future work to discover which factors are indeed universal
and which are subject to parametric variation and how constrained this variation is.
6.2 Looking ahead: extending the system to other do-
mains
Recall from Chapter 1 that Spanish hasta has other functions beyond the temporal
domain, illustrated again in (1). In space, it can mark the limit of a path in a motion
construction (Beavers 2008a, Beavers et al. 2010, Bassa-Vanrell 2013), as in (1a),
which I refer to as spatial hasta. In more abstract domains, it can function as a focus-
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sensitive scalar additive particle that signals the least likely member of a scale,

































‘Juan even came [to the party]F with us.’
Beavers (2008a) generalized over temporal and spatial domains for made ‘until’
in Japanese by leaving open the nature of the object of ‘until’ words that is theta-
related to the event e, which could be a temporal or a spatial path, hence accounting
for uses like (1a) and also temporal uses. However, in the analysis he proposes it is
not clear how this would scale up to also cover more abstract uses like (1b) wherein
the scale in question does not form an entity theta-related to the event. By contrast,
in prior work, e.g. Bassa-Vanrell (2014), I suggested that the theoretical stances and
general notions of scalar reasoning of ‘until’-like particles via activation of scalar
alternatives introduced in this dissertation can be extended to all of these other
domains. I hence argue that it is possible to give a uniform semantic and pragmatic
core to quite seemingly distinct functions of an aspectual marker like Spanish hasta.
This could explain why we find such a multi-functionality of ‘until’-like words
across languages. Overall, I claim that what all these functions have in common is
a strong family resemblance of scalarity, which manifests differently depending on
what types of scalar alternatives the ‘until’-XP computes, which could be based on
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time, paths, or likelihood, all of which are independently scalar in their own way.
In what follows, I will briefly sketch the unifying core of the dominant theoretical
stances across domains.
I posit that there are four identifiable main properties cutting across all uses
of hasta: (i) scalarity, (ii) complexity, (iii) maximality, and (iv) (un)likelihood. For
example, in Bassa-Vanrell (2014), following the analysis of English even in Rooth
(1985) for scalar additive hasta, I claim that spatial hasta also situates its syntactic
complement at the most unlikely point along a scale of (un)likelihood with respect
to contextually relevant scalar alternatives of the same semantic type, and further-
more such a scale cannot be non-gradable. In a programmatic way, I illustrate next
how these properties apply in each of these two new cases of hasta, while drawing
their family resemblance with temporal hasta.
To start, the first prominent property at play is scalarity. In the same way
as temporal hasta activates a temporal scale, additive hasta and spatial hasta also
involve a scale. Such scales are obtained in the same manner: i.e. by replacing
hasta-XP in the prejacent for contextually relevant alternatives of the same form.
What differs is what orders such scales and their domains. In the case of additive
hasta the scale follows from contextually relevant perceptions of likelihood, which
widens the physical domain to more abstract domains. The potential alternatives
under consideration are all the propositions obtained by replacing the focused ex-
pression with expressions of the same semantic type. On the other hand, in the
case of spatial hasta, the path would define the scale at issue (e.g. following Krifka
1998, Beavers 2012). In (2) and (3), I exemplify the domain of the alternatives for
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‘Juan even came [to the party]F with us.’
b. Domain: potential alternatives of the form Juan vino [a X] con nosotros






















‘Juan came up to [the party] with us.’
b. Domain: Narrowly fixed to be events of Juan reaching all of the various
points on the path of motion from Juan’s initial point to the party, i.e.
alternatives of the form Juan vino a [X] con nosotros ‘Juan came to [X]
with us’ for all X along a single path.
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• path1 path2 path3 path4 path5/goal
Fig. 6.2: Representation of a domain of alternatives for spatial hasta
The crucial difference between the two is that in (2) the alternatives do not need to
be narrowly fixed events from Juan’s initial point to his final point. For example, in
a context in which Juan came to class with us in the morning, and then left us to go
to his place to get lunch, and finally came back to the university in the afternoon to
come to a party with us in the evening, the event of Juan’s coming to class with us
in the morning could still be considered as a potential alternative in the domain of
additive hasta, but not in the domain of spatial hasta.
The second shared property is complexity. In the same way that the set of
alternatives activated by temporal hasta could not be a singleton set, the scale of
alternatives activated by additive hasta and spatial hasta cannot be non-gradable
either. In other words, there must be at least one other relevant alternative to the
prejacent besides the prejacent itself. In the case of additive hasta, such a property
directly follows from the widely assumed additive component of scalar additive
particles (Rooth 1985, 1992). For instance, suppose a context in which the only
place where Juan is expected to come with us is the party, then the use of hasta in
(2) above is infelicitous. Likewise, the complexity constraint directly follows from
the characteristic that spatial hasta cannot modify a two-point path. For instance,
suppose a context in which Juan and everyone else are standing right outside the
245
gate to the party. In that scenario, the use of hasta in (3) is also deviant, since there
is no relevant subpath (alternative) other than nothing happened.
Third, maximality comes into play. In the same way that temporal hasta in
positive environments gives rise to an interruption inference, thus suggesting that it
picks out the endpoint value of the maximal event being modified, additive hasta
and spatial hasta also select the largest event compatible with the entire predicate.
In (2), we infer that ‘Juan coming to the party with us’ is the maximal element
of the scale under consideration. If there were another more contextually salient
alternative, the use of hasta would result in deviance. Likewise, in (3), ‘Juan coming
to the party with us’ represents the maximal event under consideration. In a context
in which Juan even came to a club with us after the party, the use of hasta is correctly
predicted to be infelicitous.
Last, all alternatives are ranked according to a certain degree of likelihood.
Remember that for temporal hasta, I suggested that the entailment relation between
the alternatives activated a salient probability measure which could explain, for in-
stance, the emergence of readings such as the ‘later-than-expected’ interpretation,
or the fact that the longer an eventuality holds the more salient it becomes. In the
case of additive hasta, this follows from the general assumption about English even
in Rooth’s framework wherein the alternatives are ranked along a scale of likeli-
hood. As a consequence, hasta in (2) signals the least likely element of the scale in
question. If ‘Juan coming to the pub with us’ were a more unlikely alternative to
the prejacent, the use of hasta in (2) would be deviant. In a similar way to temporal
hasta, the sense of likelihood of the use of spatial hasta simply derives from the
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properties of the physical world, i.e. the inherent spatial ordering of a path, which
may be interrupted at any moment.
Yet, what is even more interesting about exploring the use of spatial hasta
within this framework is that beliefs of validity on the part of the speaker can also
influence hasta’s acceptability. This analysis has interesting ramifications within
the cross-linguistic Talmyan (1985, 2000) debate as it predicts the acceptability of
‘until’-like markers to introduce a goal in a motion construction in more contexts
than one would otherwise expect. For example, the use of hasta can be acceptable
even when the physical scale that hasta introduces seems to be, on the surface, a
two-point path, as illustrated in (4b) in opposition to (4a).













‘Juan walked up to the chair.’














‘Juan walked up to the chair’ or ‘Juan managed to walk up to the
chair.’
Under the conditions in (4b) where the path is superficially short, one theoretically
expects the use of hasta to be deviant (e.g. Beavers 2008a). The system we have
built for aspectual markers based on scalar reasoning and exhaustification of alter-
natives is able to predict that the use of hasta is allowed and furthermore acquires
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a ‘manage’-type reading thanks to our own perception of likelihood that causes us
to view the path to the goal as longer than we otherwise would, hence incrementing
the gradability of the scale in question. Previous theories have noticed such a pecu-
liar behavior of spatial ‘until’-like particles2 but could not appropriately account for
all the cases in a unifying manner. Instead, a theory that factors into the meaning
of ‘until’-like particles the relevant scalar alternatives ranked in terms of a salient
measure provides us the proper tools to uniformly explain their behavior, not only
in the spatial domain but also in the temporal and more abstract domains.3 Fully
exploring these connections and formalizing this work to the same level of detail as
for the temporal uses of ‘until’ is left for future work.
2See Beavers (2008a) for an account on -made ‘until’ in Japanese, which shows a very similar
pattern to Spanish hasta.
3Other uses which I have not discussed but that also seem to share this unified core of familiarity
is the use of hasta as a numeral modifier and as a degree modifier, represented below in (ia) and (ib),
































‘John is so tall that he (even) touches the ceiling.’
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